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ABSTRACT 
RECONCILING DICHOTOMIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: 
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CARL D. BRELL, JR., B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Ed.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Philip Eddy 
Recent decades have witnessed the growing emergence of a 
conception of higher learning as entailing the interaction of individual 
tendencies with physical and social conditions. The present study 
explores the theoretical and practical implications of this conception 
across several key areas of the literature, including higher education 
reform, critical thinking, moral education, college writing, and college 
teaching. 
Generally speaking, educational interactionism is the attempt to 
explain intellectual and moral growth in terms of the ongoing and 
reciprocal interaction of human beings and their physical and social 
environments. It accordingly seeks to reconcile the historical antipathy 
between inner-directed theories (rationalism, idealism, romanticism) 
and outer-directed theories (empiricism, positivism, essentialism) of 
human agency, meaning, and growth. In terms of educational 
practice, educational interactionism seeks to resolve the persistent 
VI 
tension between attention to students' individual needs and interests 
and the transmission of a socially viable body of subject matter. It 
does so chiefly by asserting that neither has any meaning without the 
other. 
In projecting this interactive conception across what are for the 
most part discrete literatures, the present study seeks to illustrate 
how similar principles operate across these areas and to encourage 
dialogue between them. It should be viewed as a first step in a larger 
effort to integrate and clarify the general features of an interactive 
educational conception, eliminate many present inconsistencies, and 
outline its implications for educational policy and teaching practice. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BELIEF AS A CONDITION OF KNOWLEDGE; 
THE NEED FOR A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
IN THE REFORM OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
In his recent study, College: The Undergraduate Experience in 
Americg,^ Ernest Boyer writes urgently of the need for a guiding 
vision of iiberal education which would give meaning and direction to 
American undergraduate institutions. Like many educational observers, 
Boyer is disturbed by the divisions he sees both between colleges and 
the larger human community and within colieges themselves. Arguing 
that the undergraduate experience plays a unique and crucial role in 
preparing people for productive and meaningful lives in an 
interdependent worid, Boyer maintains that above ail else colleges 
need to foster a sense of integrity and responsibiiity in the minds and 
hearts of undergraduates. To do this, he maintains, colleges must 
themselves forge connections between the various aspects of campus 
life such that all facets of the college experience contribute towards 
the ideal of the liberally educated person: a person who understands 
and appreciates the shared concerns of humanity and who uses her 
knowledge, skills, and habits of lifelong learning both as vehicles of 
personal growth and fulfillment and in the service of others. 
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Boyer outlines a broad sketch of concrete recommendations - 
from clarifying admission requirements to creating more meaningful 
student living arrangements to improving institutional governance - 
for revitalizing American colleges. At the heart of his proposals lies an 
academic program comprised of three main components: an 
"integrated core” of liberal learning, an "enriched major" which 
complements rather than supplants general education, and a four-year 
language requirement" wherein the development of reading, 
speaking, listening, and, above all, writing skills forms an integral part 
of all course work. The idea behind this program is, first, to lead 
students towards a greater understanding and appreciation of the 
place of their specialized and general knowledge in the larger context 
of humanity's shared concerns, and, secondly, to help them learn to 
apply that knowledge towards improving the quality of life as a whole, 
with the understanding that learning so applied is essential to a 
fulfilling life. 
Approaching the topic from a somewhat different perspective, 
the Study Group on the Conditions of Excellence in American Higher 
Education, in a study entitled Involvement in Learning: Realizing the 
Potential of American Higher Education.^ focuses less on a 
comprehensive analysis of the undergraduate experience and more 
narrowly on certain key conditions of effective higher learning. While 
sharing many of Boyer's basic assumptions about the role of college in 
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producing thoughtful and productive citizens, the Study Group bases 
Its recommendations instead on a theory of effective learning which 
revolves around three principles: student involvement in the learning 
process, clear and public standards of student performance that 
reflect the complexities of genuine learning, and the need for 
appropriate assessment and feedback measures as levers for student 
involvement and guides to teaching improvement. 
In a series of recommendations that bear some remarkable 
similarities to Boyer's, the Study Group emphasizes its conviction that 
educational practices and policy decisions should be based on a clear 
conception of the desired outcomes of liberal learning, rather than on 
the pressures of market demand, as they all too often are. The Study 
Group includes among its list of desired outcomes the abilities to think 
critically, to communicate effectively, and to synthesize and apply 
learning from various disciplines towards the handling of real life 
problems -- outcomes very similar to Boyer's, in substance, if not in 
tone. 
Problem Statement 
The present study takes as its starting point the shared 
conviction that undergraduate education in the United States is in 
need of precisely the sorts of recommendations suggested in these 
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two studies, particularly with regard to establishing a clear and 
unifying vision of the purpose of higher learning. It also recognizes the 
breadth of such an undertaking and accordingly seeks to limit its 
attention to an especially central aspect of the problem: the 
articulation of a philosophically and practically sound conception of 
higher learning, particularly as that conception is manifesting and 
being discussed in four crucial areas of the current literature in higher 
education - critical thinking, moral education, college writing, and 
college teaching. The reason for focusing on the articulation of a 
conception of higher learning is that even the most well-intentioned 
and seemingly constructive educational recommendations will 
inevitably go astray if they are not rooted in a model of learning that is 
sufficiently dynamic to capture the complexities of actual human 
learning. 
The Involvement in Learning study is a good example, for 
despite a wealth of constructive recommendations, it nevertheless 
bases too many of its proposals on an incomplete analysis. For 
instance, the Study Group wisely prescribes that assessment and 
feedback measures "should reflect the level of subtlety and 
complexity at which college subjects are taught and learned" and 
accordingly cautions against reliance on "simplistic multiple-choice 
examinations as measures of student performance."^ But their 
analysis of how assessment and feedback should be used to enhance 
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student involvement" is not entirely consistent with this advice. 
Citing evidence which indicates that "at the elementary and secondary 
levels, clearly and publicly stated high standards of performance act 
as spurs to greater achievement, largely because students come to 
share those standards with their schools," the Study Group assumes 
that the same will hold true at the college level.Reasoning that since 
"students respond positively to information on their performance in 
relation to institutional expectations," the Study Group asserts that 
"[t]he use of assessment information to redirect effort ... serves as a 
powerful lever for student involvement."® 
While clear and public standards are certainly the necessary 
bases upon which all course design, instruction, and evaluation should 
be based, the assumption that students will absorb those standards 
"directly" - simply by being kept apprised of their progress relative to 
them — contradicts what we have come to understand about learning 
in recent years. While it is certainly true that college teachers need to 
develop, communicate, and utilize clear standards, there are 
nevertheless serious psychological, ethical, and epistemological 
difficulties which suggest that basing an assessment policy on the 
assumption that students will thereby adopt those standards could 




In the first place, developmental research® would seem to 
indicate fairly conclusively that while external standards issued from 
persons in authority are major determinants of the values and 
perspectives of children and even adolescents, the influence of such 
standards decreases as people mature. The college years in particular 
seem to be marked by major reconstructions of a person's cognitive 
structures and values based on a complex network of criteria issuing 
from cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and environmental factors. 
The Study Group acknowledges this widely accepted fact 
when, in an effort to balance the need for student autonomy with its 
own objectives, it suggests that "colleges should understand what 
students expect, and should reciprocate by clearly communicating to 
students the learning objectives of college-level programs and 
courses".^ While this recommendation seems fair enough, it 
completely bypasses the questions (1) of how to reconcile student 
and institutional expectations when they conflict, and, more 
importantly, (2) of how to lead students to see and embrace (or 
intelligently reconstruct) institutional standards as a function of their 
own autonomous judgement rather than because of the power of 
institutions to grant or deny credit. All ethical considerations aside, 
the developmental evidence indicates that there are good reasons to 
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doubt the psychological adequacy of standards which students 
themselves have not adopted through their own autonomous 
deliberations. While I am no more suggesting that "student 
expectations should arbitrarily govern curriculum and the content of 
individual courses"® than is the Study Group, I am saying that the 
interaction between student expectations and institutional standards is 
more complex psychologically than the Study Group's proposals 
would indicate. 
Ethical Difficulties 
In addition to these psychological difficulties, there are closely 
related ethical considerations which pertain to the Study Group's 
recommendations concerning the role of institutional standards and 
assessment measures in securing student involvement. The Study 
Group acknowledges that "Learning is enhanced when both 
expectations and standards are clear, and when they are actively 
shared by faculty and students."® But everything would seem to 
depend on how students come to share such an understanding. If one 
of the goals of a college education is, as both the Involvement in 
Learning and Boyer studies maintain, to produce open-minded, 
thoughtful, and autonomous moral agents, it seems vital that we 
respect students' right to construct their own standards, guides, and 
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characters through independently arrived judgments, as opposed to 
any form of indoctrination, no matter how benevolent. 
For one thing, the psychological evidence cited earlier suggests 
that moral principles arrived at by any means other than autonomous 
deliberations are relatively unstable psychologically and inadequate for 
active participation in our democratic way of life. Moreover, it would 
seem that only the moral agent who arrives at her principles of 
tolerance, exchange, and personal and social integrity independently 
can be trusted to uphold those standards under duress and to help 
others develop in the same direction. Finally, the moral question of 
how to balance students' rights to their own values and standards 
with institutional expectations is far from settled. In this regard, the 
Study Group's recommendation that assessment information be used 
to secure student involvement comes dangerously close to coercion. 
None of this is to suggest that students should arbitrarily set 
the moral tone or agenda of their schools, but it is to say that clear 
and public standards and assessment measures, while certainly 
necessary conditions of effective formal learning, are insufficient to 
the development of autonomous morality in students. While the goal 
is obviously not to free students from the responsibility of measuring 
up to institutional expectations, neither is it to get them to adhere to 
impersonal standards of performance and "excellence," the bases and 
implications of which they do not fully grasp, no matter how valid 
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those standards may be from the viewpoint of the institution. In short, 
the moral intricacies involved in the balancing of students' reasoning 
and institutional expectations would suggest the need for a more 
thorough consideration of the role institutional standards play in 
students' moral development than that implied by the Study Group's 
recommendations. 
Epistemological Diffictjlries 
A third area of difficulty with the Study Groups' proposal, and 
one which requires a longer exposition, is epistemological. The Study 
Group quite correctly stresses the importance of designing educational 
policies and practices in the light of a clear understanding of desired 
student outcomes and accordingly cautions against the superficial use 
of vague and grandiose terms like "critical thinking" and "value 
education" as substitutes for concrete statements of observable 
objectives. In their effort to define student outcomes in concrete 
terms, however, the Study Group chooses behavioral indicators that 
do not well reflect the epistemological difficulties involved in making 
attributions of knowledge and commitment. 
Consider, for example, this passage on "student involvement": 
Highly involved students demonstrate their commitment 
in a variety of ways: by devoting considerable energy to 
studying, by working at on-campus rather than off- 
campus jobs, by participating actively in student 
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organizations, and by interacting frequently with faculty 
members and student peers.’® 
While these indicators may accurately reflect certain types of 
involvement, they are neither sufficient nor even necessary conditions 
of learning. That they are not necessary is evidenced by those highly 
involved students who do not exhibit these behaviors. (The one 
exception here is that highly involved students clearly do devote 
"considerable energy" to studying, but this is the one indicator in the 
Study Group's list which is not an observable behavior. Devoting 
"energy" to studying can assume many different forms, most of 
which are impervious to simplistic behavioral descriptions.) That these 
indicators are not sufficient conditions of learning is illustrated in the 
following statement by a typical high school senior in the Boyer study: 
"Students don't join the French Club to experience French culture but 
because Yale will be impressed."” If colleges were to require 
evidence of commitment on the basis of such observable behaviors, 
one can easily imagine students going through the motions of "being 
involved" without actually learning anything. 
While the Study Group assuredly has in mind more substantive 
indicators of academic achievement, their emphasis on assessment as 
a lever for securing student involvement is prone to the same basic 
difficulty: students would be too likely to try to perform in accordance 
with external standards they did not necessarily embrace or 
comprehend. How often, for example, have we, as college teachers 
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striving to get our students to think more deeply, creatively, or 
critically about something, had students respond to even our explicit 
requirements and feedback with questions such as these: "So you 
want me to take a position?" "So you want me to cite my sources?" " 
So I should try looking at things from other viewpoints?" Any teacher 
who has experienced the frustration of such responses knows that 
explicit statements of what we expect from students, even when 
coupled with careful feedback as to how well students have met 
those expectations, are still no guarantee that students will really get 
them, in the sense of believing and adopting them as active principles 
of their own reasoning. It is just as probable that students will only 
adopt our imposed standards for classroom purposes, while resorting 
in real-life to whatever standards happen actually to guide them. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that clear and public 
statements of objectives are unimportant. On the contrary, they are 
the very foundation upon which all effective teaching, course design, 
and evaluation are based, and students certainly benefit from 
knowing, as precisely as possible, both what it is we expect from 
them and how well their work measures up to those standards. But 
securing involvement in learning is not so simple a matter as making 
explicit our expectations and evaluating students' performance 
accordingly, though the Study Group is quite right that the adoption 
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of such measures could make for a substantial improvement in much 
of the teaching that goes on. 
Genuine teaching requires something more. Specifically, it 
requires engagement of and interaction with students' existing beliefs. 
To overlook this dimension of teaching would be to take inadequate 
account of the belief component in knowledge, particularly of the way 
people at all levels of cognitive development structure and commit 
themselves to their own knowledge/belief systems. 
Three Conditions of Knowledge 
The prevailing contemporary view of knowledge is often 
formulated as follows: 
S knows P 
if and only if: 
(i) S believes P, 
(ii) S has adequate evidence of P, 
and (iii) P is true.^^ 
A frequent criticism of school learning’^ is that it often satisfies (i) 
and (iii) but not (ii). In other words, it is often the case that students 
will "learn" something and come to believe it without having adequate 
reasons for doing so. In such cases, they could be said to be in 
possession of "true opinions" but not "knowledge." 
In a similar manner, it is equally possible for school learning to 
satisfy (ii) and (iii) but not (i). In this case, students are given, and can 
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reproduce on demand, "adequate” reasons for something generally 
taken to be true, while not actually subscribing to it themselves. As a 
writing teacher, for example, I have often received solid papers 
arguing particular viewpoints, only later to discover in informal 
discussions or tutorials that the students themselves held entirely 
different opinions but felt they couldn't defend them in accordance 
with the standards they believed both I and other teachers required. In 
contrast, the students who take such conflicts as opportunities to 
examine more critically the grounds for their own beliefs are precisely 
the ones who are also willing to challenge external standards — the 
irony, of course, being that in so doing they engage in precisely the 
kind of thinking and learning we are trying to teach. To state the point 
directly: it is those students who are driven to construct and justify 
their own standards, by both challenging and entering into dialogue 
with what are otherwise imposed standards, who engage in genuine 
college level learning. 
Of course, for students merely to challenge external standards 
is not enough. It is for this reason that I include "entering into 
dialogue with existing standards" as a condition of genuine college 
level learning. Much could be (and will be) said about this condition, 
but the crucial point for now is that genuine college level learning, like 
all genuine learning, involves the engagement and reworking of 
students' beliefs and belief systems. And merely providing explicit 
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standards and feedback does not ensure such involvement. To be 
genuinely involved, students must be motivated by something other 
than grades or their need for approval or the desire to measure up; 
they must be motivated by challenges, both indirect and direct, to 
their existing beliefs and belief systems. Only when they are brought 
to the point where they question the grounds of their own 
’knowledge," beliefs, and convictions will they become genuinely 
engaged in learning. 
Scheffler's Analysis 
Israel Scheffler's analysis of the belief condition of 
knowledge’'^ both supports and enlightens this thesis. Scheffler 
begins by rejecting the theory, put forth, among others, by B.F. 
Skinner^®, that belief manifests itself as the tendency to produce 
certain verbal responses in answer to questioning -- largely on the 
grounds that many other factors than belief can account for even 
ingrained tendencies towards given verbal responses (e.g., desire for 
approval, fear of punishment, ulterior motive, extenuating 
circumstances, etcetera).’® It is, moreover, often the case that a 
person believes he subscribes to a belief while acting in a way that is 
completely at odds with it. For example, Oliver North and his admirers 
quite obviously believed themselves champions of democracy yet 
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sanctioned the most undemocratic behaviors. Or again, a man may 
sincerely "believe" in the equality of men and women yet in his 
relations with women treat them as inferiors. 
Such instances would seem to suggest that attributions of 
belief must be based more broadly on a person's actual physical 
behaviors over time than on merely verbal responses in specific 
situations. Charles S. Peirce’^ suggested such a view with his 
pragmatic notion that belief ultimately manifests itself "operationally" 
as a general disposition to act in certain ways. Scheffler, however, 
rejects this notion as still too narrow, on the grounds that the actual 
factors affecting all behaviors are too numerous, complex, and 
intertwined to permit attributions of any single belief.’® For example, 
to suppose that a man who believed it was slushy outside would wear 
his galoshes would be to assume a variety of things which were 
logically independent of that belief: "that he wants to go out, wants 
to keep his feet dry, believes that his galoshes will serve the purpose, 
does not feel in too much of a hurry to put them on, et cetera..."’® 
As Scheffler sees it, beliefs themselves are so inescapably 
interlocked, not only with other beliefs but with attitudes, aims, and 
circumstances, that the only way to describe any one belief is to look 
at the whole system of attitudes, aims, contextual factors, and related 
beliefs that support it.^° Scheffler ends up settling on the view that 
"belief is ... a 'theoretical' state characterizing, in subtle ways, the 
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orientation of the person in the world" and cannot be reduced to 
descriptions which rely solely on discrete observable phenomena.^’ 
Implications for Higher Learning 
This view has important educational implications, particularly 
for higher learning, as this is the educational level at which the 
process of belief formation becomes deliberate and self-critical. To 
begin with, if by "knowledge" we mean something that students will 
take with them and use in their lives outside of school, then we must 
insist that "belief" is a condition of "knowledge," in any significant 
sense of the latter term. Scheffler's view thus suggests that 
attributions of student knowledge must include evidence that they 
have constructed that knowledge in such a way as to function 
harmoniously within their active belief systems. It further implies that 
the process of belief/knowledge formation itself entails the complex 
reconstruction of an entire network of cognitive, emotional, 
perceptual, and behavioral factors, and cannot be reduced to the sort 
of simplistic approbational model implied by the Study Group's 
recommendation that assessment information serve as the means for 
securing student involvement. 
Above all, this analysis suggests that if we want students to 
use their school knowledge as an active part of their lives, we must 
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teach them in such a way that they work out the connections and 
relevance of that knowledge in their own lives for themselves. The 
way to do this is not through the coercive, though well-meaning, use 
of assessment information as a lever for student involvement (for 
coercion is what it amounts to if students do not see the intrinsic 
advantages of adopting those standards for themselves) but rather by 
creating those conditions which lead students to discover for 
themselves the pertinence of those standards in helping them realize 
and modify their own evolving aims and interests. The Study Group's 
recommendation that assessment information be used as a lever for 
student involvement thus misconceives the bases upon which 
students actually become involved in learning and is in general too 
simplistic to serve as an intelligent guide of educational policy and 
practice. 
Hypothesis 
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to suggest 
the psychological, ethical, and epistemological complexity of higher 
learning, and to argue the need for a philosophically sound and 
practically useful conception of higher learning which takes that 
complexity into account. In the process, the thesis that higher learning 
necessarily entails the engagement of students' existing beliefs and 
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belief systems has also been advanced. Taken by itself, this thesis 
would suggest an incomplete conception of learning which puts more 
weight on students' existing beliefs and interests than on subject 
matter. In truth, subject matter figures predominantly in all education, 
though it does not determine the aim of education so much as its 
means. This notion is not self-evident, however, and requires some 
historical and philosophical background. 
First forwarded by John Dewey^^ in the early part of this 
century, and developed most notably since by Lawrence Kohlberg,^^ 
one of the dominant models in educational philosophy today posits 
three basic schools of educational thought and practice: (1) that 
which views education as a shaping from without, (2) that which sees 
it as an unfolding from within, and (3) that which conceives of it as 
the "interaction" of external conditions with internal tendencies. While 
each of these three perspectives prescribes that education should 
move in the direction of growth, the sources, conceptions, and 
hypothetical 'end points' of their respective agendas differ in some 
important ways. For the first school, which Dewey labelled the 
"traditional" approach, but which Kohiberg more accurately named the 
"cultural transmission" school, the aims of education have traditionally 
been defined by the dominant values and knowledge of the culture. 
Education, from this perspective, consists first and foremost of the 
passing on of a common body of accepted knowledge and moral 
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standards from the past, to which the accomplished learner can 
eventually contribute, once initiated into the ranks of 'knowledge 
makers.' Some noteworthy spokespersons of this approach in recent 
years have been William Bennett,^'^ Allan Bloom,and E.D. Hirsch, 
Jr.2« 
The second school, referred to by Kohiberg as "romantic," has 
its roots in Rousseau, and has twice achieved popular acceptance in 
the history of American education: first, during the progressive 
education movement of the early part of this century, and, more 
recently, during the open education, free school, and alternative 
school experiments of the 1960's and 1970's. As educational 
historians Lawrence Cremin^^ and Diane Ravitch^® have both noted, 
the romantic perspective seems periodically to gain force largely as a 
response to perceived shortcomings in the cultural transmission 
approach (which in its turn resurfaces in reaction to the romantic -- 
thus creating the "pendulum" effect so often referred to in educational 
discussions). For our present purposes it is enough to summarize the 
chief criticism romantic educators have advanced against the cultural 
transmission school: that, in setting up as the end of education a fixed 
body of pre-established knowledge and morals, the cultural 
transmission approach tends to overlook students' own interests and 
concerns, resulting in a general failure to secure student involvement 
in the "learning" process. (It is in response to this difficulty. 
19 
incidentally, that the Involvement in Learning study developed its 
recommendation that publically stated standards be used as levers of 
student involvement -- hardly the sort of reform romantic educators 
support.) 
As many educational scholars^® have argued, however, 
despite the legitimacy of the romantic critique, romantic educators 
have tended in practice to go to the opposjte extreme of the cultural 
transmission school and have typically devalued content in education, 
elevating in its place the natural tendencies and interests of students 
themselves. In the 1920's and 1970's in particular, education in this 
country witnessed a general abandoning of teacher authority and 
standard subject matter in favor of students' own inclinations and 
initiatives, which were generally assumed to have an innate, educative 
power of their own. As at least one prominent cultural transmissionist 
(Hirsch, 1987) has argued, the result has been a general decline in the 
amount and quality of shared cultural knowledge. 
Despite its excesses, however, the romantic perspective 
contains some valid principles, not the least of which is that in order 
for learning to take place what goes on in the classroom must be 
continuous with the learner's experience; {the most common mistake 
in this regard comes from construing the meaning of "experience" too 
narrowly as constituting something that is strictly subjective and 
personal, overlooking its objective and social aspects). Some of the 
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more well-known practitioners and/or advocates of this approach 
today include Peter Elbow,^° Carol Gilligan,^’ and the authors of 
what is perhaps the most significant work to come out of the 
romantic perspective in recent years, Women's Wavs of Knowina.^^ 
The third and final perspective in this model has historically 
gone by the label "progressive" education, though it is alternatively 
known as the "interactive" approach — by virtue of the dynamic 
relation it posits between the natural structuring tendencies of 
individuals with an objective environment that both challenges and is 
in turn changed by the explanatory frameworks people impose on 
it.^^ The main proponents of educational interactionism have been 
John Dewey, Lawrence Kohiberg, and Jean Piaget, though a list of 
present-day adherents might include such diverse theorist-practitioners 
as Ann Berthoff, Dwight Boyd, Richard Paul, Richard Rorty, and Israel 
Scheffler. (This perspective should not be confused with Cartesian 
mind-body dualism, which also goes by the name "interactionism" but 
which has no connection to modern educational theory.) For better or 
worse, the term "progressivism" in education has historically been 
associated with the aims and methods of romantic educators. 
Owing to this confusion, and to the fact that "interactive" is more 
descriptive of the actual principles underlying this perspective, we will 
henceforth use the more modern term. 
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Even here, though, the term "interactive" is often used to refer 
generally to such instructional methods as open discussions, peer 
collaboration, and student-centered classrooms, which obviously 
involve a lot of student interaction but which may or may not be 
"interactive" in the sense used here. "Interactionism," as both Dewey 
and Piaget use the term, denotes the ongoing and dynamic process by 
which an individual constructs, tests, and adopts or revises behavioral 
and explanatory frameworks in response to challenges posed by the 
environment. The chief function of education from this perspective is 
to create those conditions which challenge students not only to 
reassess their existing cognitive, affective, and behavioral structures, 
but, more importantly, to develop new ones which are not mere 
extensions of the old but more inclusive and differentiated 
reconstructions of them. The aim of education, according to this view, 
is to get students to the point where they initiate and sustain this 
learning process themselves. 
The role of subject matter in this scheme is a source of much 
educational confusion. Generally speaking, cultural transmissionists 
(e.g., Hirsch) concede the importance of students being actively 
engaged in learning, but not at the expense of absorbing the requisite 
subject matter. Educational romantics (e.g.. Elbow), on the other 
hand, generally acknowledge that transmission of subject matter is 
important, but not at the cost of securing active student involvement 
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in the learning process. As Dewey points out, however, the same 
assumption underlies both positions: that the subject matter which 
schools have traditionally sought to impart stands in some sort of 
opposition to the natural inclinations and interests of students, and 
vice-versa.^® 
From the interactionist perspective, the debate over subject 
matter stems primarily from its being conceived as the end of 
education, rather than as a means to increased understanding, 
appreciation, and control of experience. When subject matter is 
presented as an educational end, as has traditionally been the case, it 
holds no intrinsic attraction for students, and artificial means, such as 
the imposition of external standards (for example, as recommended in 
the Involvement in Learning study -- though, again, it is not the 
standards which are artificial but their use as levers for student 
involvement) must be utilized to coerce students into learning it. The 
typical result is what Alfred North Whitehead refers to as "inert 
ideas,knowledge which students possess but which serves no 
active function in their lives. The solution, however, is not to diminish, 
as romantic educators have typically done, the importance of subject 
matter (or objective standards) in favor of students' natural interests, 
but rather to make the educational function of subject matter more 
closely match its actual social and intellectual function: as a means 
better to understand, appreciate, and control experience. 
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Central to this idea is the interactionist conception of an 
interest not as an end to be pursued for its own sake (which is how 
the romantic educator generally conceives it) but as a dynamic 
tendency in a person's psychological make-up which compels that 
person to try to secure certain ends-in-view, whether they be 
physical, affective, or intellectual in nature. Interest so conceived 
gives us purpose," especially when some challenge in our 
environment frustrates our attempts to secure those ends-in-view. 
And it is this purposefulness in the face of an unaccommodating 
environment which compels us to organize our knowledge and actions 
along increasingly more sophisticated lines. 
The formal disciplines are both the result of this purposefulness 
and a means of achieving future purposes. From the standpoint of the 
disciplinary expert, this dual function is obvious. But from the 
standpoint of the novice, the formal content and organization of the 
subject areas is just one more thing to be learned - unless the teacher 
can do two things: (1) find, or create, within the experience of 
learners those interests which for their fulfillment would require the 
superior organization of the subject areas, and (2) find or create those 
conditions which will frustrate students' attempts to achieve their 
purposes, thus compelling them not only to seek answers within the 
appropriate disciplines but also to construct their own conceptual 
frameworks for achieving, and modifying, those purposes. The role of 
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the teacher in this educational scheme is thus to create those 
conditions which will elicit, sustain, and, most difficult of all, regulate 
the processes by which students construct their understanding of and 
discourse with the world. 
Creating and maintaining such conditions, is, of course, no 
simple task; in fact, it is probably the most fundamental of all 
educational problems. The proposed study is accordingly guided by 
the following general hypothesis: that three of the most basic 
conditions for engaging students' existing belief systems, and thus for 
initiating and sustaining higher learning, are (1) doubt, (2) dialogue, 
and (3) commitment. They are, respectively, the cognitive, social, and 
moral components of a stimulating college environment. 
Method 
Rather than explore this hypothesis directly, the present study 
uses it as a general reference point from which to launch separate but 
complementary forays into key areas of the literature on higher 
education. An in-depth study of this specific hypothesis would in any 
case entail comparative-classroom, cross-disciplinary, and longitudinal 
studies far beyond the scope of the present project, which seeks 
primarily to suggest a way of conceptualizing higher learning that is 
both philosophically sound and practically useful. That conception, 
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which I am calling "interactive" and the broad features of which were 
just outlined, is very much in evidence in four key areas, and it is to 
those which we now turn. 
The past two decades have witnessed the birth and expansion 
of at least four significant trends in higher education: the "critical 
thinking, moral education," "writing-as-process," and "college 
teaching" movements. Entire organizations, journals, series of books, 
and cross-disciplinary symposia have appeared to accommodate the 
growing interest in these areas nationwide. While a central concern in 
all of these areas has been the articulation of a conception of higher 
learning, especially pertinent to the present study is the fact that in all 
four literatures the same interactive conception has been emerging for 
some time. 
The present study explores the interactive model in each of 
these areas by concentrating in each case on an issue which has 
received attention in recent years - in the critical thinking literature: 
the debate over the transfer of thinking skills; in moral education: the 
gender question in moral development; in college writing: the apparent 
tension between individual cognition and social context as sources of 
meaning and invention; and in college teaching: the relation of 
educational theory to teaching practice as pertains to the growing 
popularity of collaborative learning techniques. A separate chapter is 
devoted to each issue, exploring it in the context of the appropriate 
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literature. In general, the method consists of selecting dichotomous 
models from the relevant literature, exploring their strengths and 
weaknesses, and suggesting how an interactive conception 
transforms what was previously thought to be an irreconcilable 
conflict into a more inclusive, integrated, and dynamic educational 
conception. 
There are three basic reasons for conducting the study in this 
manner: first, to illustrate how the same interactive principles operate 
across several key areas of the literature, second, to begin exploring 
the connections between literatures which might otherwise remain 
discrete, and third, to generate five or six discrete essays suited to 
diverse audiences (but nonetheless held together by the same basic 
principles). 
There are three chapters in addition to the four topic essays. 
The first consists of this prospectus itself. The second is entitled 
"Hirsch on Dewey: Setting the Record Straight,” and aims to describe 
the interactive educational perspective in the context of the current 
debate over a national curriculum. It is intended as a more detailed 
introduction to the interactive model than that offered in the 
hypothesis section of this proposal. Finally, a brief concluding chapter 
offers summary remarks that reconsider the six main chapters in their 
relation to one another. Abstracts of the separate chapters, and a 
description of how they contribute to the dissertation overall, follows. 
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g^gpter 1 - Belief as a Condition of Knowledge: The NppH f^r ^ 
PhilQgQphicgl Perspective in the Reform of Higher Edurati^r^ 
In an effort to illustrate the need for a philosophical perspective 
in higher education reform, this chapter begins with a discussion of 
specific shortcomings in the federally-sponsored study, Involvement in 
Learning: Realizing the Potential of American Higher Education. It 
argues primarily that this study takes inadeguate account of the belief 
condition of knowledge and, in so doing, makes recommendations 
which undermine one of its chief objectives: that students develop 
habits of learning and commitment which would enable them to apply 
their school knowledge in non-educational settings. The chapter goes 
on to discuss a more dynamic conception of human learning which 
better reflects the intricacies of actual human growth than that which 
underlies the Involvement in Learning study. 
In terms of the dissertation, this chapter illustrates the practical 
need for a philosophically sound conception of higher learning. It also 
advances the key interactive notion that genuine learning entails the 
engagement of students' existing beliefs and belief systems. In the 
interactive conception, human beings construct their understanding of 
the world in response to the challenges posed by an 
unaccommodating environment. Posing such challenges as compel 
students to reconstruct their prior conceptual frameworks is the only 
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sure path to securing genuine, wholehearted student involvement, and 
is the teacher's primary (but by no means only) function. 
Chapter Twp - Hirsch on Dewev: Setting the Record Straight 
In his book. Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to 
Know (1987), E.D. Hirsch, Jr. advances the thesis that American 
schools should all teach the same fundamental body of culturally 
shared information. In the process, he perplexingly traces the rise in 
this country of the "content-neutral" curriculum to John Dewey, 
somehow missing the fact that Dewey staunchly opposed all 
educational schemes which separate attention to students' individual 
needs and interests from the transmission of a socially viable body of 
subject matter. This chapter attempts, first, to set straight Hirsch's 
mischaracterization of Dewey and, second, to explain how Dewey 
sought actually to preserve the formal content of education while also 
making it play a more dynamic role in the formation of students' 
habits of constructive communication and inquiry. Dewey's 
educational philosophy is presented as providing a more encompassing 
framework within which Hirsch's otherwise beneficial 
recommendations take on new meaning. 
In the context of the dissertation, this chapter gives a more 
complete exegesis of the interactive conception than that offered in 
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the hypothesis. It does this by reframing Dewey's formulation of the 
interactive conception (without a doubt the most complete and 
penetrating of its kind) in the context of the current debate over 
curricular reform. The essay distinguishes Dewey's interactionism 
from both Hirsch's cultural transmissionism and Rousseauan 
romanticism. It seeks to reconcile the apparent dichotomy between 
attention to students' personal development and the transmission of 
subject matter (by discussing how neither has any meaning except 
insofar as it interacts with and regulates the other). 
Qpgptpr Three -- Critical Thinking as Transfer: The Reconstructive 
iQtQgrstion of Otherwise Discrete Interpretations of Experience 
Recent work in the delineation and teaching of critical thinking 
skills has led some theorists to question the extent to which skills 
learned in one context can be transferred to others. Although there 
exists a range of positions on the subject, the lines of the debate have 
nevertheless been relatively clear-cut, with one side arguing that 
thinking skills are specific to discrete subject areas, and the other that 
they are transferable. The present chapter begins by attempting to 
capture and clarify the major themes of the transfer debate. The chief 
purpose of this discussion is to reveal that underlying the arguments 
of both sides is a fundamentally shared conception of "thinking" as 
something that is not so much comprised of skills (whether they be 
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subject-specific or general) to be transferred as it is itself a process of 
transfer through which otherwise discrete interpretations of 
experience become integrated. The chapter concludes by arguing that 
while the teaching of both subject-specific and general thinking skills 
is important, our chief concern should be with fostering in students 
those habits of reflective inquiry and ongoing transfer by which they 
seek to construct ever more inclusive and integrated knowledge 
systems, or what is generally referred to as "the critical spirit." 
This chapter poses an interactive solution to the apparent 
dichotomy between teaching for skill and teaching for content. 
Thinking is presented as the process by which people reconstruct and 
integrate what would otherwise remain discrete interpretations of 
experience. Such a conception makes the promotion of students' 
habits of reflective inquiry the primary educational concern. For more 
important than skill or knowledge themselves is the development of a 
disposition which inclines a person actively to seek moral and 
intellectual integrity. Genuine and wholehearted involvement, in other 
words, is the necessary basis upon which the learning of content and 
skills must take place if they are to play an active role in students' 
larger lives. This thesis is but a restatement of the idea that engaging 
students' existing belief systems is a necessary condition of genuine 
learning. 
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ghgpter Pqmt -- Justice and Carina and the Problem nf 
pgigtivism; Peframinn the Gender Question in Fthi^^ 
The relatively recent addition of women's voices to the study of 
moral development has led to the postulation of two separate moral 
contexts defined by gender, each with its own dominating concerns, 
guiding principles, forms of reasoning and hypothetical end point. 
While many developmental theorists agree that mature moral 
reasoning entails some sort of integration of these two perspectives, 
the exact nature of that reconciliation is a matter of considerable 
speculation and debate. This chapter begins with the premise that the 
mark of a moral developmental model's philosophical adequacy is its 
handling of the problem of moral relativism. It examines the strengths 
and weaknesses of the justice and caring approaches in regulating the 
contextual relativism inherent in genderized moralities. And it 
concludes by proposing that only by reframing the gender question in 
broader, more teleological terms than present theories have attempted 
can the problem be resolved. 
This chapter again poses an interactive resolution to a topic 
which has received much attention in recent years. Kohiberg's justice 
model and Gilligan's caring model alike share the interactive 
assumption that moral development proceeds through the ongoing 
revision of previous structures in the context of challenges posed by 
an objective environment. The main point of this chapter, however, is 
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that neither model takes the implications of its underlying 
interactionism far enough. Whereas the justice and caring conceptions 
both assume that the problem of moral relativism is an inevitable 
outcome of the irreconcilability of conflicting conceptions of the Good, 
a fully interactional model posits that the problem is ultimately one of 
how to go about reconstructing a more encompassing and integrated 
teleological conception. The interactionist conception, in other words, 
offers the possibility of a reflective transformation of moralities 
previously assumed to be irreconcilable. The educational implication is 
once again that our primary concern should be the development in 
students of the active propensity to seek moral and intellectual 
integrity. 
Chapter Five -- The Indeterminacy of Knowledge and Discourse 
Communities: How Cognition and Context Interact in Reflective 
Thinking and Writing 
Despite the growing popularity of the "process approach" to the 
teaching of writing, many versions of this approach currently vie for 
dominance. As part of a wider effort either to negotiate the 
differences between these varying conceptions, or at least to make 
more informed educational choices regarding them, a model positing 
three basic process-oriented rhetorics has emerged. While all three 
rhetorics are seen as having arisen in response to the shortcomings of 
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the traditional, product-oriented approach, each has evolved according 
to Its own particular sensitivity. The "expressive" school, which 
surfaced in the 1970's. views writing primarily as a means by which 
people construct or discover and communicate to others their deepest 
or most authentic selves. The "cognitive process" school, which 
achieved widespread popularity and institutional support during the 
1980 s. focuses chiefly on the thinking and composing strategies by 
which successful writers make and communicate meaning. And the 
social constructionist" school, which by all indications will dominate 
composition studies in the 1990's. concerns itself mainly with the 
various discourse communities and overarching social and cultural 
forces which shape our knowledge, language-use. and purposes. 
At the present time, the most active debate is between the 
cognitive process theorists and the social constructionists. Although 
proponents of the two schools frame what is being debated 
somewhat differently, the following formulation more or less captures 
the gist of that debate. Social constructionists basically accuse 
cognitive theorists of holding a positivistic conception of language as 
nothing more than a medium of communication which people use to 
achieve purposes formed independently of their sociolinguistic 
contexts, contexts which social constructionists believe are actually 
the major determinants of how we perceive and act in the world. 
Cognitive theorists, in their turn, charge social constructionists with a 
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social determinism that too hastily dismisses the role of the self- 
conscious individual in negotiating among and between socially 
constrained options, options which cognitive theorists admit may 
indeed shape a great deal of our thinking but which do not override 
the capacity of individuals to construct their own meanings and 
achieve their own purposes. In terms of the actual teaching of writing, 
the issue is over which to emphasize: the cognitive processes by 
which people construct meaning, or the social contexts and discourse 
communities within which people's thinking and writing take place. 
Theorists from both schools have called for a reconciliation 
whereby the principles of one approach would enlarge our 
understanding of the other. One such attempt has even been labelled 
"interactive."^^ The present essay supports these efforts but seeks 
to take the interactive conception further than either of them. It 
argues that neither general cognitive strategies nor particular social 
arrangements are intrinsically thought-provoking or thought¬ 
generating; hence neither can induce students to think and write in 
meaningful ways. Taking its inspiration from the conception of 
"reflective thinking" outlined by Dewey,the essay argues instead 
that the construction of meaning entails the interaction of objective 
social and physical conditions with a structuring self and arises where 
a perplexing situation leads one to a state of doubt about what to 
believe or do. The key educational condition for eliciting reflective 
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thinking and writing from this perspective is neither the social 
groupings or apprehension of discrete academic discourse conventions 
advanced by social constructionists nor the process strategies or 
cognitive-developmental capabilities advanced by cognitive theorists. 
It is rather the teacher's structuring of a perplexing situation (from the 
students as well as the academic community's viewpoint) into a task 
requiring reflective inquiry and reconstructive dialogue for a creative 
and satisfying resolution. 
In terms of the dissertation, this chapter explores more directly 
the practical implications of an interactive theoretical conception, a 
relationship which is addressed explicitly in the sixth chapter. 
Chapter Six — Personal and Philosophical Reservations About 
Collaborative Learning 
An increasing number of university faculty from a wide range of 
disciplines are turning to "collaborative learning" as an alternative to 
more traditional modes of instruction. The term itself denotes a 
general pedagogical style which emphasizes cooperation - either 
among students or between students and faculty - as the basic mode 
of learning. Founded on the premise that learning is fundamentally a 
social process, collaborative learning seeks to replicate that process in 
the classroom. In practice, it can take the form of small-group 
exercises, collaborative research projects, peer-review methods. 
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cooperative course development, or reconfigured lecture formats - to 
name some of the more widely used techniques. 
This chapter begins with a personal account of my experience 
in a variety of collaborative learning situations -- first as a high school 
and college student, then as a college teacher. The chapter then 
considers three learning outcomes which proponents of collaborative 
learning claim it is supposed to achieve: (1) increased responsibility for 
learning, (2) the understanding that knowledge is socially constructed, 
and (3) the development of higher order reasoning skills. The purposes 
of this inquiry are, first, to caution against the dangers of ascribing to 
collaborative learning educative powers which it does not necessarily 
possess, second, to give a more cautious account of what 
collaborative learning actually achieves and under what conditions, 
and third, to suggest avenues for further inquiry and research. 
In general, this chapter argues that collaborative techniques are 
excellent motivators and extremely helpful in promoting tolerance, 
critical thinking, and the understanding of the social nature of 
knowledge. However, learning and motivation depend finally on the 
learning task, how it interacts with students' interests, abilities, and 
existing belief systems, and how it is structured to sustain and 
regulate the interplay of skepticism and belief in students' reasoning. 
This thesis is but a restatement, in a particular context, of the 
interactive conception being put forth in the dissertation overall. 
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Summary Remarks 
Almost everywhere one turns in the literature on higher 
education, the same basic conception of learning as the interaction of 
internal tendencies with external conditions is emerging as an antidote 
to the enduring educational dichotomies: process versus product, skill 
versus content, student versus curriculum, method versus subject 
matter, and so on. A single study which would consider the various 
conversations in their relation both to one another and to the 
interactive conception as a whole could produce valuable new insights 
and encourage dialogue between otherwise discrete discourse 
communities. 
The proposed study takes a first step in that direction. It aims 
to formulate an interactive conception of higher learning across 
several key areas of the literature -- including critical thinking, moral 
education, college writing, college teaching, and higher education 
reform. The study integrates concerns from epistemology, ethics, 
rhetoric, learning theory, and policy analysis, and, in so doing, seeks 
to outline a more unified philosophical conception which draws on 
recent advances in each of these areas. 
Generally speaking, educational interactionism is the attempt to 
explain intellectual and moral growth in terms of the ongoing and 
reciprocal Interaction of human beings and their environments, both 
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physical and social. It accordingly seeks to reconcile the historical 
antipathy between rationalism and empiricism (and, more recently, 
social constructionism) — that is, between the assumption that 
meaning resides in the mind and the assumption that it resides in 
objective reality (whether that be defined empirically or socially). In 
terms of educational practice, educational interactionism seeks to 
resolve the persistent tension between attention to students' 
individual needs and interests and the transmission of a socially viable 
body of subject matter (by asserting that neither has any meaning 
without the other). 
This study is but a first step in a much larger effort which 
would aim to integrate and clarify the general features of the 
interactive conception, eliminate many present inconsistencies, and 
outline its implications for educational policy and teaching practice. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HIRSCH ON DEWEY: 
SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 
Lawrence Cremin once wrote of John Dewey's educational 
writings that the grossest caricatures of his work have come from 
otherwise intelligent commentators in the United States and 
abroad."’ Cremin's observation is unfortunately as true today as it 
was thirty years ago, and manifests itself in the form of E. D. Hirsch, 
Jr.'s conspicuous misrepresentation of Dewey's thoughts on the role 
of subject matter in education.^ Hirsch, in advancing his thesis-that 
American schools should all teach the same fundamental body of 
culturally shared information, perplexingly traces the rise in this 
country of the "content-neutral” curriculum to Dewey, somehow 
missing the facts that Dewey not only staunchly opposed all 
educational schemes which divorce method from content, and the 
teaching of skills from subject matter, but openly criticized (though 
probably not forcefully enough) the separation of students' individual 
needs and interests from the transmission of an organized body of 
shared cultural knowledge. 
Indeed, it is arguable that if Dewey were alive today he would 
support the idea of teaching a common national culture, and for many 
of the same reasons as Hirsch. This is not to say, however, that there 
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are not important differences between Hirsch's and Dewey's 
educational visions. But those differences are not, in general, the ones 
Hirsch identifies. The truly unfortunate thing about Hirsch's 
mischaracterization is that in maligning Dewey, Hirsch not only 
neglects the counsel of a powerful opponent of educational formalism, 
but steers countless others away from examining this advice also. 
The present essay attempts, in some small way, to rectify this 
situation. It begins with a brief overview of Hirsch's thesis that the 
most important function of education is the transmission of a 
society's shared cultural knowledge -- a thesis which Hirsch presents 
as standing in opposition to Dewey's educational agenda. The essay 
next addresses the specific distortions which Hirsch commits against 
Dewey -- including his characterization of Dewey as a disciple of 
Rousseau, an opponent of formal subject matter, and an advocate of 
content-neutral skills and social utility as educational aims -- and 
offers numerous and striking counterexamples to these charges from 
Dewey's own writings. {The unusual number of quotations cited in 
this and the following section is warranted by the need to 
demonstrate that Dewey actually said the things which I attribute to 
him. It is also hoped that they might motivate readers to examine the 
works cited herein for themselves.) This discussion reveals the many 
important ways in which Dewey in fact anticipated and agrees with 
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Hirsch about the role of subject matter in education, particularly with 
regard to its socializing function. 
The essay then examines that part of Dewey's writings most 
neglected by Hirsch: his concern about the dangers of over-formalizing 
both subject matter and basic skills and the means by which he 
sought actually to preserve the formal content of education while also 
making it play a more dynamic role in the formation of students' 
habits of reflective inquiry and discourse. Finally, in what constitutes 
something of an appendix, the essay attempts to account for Hirsch's 
misrepresentation of Dewey by elaborating on Lawrence Cremin's 
three-part explanation for the persistent mischaracterizations of 
Dewey which he has observed in his work as an educational historian. 
In the end the reader should see that Hirsch, in mistaking his 
own skewed and fragmentary misinterpretation for the whole of 
Dewey's educational philosophy, not only commits an intellectual 
injustice and social disservice but fails to avail himself of a 
philosophical framework of greater scope and integrity than his own, a 
framework within which his own otherwise beneficial research and 
recommendations take on new meaning. 
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Teaching the National Culture 
In his book, Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to 
Know, E. D. Hirsch, Jr. sets forth his "anthropological" thesis that the 
primary function of schooling should be the transmission of that body 
of specific cultural information necessary for participation in the social 
life of a community.^ His basic argument is that effective 
communication, particularly in an advanced society, depends upon its 
people being familiar with a wide range of shared information more or 
less specific to that society. This body of shared information, he 
argues, lies below the surface of all communication, and anyone 
unfamiliar with its contents simply cannot partake in the give and take 
of ideas and information which characterizes all successful societies. 
Recent research in the psychology of reading, Hirsch 
persuasively argues,"^ supports this idea. Reading, it turns out, 
involves much more than the mere decoding of the specific 
information and ideas symbolized in a given text. Readers, in fact, 
bring to any text a vast background of previously structured 
information without which the task of decoding would be virtually 
impossible -- or at least so time-consuming and laborious as to be 
absurdly impractical. The name given by reading researchers to these 
previously structured bodies of information is schemata, and they 
function basically the same way as Piaget's "structures": as dynamic 
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networks of meaning with which new information must be integrated, 
through a process of mutual adjustment of both the schema and the 
new data, in order to take on meaning. 
Effective communication, Hirsch argues, depends upon people 
having learned the same basic schemata, for without them people 
would have to expend tremendous amounts of time and energy 
familiarizing themselves with the structure of each other's background 
knowledge. In essence, it would be like learning a new language. 
Hirsch's rationale® is again convincing. The history of the ontogenesis 
of national languages forcefully demonstrates that nations which 
consciously normalize their languages through national educational 
systems are much better able to meet the demands of industrialized 
living than those which fail to do so. As Hirsch points out, what is 
less obvious is the fact that such nations conceive and transmit their 
national cultures consciously as well, as educators in this country did 
for nearly two centuries following the American Revolution. Thus, 
Hirsch argues, literate Americans could, until recently, assume a 
shared body of knowledge and corresponding schemata within which 
their national dialogue could take place. 
The problem with our present educational system, according to 
Hirsch, is that we have relinquished responsibility for the construction 
and transmission of a national culture in favor of one that is both 
dangerously fragmented and substantively sparse. The culprits, Hirsch 
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believes, are primarily school administrators and professors of 
education fixated on misguided notions of "natural" student 
development and "content-neutral" learning, the origins of which 
Hirsch traces to Rousseau and Dewey via the curricular upheavals of 
the progressive and open education movements. These misguided 
notions, he argues, have given rise to an era of what he alternatively 
refers to as "romantic formalism" and "educational formalism," 
wherein skills assumed to be general and transferable are taught with 
reference to students' immediate and parochial interests rather than 
within the context of a coherent body of culturally shared subject 
matter. "The inevitable effect of this fundamental educational 
mistake," writes Hirsch, "has been a gradual disintegration of cultural 
memory, causing a gradual decline in our ability to communicate."® 
Despite his opposition to many current educational practices, 
however, Hirsch advocates no simple return to traditional methods of 
instruction, as some of his critics have charged,^ acknowledging that 
certain important educational advances have come about in recent 
decades. Among these he includes respect for individual and cultural 
differences, imaginative and flexible presentation of subject matter, an 
appreciation of the active nature of genuine learning, and the use of 
intensive study to promote deeper and more comprehensive 
understanding. 
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It is not entirely clear, however, whether Hirsch subscribes to 
the epistemology of traditional Lockean pedagogy — which generally 
likens the mind to a blank slate onto which teachers can inscribe 
subject matter - or to the modern view that unless students are led 
somehow to structure that subject matter for themselves they will 
neither grasp it nor be able to apply it in non-educational settings. His 
discussion of the way in which readers must organize and adjust 
existing schemata in order to make sense of new information,® along 
with his assertion that subject matter "should be taught not just as a 
series of terms, or list of words, but as a vivid system of shared 
associations,"® would seem to suggest an active epistemology. At 
other times, however, Hirsch seems to advocate a very passive 
epistemology. In particular, he claims that young children not only can 
but should absorb adult information before they fully understand it.^° 
And although he acknowledges that only through "intensive study and 
experience" can students "understand how isolated facts fit together 
in some coherent way,"" he nevertheless maintains that, "in the 
early grades, truly intensive study is in any case difficult to 
pursue.'"^ 
In the end, Hirsch winds up advocating a two-part model of 
education comprised of both an "extensive curriculum of culturally 
shared information and an "intensive curriculum" of detailed and 
active study adapted to the needs and interests of individual 
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students — a proposal which reflects his apparent desire for a 
reconciliation of traditional and so-called "progressive" pedagogies. 
Arguing, first, that a curriculum can be "pluralistic in its materials and 
modes of teaching but nonetheless provide ... our children with a 
common core of cultural information,"^^ and, secondly, that a failure 
to specify the contents of a national extensive curriculum will leave 
students at the mercy of a "curriculum of cultural fragmentation and 
illiteracy,"’'^ Hirsch goes on to present his famous list of items, the 
meaning of which "every American needs to know." 
Hirsch's Mischaracterization of Dewev 
Throughout his book, Hirsch contrasts his "anthropological 
theory of education" with the "content-neutral conception of 
educational development"’® that he more or less plausibly diagnoses 
as dominating American pedagogy today. According to this content- 
neutral model - which Hirsch tells us was first advanced by Rousseau 
and later popularized in this country by Dewey - schooling 
emphasizes natural human growth and the development of general 
intellectual skills with little regard for the specific knowledge and 
traditions which make up a society's culture. Thus, for example, 
children are taught to read through the use of Dick-and-Jane-type 
texts which are accommodated to children's particular developmental 
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needs but devoid of any specific cultural content -- the premise being 
that what children need is not a lot of adult information but practice in 
the rudimentary decoding skills which will form the basis of later 
literacy. 
Dewey's Critique of Rousseau's Conception of Natural Development 
In fact, while a case can be made for the claim that this 
content-neutral approach to education has at least some basis in 
Rousseau, the same cannot be said of Dewey, who criticized 
Rousseau precisely for the rift the romantic educational philosopher 
created between natural human development, on the one hand, and 
induction into a shared culture, on the other. Hirsch, however, entirely 
misses this crucial distinction, and in so doing not only fails to 
enlighten us as to the profound differences between Rousseau's and 
Dewey's educational philosophies but unwittingly perpetuates the 
very sort of uninformed generalizing to which one might suppose he 
would object. 
To begin with, to emphasize as Hirsch does the content-neutral 
strain in Rousseau's educational philosophy is misleading, for it diverts 
attention away from Rousseau's primary concern — that children 
should learn to think and choose for themselves. For Rousseau, the 
problem with education as it was practiced in his day was that it 
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coerced children into accepting the intellectual frameworks and moral 
values of society without the exercise of their own native intelligence. 
According to him, before they are indoctrinated by society, children 
well know the difference between acting from necessity and acting in 
order to conform to authority. And since education, as he saw it, 
relied on the latter, it caused a profound division between children's 
"genuine" selves and their "social" selves, resulting in a state of 
chronic artificiality and hypocrisy. 
Rousseau's solution (if we are to take the Emile as prescriptive 
of what education ought to be) was to structure the entire educative 
experience so that children always act from a perceived necessity and 
never from a restriction placed upon them by authority (an idea' of 
enormous and, for the most part, unrealized educational import). 
Where Rousseau went wrong was in assuming that this meant 
education must proceed outside the existing social order -- that is, as 
it would "in nature," with children acting in pursuit of their own 
perceived best interests as opposed to any socially-imposed 
expectations. Only this way, Rousseau believed, could children's will 
and personal integrity be preserved.’® 
Now Hirsch writes that in Schools of To-Morrow’^ Dewey 
"acknowledges Rousseau as the chief source of his educational 
principles" (though he in fact does no such thing), ostensibly on the 
grounds that "The first chapter ... carries the telling title 'Education as 
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Natural Development' and is sprinkled with quotations from 
Rousseau. Those who have read Dewey's other educational 
writings, especially Democracy and Education, will find this statement 
particularly remarkable, as Dewey spends more time telling us what 
Rousseau got wrong than what he got right.’® That situation is, 
however, conspicuously reversed in Schools of To-Morrow, the first 
chapter of which does indeed read like a paean to Rousseau, of whom 
Dewey writes: 
[H]is insistence that education be based upon the native 
capacities of those to be taught and upon the need of 
studying children in order to discover what these native 
powers are, sounded the keynote of all modern efforts 
for educational progress.^® 
Even here, though -- in the sentence immediately preceding that 
just cited, in fact -- Dewey remarks that "Rousseau said, as well as 
did, many foolish things,"^’ a comment which evidently piqued 
neither Hirsch's curiosity nor his scholarly instincts enough for him to 
pursue. Had he done so, he would have found that according to 
Dewey there is an enormous difference between the notion that 
growth should proceed "naturally," that is, by stimulating the native 
interests and abilities of children, and the rather absurd notion that it 
can only do so in isolation from the social milieu in which children live. 
And this difference goes to the heart of Dewey's critique of Rousseau; 
The recognition ... that great historic institutions are 
active factors in the intellectual nurture of mind was a 
great contribution to educational philosophy. It indicated 
a genuine advance beyond Rousseau, who had marred 
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his assertion that education must be a natural 
development and not something forced or grafted upon 
individuals from without, by the notion that social 
conditions are not natural. 
Actually, Dewey greatly admired Rousseau's contention that 
the child's present abilities and interests form the starting point of 
education (an educational principle which I later argue Hirsch himself 
must be constrained to admit — even if he will not follow it through to 
its logical conclusion). But Hirsch goes too far when he maintains that 
Dewey shared Rousseau's conception of natural development "on 
analogy with the development of an acorn into an oak." Writes Hirsch: 
[T]he theory ... has its drawbacks, one of which is that a 
child is not in fact like an acorn. Left to itself, a child will 
not grow into a thriving creature; Tarzan is pure fantasy. 
To thrive, a child needs to learn the traditions of the 
particular human society and culture it is born into.^^ 
In fact, Dewey criticized Rousseau on precisely the same 
grounds: 
Rousseau and his followers ... made much use of the 
analogy of the development of a seed into the full-grown 
plant. They used this analogy to draw the conclusion that 
in human beings there are latent capacities which, if they 
are only left to themselves, will ultimately flower and 
bear fruit. So they framed the notion of natural 
development as opposed to a directed growth which they 
regarded as artificial. 
But ... [e]ven the seed of a plant does not grow 
simply of itself. It must have light, air and moisture in 
order to grow. Its development is after all controlled by 
conditions and forces that are outside of it... A stunted 
oak, a stalk of maize that bears few ears with only a few 
scattered grains, exhibit so-called natural development as 
truly as does the noble tree with expanding branches or 
the ear of maize that wins the prize at an exhibition. 
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According to Dewey, Rousseau's error lay in mistaking an 
educational means -- the child's native curiosity, impulses, and 
interests — for an educational end. 
Rousseau was right, introducing a much-needed reform 
into education, in holding that the structure and activities 
of the organs furnish the conditions of all teaching of the 
use of the organs; but profoundly wrong in intimating 
that they supply not only the conditions but also the ends 
of their development. ..[T]he notion of a spontaneous 
normal development of these activities is pure 
mythology. The natural, or native, powers furnish the 
initiating and limiting forces in all education; they do not 
furnish it ends or aims.^® 
A child's native capacities, in other words, can never fix the goal of 
education, any more than her experience can be construed as 
something that exists apart from social conditions. At the same time 
that education must take the child's present interests and abilities into 
account, the direction of education, according to Dewey, comes from 
a source outside the child. 
Dewey's Advocacy of an Organized Body of Shared Cultural Subject 
Matter 
Contrary, then, to Hirsch's characterization of Dewey as 
opposing the transmission of an organized body of shared cultural 
knowledge, Dewey maintained that it is precisely such knowledge as 
this that determines the direction of education. Far from advocating 
that the actual content of education is a matter of indifference, 
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Dewey believed that the transmission of the shared knowledge and 
traditions of a society constitutes one of education's primary 
functions. Like Hirsch, Dewey justified this notion on anthropological 
grounds: 
The primary facts of the birth and death of each one of 
the constituent members in a social group determine the 
necessity of education. On one hand, there is the 
contrast between the immaturity of the new-born 
members of the group -- its future sole representatives -- 
and the maturity of the adult members who possess the 
knowledge and customs of the group. On the other hand, 
there is the necessity that these immature members be 
not merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but 
that they be initiated into the interest, purposes, 
information, skill, and practices of the mature members: 
otherwise the group will cease its characteristic life... 
Education, and education alone, spans the gap...^® 
Much like Hirsch, Dewey also argued the need for a common 
subject matter, particularly in a pluralistic culture where the interests 
of smaller groups, communities, and sub-cultures can easily cause 
cultural divisiveness. 
[Wjith the development of commerce, transportation, 
intercommunication, and emigration, countries like the 
United States are composed of a combination of different 
groups with different traditional customs. It is this 
situation which has, perhaps more than any other one 
cause, forced the demand for an educational institution 
which shall provide something like a homogeneous and 
balanced environment for the young... The intermingling 
in the school[s] ... of different races, differing religions, 
and unlike customs creates for all a new and broader 
environment. Common subject matter accustoms all to a 
unity of outlook upon a broader horizon than is visible to 
the members of any group while it is isolated. The 
assimilative force of the American public school is 
eloquent testimony to the efficacy of the common and 
balanced appeal. 
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Hirsch, however, incorrectly lumps Dewey together with 
Rousseau and his followers, and accuses them all of failing to show 
"an adequate appreciation of the need for transmission of specific 
cultural information."^® In reality, Dewey not only maintained that 
children need to learn the shared information of the culture, but he 
criticized so-called progressive educators in his own time precisely on 
the grounds that they had overreacted against the tendency of 
traditional schools to impose factual knowledge without securing 
student involvement. 
[I]t is often held that since traditional education rested 
upon a conception of organization of knowledge that was 
almost completely contemptuous of living present 
experience, therefore education based upon living 
experience should be contemptuous of the organization 
of facts and ideas. 
Dewey warned against this tendency as early as 1902, in The Child 
and the Curriculum. He later criticized it, among other places, in a 
1928 speech to the Progressive Education Association entitled 
"Progressive Education and the Science of Education,"^® in a 1930 
essay entitled "How Much Freedom in the New Schools?,in a 
1934 essay entitled "The Need for a Philosophy of Education, 
and, most notably, in his 1938 critique of the progressive education 
movement. Experience and Education. 
In fact, so pervasive is this theme in Dewey's educational 
writings that it is difficult to understand why Hirsch neglects to 
mention it. Indeed, two of Hirsch's chief historical sources, Patricia 
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Graham and Lawrence Cremin,^^ document at length and in the 
plainest terms Dewey's struggles with the opponents of organized 
subject matter. Graham, for instance, cites Dewey's 1928 speech to 
the Progressive Education Association, where Dewey said that he 
wondered "whether this earlier and more negative phase of 
progressive education has not upon the whole run its course, and 
whether the time has not arrived in which these schools are 
undertaking a more constructive organized function."^® Graham 
writes that in this speech "Dewey then urged that the schools attempt 
to organize subject matter along intellectual lines and to study 
conditions favorable to learning."^® 
The point is taken up in even more detail by Cremin, whom I 
quote at length. 
[Tjhere is a point to be made here, one that Dewey 
argued for the rest of his career but never fully 
communicated to some who thought themselves his 
disciples. A teacher cannot know which opportunities to 
use, which impulses to encourage, or which social 
attitudes to cultivate without a clear sense of what is to 
come later. With respect to character, this implies a 
conception of the kind of individual who is to issue from 
the school; and with respect to intellect, this implies a 
thorough acquaintance with organized knowledge as 
represented in the disciplines... In short, the demand on 
the teacher is twofold: thorough knowledge of the 
disciplines and an awareness of those common 
experiences of childhood that can be utilized to lead 
children toward the understandings represented by this 
knowledge. As Dewey himself pointed out, the demand is 
weighty indeed, and easily side-stepped. For simple as it 
is to discard traditional curricula in response to cries for 
reform, it is even simpler to substitute for them a 
succession of chaotic activities that not only fail to 
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facilitate growth but actually end up miseducative in 
quality and character.^^ 
Hirsch, however, quite remarkably misses all of this, 
characterizing Dewey instead on the basis of selected and often 
uncharacteristic quotes which he either takes out of context or 
grossly misinterprets. One example of a quote taken out of context is 
a passage to which Hirsch alludes, ironically, in Dewey's defense. 
"Dewey," he writes, "in fact, became appalled by the neutral 
scientism of those American educational administrators who began to 
institutionalize progressive ideas.While this claim is true enough, 
the passage Hirsch cites to support it has absolutely no connection 
whatsoever to Dewey's critique of scientism in education. On the 
contrary, when Dewey wrote that "[tlhere is always the danger in a 
new movement that in rejecting the aims and methods of that which 
it would supplant, it may develop its principles negatively rather than 
positively and constructively,"^® he was criticizing precisely the 
detractors of organized subject matter with whom Hirsch incorrectly 
identifies Dewey! (As anyone who has actually read Experience and 
Education knows.) In fact, I know of no passage in that entire book 
where Dewey takes the "scientific managers" of education to task, so 
focused is he on trying to correct the misconceived child-centeredness 
of the progressive education movement. 
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An example of a misinterpreted quote is Hirsch's citation of 
Dewey as strongly second[ing] Rousseau's opposition to the mere 
accumulation of information”: 
Development emphasizes the need of intimate and 
extensive personal acquaintance with a small number of 
typical situations with a view to mastering the way of 
dealing with the problems of experience, not the piling up 
of information/® 
In the first place, to deduce from this passage, as Hirsch does, that 
Dewey believed "that a few direct experiences would suffice to 
develop the skills that children require" entails the most obvious of 
fallacies, as can be seen simply by examining the quoted passage: to 
"emphasize" direct acquaintance is by no means to declare that it is a 
"sufficient" condition of learning. 
More to the point, however, is the fact that it is the "mere 
accumulation" and the "piling up of information" to which Dewey was 
opposed, and not the learning of information per se. 
Things remote in space and time affect the issue of our 
actions quite as much as things which we can smell and 
handle... Information is the name usually given to this 
kind of subject matter. The place of communication in 
personal doing supplies us with a criterion for estimating 
the value of informational material in school. Does it 
grow naturally out of some question with which the 
student is concerned? Does it fit into his more direct 
acquaintance so as to increase it efficacy and deepen its 
meaning? If it meets these two requirements, it is 
educative. 
The difference between information which is educative and that which 
is not resides, then, according to Dewey, in whether or not the 
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student is able to create a place for it within his own active cognitive 
structures. 
It is no objection to information that it is clothed in 
words; communication necessarily takes place through 
words. But in the degree in which what is communicated 
cannot be organized into the existing experience of the 
learner, it becomes mere words: that is, pure sense- 
stimuli, lacking in meaning. 
The irony is that Hirsch himself attacks the mere accumulation 
of knowledge on precisely the same grounds: "Indeed, if traditional 
facts were to be presented unimaginatively or taught ignorantly or 
regarded as ends in themselves, we would have much to deplore in a 
return to traditional education."'*^ Writing of the "extensive 
curriculum" of shared cultural information, he goes on to say: "Of 
course, this curriculum should be taught not just as a series of terms, 
or list of words, but as a vivid system of shared associations.In 
fact, Hirsch ends up endorsing the very principle of intensive study for 
which he criticizes Dewey: 
[Tjhe extensive curriculum is not a sufficient basis for 
education by itself... The intensive curriculum, though 
different, is equally essential. Intensive study encourages 
a fully developed understanding of a subject, making 
one's knowledge of it integrated and coherent. It 
coincides with Dewey's recommendation that children 
should be deeply engaged with a small number of typical 
concrete instances. 
"To understand how isolated facts fit together," he continues, "we 
must always acquire mental models of how they cohere, and these 
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schemata can come only from detailed, intensive study and 
experience."**® 
In spite of Hirsch's characterization that Dewey endorsed only 
the intensive curriculum, Dewey in fact agreed with Hirsch's 
estimation of the need for both an extensive body of shared cultural 
knowledge and a program of intensive study to secure that knowledge 
in students' cognitive and communicative repertoires. 
The parceling out of instruction among various ends such 
as acquisition of skill (in reading, spelling, writing, 
drawing, reciting), acquiring information (in history and 
geography), and training of thinking is a measure of the 
ineffective way in which we accomplish all three. 
Despite this seeming similarity, however, there are important 
differences here between Hirsch and Dewey, one of which would 
seem to be the question of emphasis. Before considering these 
differences, however, let us first look at two more ways in which 
Hirsch mischaracterizes Dewey: as an advocate of content-neutral 
skills and of social utility as educational aims. 
Dewey's Rejection of Formalized Skills and Social Utility as 
Educational Aims 
Hirsch blames many of today's educational ills on "educational 
formalism," a pedagogical approach which he characterizes as 
follows: 
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Educational formalism holds that reading and writing are 
like baseball and skating; formalism conceives of literacy 
as a set of techniques that can be developed by proper 
coaching and practice... Educational formalism assumes 
that the specific contents used to teach "language arts" 
do not matter so long as they are closely tied to what the 
child already knows... Current schoolbooks in language 
arts pay little systematic attention to conveying a body 
of culturally significant information from grade to 
grade.^® 
Teaching reading as a content-neutral skill, he maintains, fails socially 
because cultural literacy requires culturally specific knowledge, with 
the result that a content-neutral reading curriculum leads to poor intra- 
societal communication. 
In the course of this otherwise sound argument, however, 
Hirsch falsely identifies Dewey as one of the forerunners of present- 
day educational formalism. Along with several unexplained and 
unsupported references to the "content-neutral curriculum'"^® and 
"content-neutral ideas of Rousseau and Dewey,he writes that 
"Dewey assumed that early education need not be tied to specific 
content."®’ In actuality, Dewey deplored the separation of skills and 
subject matter in education. To begin with, he believed that although 
we can draw a distinction between them in theory, they cannot in 
fact be separated in human intellectual functioning. In an extended 
critique of what he calls the "theory of 'formal discipline,'"®^ Dewey 
wrote that 
the fundamental fallacy of the theory is its dualism: that 
is to say, its separation of activities and capacities from 
subject matter. There is no such thing as an ability to see 
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or hear or remember in general; there is only the ability to 
see or hear or remember something. To talk about 
training a power, mental or physical, in general, apart 
from the subject matter involved in its exercise, is 
nonsense.®^ 
Even more pertinent to Hirsch's critique are Dewey's comments 
on the negative consequences that accrue from divorcing the teaching 
of skills from the transmission of socially desirable subject matter (a 
practice which he attributed, in part, to the misguided psychological 
doctrine of formal discipline just cited). 
If the how and the what, the psychological and the 
social, method and subject matter, must interact 
cooperatively in order to secure good results, a hard and 
fast distinction between them is fraught with danger. We 
want a method that will select subject-matter that aids 
psychological development, and we want a subject- 
matter that will secure the use of methods 
psychologically correct. We cannot begin by dividing the 
field between the psychology of individual activity and 
growth[,] and studies or subject-matters that are socially 
desirable, and then expect that at the end In practical 
operation the two things will balance each other. 
With specific regard to the teaching of reading, Dewey wrote 
that "[t]he question of what one learns to read is thus inextricably 
bound up with the question of how one learns to read."®® In 
discussing the dangers of basing educational practice on incomplete 
psychological theories, Dewey complained that "the tools that are 
recognized to be social [e.g., literacy] are not treated socially but are 
relegated to the mechanics of psychology."®® He then went on to 
give the following illustration of the ills which result from this 
separation: 
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The kind of reading-matter that now most abounds 
socially, as may be gathered from a glance at 
newsstands, is largely of a socially undesirable character. 
Yet It can be sold only to readers, to those in possession 
o the so-called social tools. Pages of exposition would 
not speak more eloquently of what is bound to happen 
when educational theory separates, in the name of 
science, the psychological processes that regulate the 
mere mechanism of acquiring a skill from the social 
conditions and needs which have to do with the 
application of that skill.®^ 
Far from arguing, then, that skills can or should be taught apart from 
subject matter, Dewey agreed with Hirsch's opinion that reading, 
writing, and even figuring are social skills, tied to specific social 
content. 
But what of the charge that Dewey advocated social utility 
itself as an educational aim? Once again, Hirsch flagrantly 
misrepresents Dewey in this regard. Hirsch refers to "Dewey's 
pragmatic emphasis on direct social utility as an educational goal,"®® 
and maintains that the emphasis on "utility and the direct application 
of knowledge" which the NEA's Commission on the Reorganization of 
Secondary Education advanced in its 1918 report Cardinal Principles 
of Secondary Education®® originated in "European romanticism and 
American pragmatism as amalgamated in the educational philosophy 
of John Dewey. 
In fact, Dewey adamantly opposed social utility as an 
educational aim on several grounds. In the first place, he maintained 
that studies which aim to prepare people for specific vocational 
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callings fail precisely because vocational callings themselves are not 
stable but subject to constant change. 
As a matter of fact, industry at the present time 
undergoes rapid and abrupt changes through the 
evolution of new inventions. New industries spring up, 
and old ones are revolutionized. Consequently an attempt 
to train for too specific a mode of efficiency defeats its 
own purpose. When the occupation changes it methods, 
such individuals are left behind with even less ability to 
readjust themselves than if they had a less definite 
training.®’ 
Hirsch makes precisely the same point when he writes that 
[tjhe flaw in utilitarianism is its lack of utility for the 
modern world. Narrow vocational education, adjusted to 
the needs of the moment, is made ever more obsolete by 
changing technology. Vocations have multiplied beyond 
the abilities of the schools to accommodate them. What 
is required is education for change, not for static job 
competencies.®^ 
Indeed, Dewey believed that the subject matter of a genuinely 
vocational education should be largely traditional in content. 
[A]n education which acknowledges the full intellectual 
and social meaning of a vocation would include 
instruction in the historic background of present 
conditions; training in science to give intelligence and 
initiative in dealing with material and agencies of 
production; and study of economics, civics, and politics, 
to bring the future worker into touch with the problems 
of the day and the various methods for its improvement. 
Above all, it would train power of readaptation to 
changing conditions so that future workers would not 
become blindly subject to a fate imposed upon them.®^ 
Following this same basic line of reasoning, Dewey further 
attacked social utility as an educational aim on the grounds that 
preoccupation with present-day social needs is often bought at the 
69 
expense of the very historical and accumulated past knowledge which 
would enable people to understand and cope with current problems. 
[Tlhe achievements of the past provide the only means at 
cornmand for understanding the present. Just as the 
individual has to draw in memory upon his own past to 
understand the conditions in which he individually finds 
himself, so the issues and problems of present social life 
are in such intimate and direct connection with the past 
that students cannot be prepared to understand either 
these problems or the best way of dealing with them 
without delving into their roots in the past.®^ 
Again, Hirsch advances much the same point in his attack on the 
Commission's 1918 report: 
History was seen as an indirect and inefficient means of 
achieving ... social goals, and was transformed into 
social studies. Like vocational courses, social studies 
courses were directed "to the activities of life rather than 
to the demands of any subject as a logically organized 
science."®® 
Not only did Dewey agree, then, with Hirsch's estimation that 
the "antitraditional goals of the progressive movement have turned 
out to depend upon traditional information,"®® but he stated as a 
matter principle that educational values must never be subordinated to 
present societal conditions. 
[TJhe belief that social conditions determine educational 
objectives ... is a fallacy. Education is autonomous and 
should be free to determine its own ends, its own 
objectives... To look to some outside source to provide 
aims is to fail to know what education is as an ongoing 
process. What a society is, it is, by and large, as a 
product of education, as far as its animating spirit and 
purpose are concerned. Hence it does not furnish a 
standard to which education is to conform.®^ 
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According to Dewey, education ultimately finds its direction in 
the democratic principle of growth, by which he meant not 
Rousseau's spontaneous development of individual potentialities but 
rather growth in the range and depth of understanding, 
communication, and shared purposes between people in a democratic 
society.®® Indeed, Dewey's suggestion that all social institutions 
(including the contents of its shared cultural vocabulary) should be 
judged in terms of the extent to which they promote democratic 
growth seems, if anything, less utilitarian than Hirsch's suggestion 
that the contents of a national vocabulary should be judged only in 
terms of the extent to which they are already shared.®® Be that as it 
may, Dewey and Hirsch clearly agree not only that communication 
between the people in a society is a fundamental aim of education, 
but that a body of shared cultural information is crucial to the 
realization of that end, and should not be sacrificed to misguided 
notions of spontaneous natural development, deprecation of traditional 
knowledge, or content-neutral skills and direct social utility as 
educational aims. 
Three Crucial Differences Between Hirsch and Dewey 
Despite this shared commitment to the transmission of shared 
cultural knowledge, Dewey would take issue with Hirsch on three 
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crucial points, all having to do with the way in which shared cultural 
knowledge is taught. First, Dewey's epistemology is more active (or at 
least more consistent) than Hirsch's, and assigns a more active role to 
the learner. Second, Dewey maintained that shared meanings could 
not be transmitted through direct formal presentation but could only 
be learned in the context of shared activities and concerns. Third, 
Dewey's primary concern was not with transmitting cultural 
knowledge per se but with promoting rational habits of reflective 
inquiry and social-minded discourse, of which shared cultural 
knowledge is but one component. 
The Principle of Interaction 
The first place where Dewey would disagree with Hirsch 
concerns the point on which Hirsch himself is the most inconsistent. 
Within an individual's cognition, by Hirsch's own account, a vital 
system of stored information must be organized in a meaningful 
pattern in order for it to be accessible. Such organization can only be 
achieved, he says, through active individual processing: "To 
understand how isolated facts fit together in some coherent way, we 
must always acquire mental modes of how they cohere, and these 
schemata can come only from detailed, intensive study and 
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experience."^® Hirsch cites the prototypical example of the reading 
process: 
[T]he reader is not just passively receiving meaning but 
actively selecting the most appropriate schemata for 
making sense of the incoming words. Then the reader 
actively adjusts those schemata to the incoming words 
until a good fit is achieved. This process can work 
efficiently only if the reader has quick access to 
appropriate schemata. 
Quick access depends on existing schemata having themselves 
been constructed into meaningful systems. 
[Slchemata perform two essential functions that are 
relevant to literacy. The first is storing knowledge in 
retrievable form; the second is organizing knowledge in 
more and more efficient ways, so that it can be applied 
rapidly and efficiently. Without appropriate background 
knowledge, people cannot adequately understand written 
or spoken language. And unless that knowledge is 
organized for rapid and efficient deployment, people 
cannot perform reading tasks of any complexity. 
Hirsch correctly construes this need for organized background 
information as an argument in favor of his extensive curriculum of 
shared cultural knowledge. What he seems to overlook, however, is 
the way in which individuals organize this body of information in the 
first place. Rather than acknowledging that young children must be 
led somehow to organize their background knowledge for 
themselves -- which would seem to follow from the premise that 
"[wle are able to make our present experiences take on meaning by 
assimilating them to prototypes formed from our past experiences 
- Hirsch seems to want to short-circuit the process by giving children 
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quantities of unassimilated adult information upon which they can 
then begin organizing future experience. 
Of course, we must always present material to children 
in an interesting way. But very young children are 
interested in extensive, limited information. In the early 
grades, truly intensive study is in any case difficult to 
pursue. The predicted difficulties of teaching the 
extensive curriculum simply do not apply to young 
children... They like to pick up adult information long 
before they can make sense of it... Young children are 
fascinated by straightforward information and absorb it 
without strain... Children don't have to be forced to 
memorize facts; they do it anyway. 
What Hirsch does in this passage is essentially to postulate that 
what is true of adults -- that they make sense of experience through 
the mutual adjustment of present and prior experience -- is somehow 
different for children -- who seem to have the mysterious ability to 
absorb knowledge in prearranged systems. This claim is not only 
unsupported (especially when compared to Hirsch's scholarly defense 
of reading as an active process of cognitive reconstruction), but it 
contradicts the very evidence Hirsch cites to support his claim that 
reading is not a content-neutral skill but depends upon relevant 
information having been organized into accessible systems. 
The real conclusion to be drawn from the need for an organized 
system of background information is not that we must first transmit it 
to children directly so that they can then begin the task of making 
sense of experience. It is rather that we must somehow lead children 
to organize this knowledge for themselves from the first. Dewey 
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called this the principle of interaction -- in reference to the view, 
advanced by Hirsch himself, that intellectual growth entails the mutual 
adaptation, or interaction, of existing mental structures and the data 
of present experience. The difference is that for Dewey the principle 
of interaction applied to the whole spectrum of learning, not just to 
the more advanced levels. 
[T]he educator cannot start with knowledge already 
organized and proceed to ladle it out in doses... [T]he 
active process of organizing facts and ideas is an ever¬ 
present educational process. No experience is educative 
that does not tend both to knowledge of more facts and 
entertaining of more ideas and to a better, a more 
orderly, arrangement of them.^® 
The difference between Hirsch's and Dewey's views is 
highlighted by their distinct anthropological conceptions. Whereas 
Hirsch asserts that cultures simply transmit their past learning to the 
young, Dewey notes that how this is done changes as cultures 
progress. It is worth quoting Dewey at length: 
For the most part, [subsistence cultures] depend upon 
children learning the customs of the adults, acquiring 
their emotional set and stock of ideas, by sharing in what 
the elders are doing... But as civilization advances, the 
gap between the capacities of the young and the 
concerns of adults widens. Learning by direct sharing in 
the pursuits of grown-ups becomes increasingly 
difficult... Without ... formal education, it is not possible 
to transmit all the resources and achievements of a 
complex society... But there are conspicuous dangers 
attendant upon the transition from indirect to formal 
education... There is the standing danger that the 
material of formal instruction will be merely the subject 
matter of the schools, isolated from the subject matter of 
life-experience.^® 
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We are thus met by the danger of ... the tendency to 
assume that pupils have a foundation of direct realization 
of situations sufficient for the superstructure of 
representative experience erected by formulated school 
studies../^ 
What Dewey here warns against is precisely the trap into which 
Hirsch has fallen when he recommends that children in the early 
grades do not need intensive study but should be made to memorize 
quantities of adult information. Dewey, by contrast, advocated a very 
different approach: 
Before teaching can safely enter upon conveying facts 
and ideas through the media of signs, schooling must 
provide genuine situations in which personal participation 
brings home the import of the material and the problems 
which it conveys. From the standpoint of the pupil, the 
resulting experiences are worth while on their own 
account; from the standpoint of the teacher they are also 
means of supplying subject matter required for 
understanding instruction involving signs, and of evoking 
attitudes of open-mindedness and concern as to the 
material symbolically conveyed.^® 
Children, in other words, need more than traditional information; they 
need to learn it in a way that is continuous with their past and present 
experience. Only that way can they construct it such a manner that it 
is integral with their active knowledge and beliefs. The teacher's job 
thus becomes that of finding or creating conditions which will compel 
students to learn subject matter in the course of making sense of their 
own experience. 
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Shared Meanings Are Learned in a Social Context 
Experience, however, is not something that goes on only in the 
mind and heart of the individual, as romantic educators have tended 
to conceive it. Nor is it something that can be separated from past 
and present social conditions, as Rousseau had advocated. Rather, 
experience is social and requires a social context to develop. Herein 
lies a second point on which Dewey would find fault with Hirsch. For 
although Hirsch maintains that children should learn the social 
meanings of the contents of the national vocabulary, he makes no 
particular provision by which they can in fact learn those meanings. 
"Successful communication,” writes Hirsch, "depends upon 
shared associations. To participate in the literate national culture is to 
have acquired a sense of the information that is shared in that 
culture."^® With regard to reading, he writes: 
The comprehending reader must bring to the text 
appropriate background information that includes 
knowledge not only about the topic but also the shared 
attitudes and conventions that color a piece of writing... 
Our children can learn this information only by being 
taught it.®° 
Hirsch seems to think that children will acquire a sense of these 
shared attitudes and meanings simply by absorbing the contents of 
the national vocabulary: "Only by piling up specific, communally 
shared information can children learn to participate In complex 
cooperative activities with other members of their community. 
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Dewey s more complete anthropological conception once again 
suggests the superficiality of this view. According to him, people learn 
shared meanings not through the formal presentation of subject 
matter, but through shared activity where information is exchanged in 
the context of achieving and negotiating shared purposes. 
The development within the young of the attitudes and 
dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive 
life of a society cannot take place by direct conveyance 
of beliefs, emotions, and knowledge. It takes place 
through the intermediary of the environment... The social 
environment ... is truly educative ... in the degree in 
which an individual shares or participates in some 
conjoint activity. By doing his share in the associated 
activity, the individual appropriates the purpose which 
actuates it, becomes familiar with its methods and 
subject matters, acquires needed skill, and is saturated 
with its emotional spirit.®^ 
Hirsch, by contrast, cites the example of children learning 
sports statistics as evidence that they can memorize and learn the 
meaning of complex adult information: 
At an early age when their memories are most retentive, 
children have an almost instinctive urge to learn specific 
tribal traditions. At that age they seem to be fascinated 
by catalogues of information and are eager to master the 
materials that authenticate their membership in adult 
society. Observe for example how they memorize the 
rather complex materials of football, baseball, and 
basketball, even without benefit of formal avenues by 
which that information is inculcated.®® 
Dewey's view suggests a different interpretation. Children who 
memorize sports statistics not only have an active interest in these 
things; they share it with their peers, elders, and the larger culture. 
Formal avenues of instruction are not only unnecessary to such 
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learning, they would almost certainly detract from the sense of vital, 
shared experience which such children feel with regard to this 
information. If anything the example illustrates that children memorize 
and develop a sense of the meaning of facts for reasons vital to their 
own, socially-motivated interests and not through some intrinsic 
desire to absorb adult culture irrespective of their ability to understand 
it. 
For Dewey, shared cultural knowledge must be constructed 
through conjoint, purposeful activity. 
To have the same ideas about things which others have, 
to be like-minded with them, and thus to be really 
members of a social group, is ... to attach the same 
meanings to things and to acts which others attach... [I]n 
shared activity, each person refers what he is doing to 
what the other is doing and vice-versa. That is, the 
activity of each is placed in the same inclusive situation... 
[l]f each views the consequences of his own acts as 
having a bearing upon what others are doing and takes 
into account the consequences of their behavior upon 
himself, then there is a common mind...®'^ 
By the same token, shared meanings can only be learned in a 
social context. 
In social situations the young have to refer their way of 
acting to what others are doing and make it fit in. This 
directs their action to a common result, and gives an 
understanding common to the participants... This 
common understanding of the means and ends of action 
is’the essence of social control ... [which] is intrinsic to 
the disposition of the person, not external and coercive. 
To achieve this internal control through identity of 
interest and understanding is the business of 
education.®® 
79 
But in an advanced culture, where instruction must necessarily 
be removed from the social purposes that normally motivate learning, 
it becomes necessary to provide those conditions consciously. 
While books and conversation can do much, these 
agencies are usually relied upon too exclusively. Schools 
require for their full efficiency more opportunity for 
conjoint activities in which those instructed take part, so 
that they may acquire a social sense of their own powers 
and of the materials and appliances used.®® 
Democratic Participation as the Aim of Erlnratinn 
Where Dewey would perhaps take the greatest issue with 
Hirsch is with the lack of provision in Hirsch's educational scheme for 
the ways in which citizens in a democratic society learn to negotiate 
their shared knowledge and purposes among themselves. Hirsch's 
educational agenda does not prepare students for such active 
citizenship because it does nothing to foster such rational and socially- 
minded habits of inquiry and discourse as are necessary to negotiate 
knowledge and purposes in a democracy. In some respects, Hirsch's 
agenda may even work against the inculcation of such habits. 
Hirsch seems to think that by simply transmitting the shared 
vocabulary of the culture (to be sure, a necessary part of a democratic 
education), democratic results will thereby follow. Writes Hirsch: 
Putting aside for the moment the practical arguments 
about the economic uses of literacy [that it is ultimately 
more utilitarian than narrow vocational training], we can 
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contemplate the even more basic principle that underlies 
our national system of education in the first place -- that 
people in a democracy can be entrusted to decide all 
important matters for themselves because they can 
deliberate and communicate with one another... Illiterate 
and semiliterate Americans are condemned not only to 
poverty, but also to the powerlessness of 
incomprehension... They do not feel themselves to be 
active participants in our republic, and they often do not 
turn out to vote. The civic importance of cultural literacy 
lies in the fact that true enfranchisement depends upon 
knowledge, knowledge upon literacy, and literacy upon 
cultural literacy.®^ 
True as this passage's concluding sentence and implicit 
criticism of the content-neutral curriculum are, the passage leaves 
completely unanswered -- indeed, the question is not even asked -- 
how people learn to "feel themselves active participants in our 
republic." Hirsch seems to think that if people are taught the literate 
culture, they will not only feel ownership of that culture, but they will 
know how to deliberate about its mutual concerns and even be 
inclined to do so. He overlooks that how people acquire cultural 
literacy is at least as important as the fact that they acquire it. Not 
only does his educational scheme fail to provide the conditions by 
which people learn to deliberate together, but his recommendation 
that children should acquire the basic framework of the literate culture 
through rote memorization offers an educational foundation which is 
quite at odds with the sort of active, democratic disposition he wants 
to foster in the long run. 
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Dewey's remarks concerning the teaching of reading as a 
content-neutral skill are instructive in this regard: 
[EJducationally speaking the problems of attendant 
radiations, expansions and contractions ... are in the end 
more important [than whether or not skill in reading is 
acquired]... Nor is it satisfactory to say that the part 
must be mastered before the whole can be attacked. For, 
by the riature of the case, the whole enters into the part, 
that is, it is a determining factor in the way in which one 
learns to read. Thus the consideration of how one learns 
to read in its connection with its effect upon future 
personal development and interests demands attention to 
desirable subject-matter.®® 
Dewey here points out the fallacy in believing that reading skills 
acquired in isolation from particular subject matter will eventually 
secure desirable reading habits, a criticism with which Hirsch is clearly 
sympathetic. By the same token, however, it is just as fallacious to 
assume that subject matter acquired through rote means will thereby 
secure an active disposition with regard to that subject matter. 
Dewey attributed both mistakes to a failure to grasp the 
principle of collateral learning: "Collateral learning in the way of 
formation of enduring attitudes, of likes and dislikes, may be and 
often is much more important than the spelling lesson or lesson in 
geography or history that is learned. For these attitudes are 
fundamentally what count in the future."®® He severely criticized the 
belief that students should be prepared for future life by imparting 
upon them knowledge and skills in isolation from the sorts of contexts 
in which those things were later to be used. 
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The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the 
future contradicts itself. It omits, and even shuts out, the 
very conditions by which a person can be prepared for 
his future. We always live at the time we live and not at 
some other time, and only by extracting at each present 
time the full meaning of each present experience are we 
prepared for doing the same thing in the future. This is 
the only preparation which in the long run amounts to 
anything.®® 
It is in the context of Dewey's democratic vision of education 
that these ideas achieve their full expression, as reflected in the 
following passage -- among the most famous Dewey ever wrote: 
The devotion of democracy to eduction is a familiar fact. 
The superficial explanation is that a government resting 
upon popular suffrage cannot be successful unless those 
who elect and who obey their governors are educated... 
But there is a deeper explanation. A democracy is more 
than a form of government; it is primarily a mode-of 
associated living, of conjoint communicated experience. 
The extension in space of the number of individuals who 
participate in an interest so that each has to refer his 
own action to that of others, and to consider the action 
of others to give point and direction to his own, is 
equivalent to the breaking down of those barriers of 
class, race, and national territory which kept men from 
perceiving the full import of their activity. These more 
numerous and more varied points of contact ... secure a 
liberation of powers which remain suppressed as long as 
the incitations to action are partial, as they must be in a 
group which in its exclusiveness shuts out many 
interests. 
The widening of the area of shared concerns, and 
the liberation of a greater diversity of personal capacities 
which characterize a democracy, are not of course the 
product of deliberation and conscious effort... But after 
greater individualization on one hand, and a broader 
community of interest on the other have come into 
existence, it is a matter of deliberate effort to sustain and 
extend them... A society which is mobile, which is full of 
channels for the distribution of a change occurring 
anywhere, must see to it that its members are educated 
to personal initiative and adaptability. Otherwise, they 
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will be overwhelmed by the changes in which they are 
caught and whose significance or connections they do 
not perceive.®’ 
The primary educational aim in a democracy, according to 
Dewey, thus becomes that of securing active habits of democratic 
participation and deliberation: 
A society which makes provision for participation in [the] 
good of all its members on equal terms and which 
secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through 
interaction of the different forms of associated life is in 
so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of 
education which gives individuals a personal interest in 
social relationships and control, and the habits of mind 
which secure changes without introducing disorder.®^ 
For Dewey, this meant that education should provide a context 
that replicates those features which most characterize the democratic 
way of life, namely, interaction among its people towards the 
negotiation and accomplishment of communal purposes. The teacher's 
role in such an environment is twofold. From the students' point of 
view, she is primarily a more knowledgeable participant, an elder of 
the community who embodies its knowledge, purposes, and animating 
spirit. From the teacher's own standpoint, she is an organizer of such 
an environment as will elicit students' natural social impulses, and 
progressively order them into more intelligent patterns through the 
acquisition of knowledge, skills, and reflective habits of mind.®® 
When measured against Dewey's criteria of participation and 
readjustment through interaction, Hirsch's educational agenda comes 
up short. For in making no provision for the ways in which people 
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learn to negotiate knowledge and purposes, Hirsch assumes a level of 
homogeneity and stability that is neither attainable nor desirable. We 
do need a shared national vocabulary, and we do want students to 
acquire a knowledge of what others are likely to know and feel. And 
Hirsch IS quite right to criticize content-neutral curricula on the 
grounds that they fail to provide for such common understanding. But 
even if subject matter could be poured into children like water into 
cups, like-mindedness and common understanding cannot be 
transmitted in such a fashion, for the simple reason that social 
conditions are not static. What Hirsch elsewhere says of technological 
knowledge is also true of cultural knowledge: it is changing and 
diverse. He attempts to acknowledge this fact by suggesting that the 
contents of the national vocabulary will change with time, but he 
makes no mention of how. The contents of the national vocabulary 
change through negotiation among the citizens in a democracy, and 
people learn to partake in such negotiation through education. What 
we need to do educationally, then, is to foster in students an 
intellectual and socially-minded disposition which will enable and 
encourage them to inquire, discuss, and negotiate such a vocabulary 
and such knowledge and purposes for and among themselves. 
By this means, Dewey hoped that eventually his educational 
ideal might be realized: "that we may produce in schools a projection 
in type of the society we should like to realize, and by forming minds 
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in accord with it gradually modify the larger and more recalcitrant 
features of adult society."®'* This point is well summarized by 
Cremin: 
[Dewey] wanted education constantly to expand the 
range of social situations in which individuals perceived 
issues and made and acted upon choices. He wanted 
schools to inculcate habits that would enable individuals 
to control their surroundings rather than merely adapt to 
them. And he wanted each generation to go beyond its 
predecessors in the quality of behavior it sought to 
nurture in its children. Progressive societies, he 
counseled, "endeavor to shape the experiences of the 
young so that instead of reproducing current habits, 
better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult 
society be an improvement on their own."®® 
The notion that education should thus be an agent of the progressive 
and ongoing reconstruction of communal experience lies at the heart 
of Dewey's educational writings. It is an idea which Hirsch not only 
ignores in Dewey's writings but which he fails to consider in his own 
educational vision. 
Three Reasons Why People Mischaracterize Dewev 
What has led otherwise thoughtful scholars to mischaracterize 
Dewey's work in education? Cremin®® offers three explanations. First 
is Dewey's writing style, which is infamous for the remarkable (some 
would say impossible) complexes of meaning it ascribes to key words 
Cremin cites "experience," "growth," "inquiry," and interest as 
examples, though almost as noteworthy are democracy. 
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"interaction," "continuity," and "habit." The problem with Dewey's 
penchant for intricate meanings is not that he used them to mask 
inconsistencies or sloppy thinking. On the contrary, most devoted 
scholars of Dewey's work will tell you his use of terminology is part 
and parcel of a remarkably inclusive and consistent philosophical 
system.®^ 
The problem is rather that Dewey's complex use of language 
opened the way for his key terms to be construed in all manner of 
ways which Dewey himself never intended. As Cremin points out, the 
culprits were chiefly those people who either did not read Dewey 
thoroughly, or did not read him at all. For example, "interest," which 
for Dewey was a value-neutral term denoting an object or goal 
towards which our behavioral and attitudinal tendencies compel us, 
was stripped by educational romantics of its empirical meaning to 
connote instead a spontaneous impulse to be encouraged for its own 
sake. Dewey, by contrast, construed interests as the termini of native 
tendencies which generally need to be frustrated in order to lead 
students to develop reflective habits of mind.®® The romantic 
interpretation of "interest" is, of course, the one that stays with us 
today. 
A second and related explanation cited by Cremin is that 
Dewey's influence was so widespread that people frequently learned 
of his philosophy indirectly, through secondary and still more distant 
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sources. As an example, Cremin cites William Heard Kilpatrick, a 
student and noted disciple of Dewey's whom Dewey allegedly 
challenged for certain misapplications of Dewey's work.®® According 
to Cremin, Kilpatrick taught some 35,000 graduate students during 
his forty year tenure at Columbia.And, to paraphrase Cremin, 
who can guess what influence these students had? As the popular 
misinterpretation of the term "interest” illustrates, the interpretations 
to which people were many times exposed not only frequently ran 
counter to Dewey's original meaning, but were often espoused by 
some of his most ardent "supporters." Such distortions led many 
critics to believe that they were attacking Dewey's ideas, when in 
fact they were as often as not advancing criticisms of progressive 
education very similar to Dewey's own. 
The final and, for Cremin, the most important explanation of 
why otherwise intelligent commentators have mischaracterized 
Dewey's work is the tendency to interpret influential ideas in terms of 
present social needs and concerns rather than in the light of their 
original historical contexts. In order to understand the meaning of 
Dewey's writings, both at the time of their origin and in terms of 
present conditions, we must understand the evolving social climate 
that engendered them and of which they became an integral part. 
Otherwise, we may interpret them in the light of present educational 
conditions alone, conditions which at any given historical moment are 
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likely to offer a very different set of problems than confronted Dewey 
in the early part of this century. As Dewey himself observed: 
[Wle do not emphasize things which do not require 
emphasis -that is, such things as are taking care of 
themselves fairly well. We tend rather to frame our 
statement on the basis of the defects and needs of the 
contemporary situation... It is, then, no paradox requiring 
explanation that a given epoch or generation tends to 
emphasize in its conscious projections just the things 
which it has least of in actual fact. A time of domination 
by authority will call out as response the desirability of 
great individual freedom; one of disorganized individual 
activities the need of social control as an educational 
aim.’®’ 
In particular, turn of the century schools were much more 
formal and dogmatic than they have ever been since or are likely ever 
to be again, and the educational experiments of the Progressive Era 
had not yet occurred. Dewey no doubt felt he could thus assume of 
his initial audience a basic respect for cultural traditions and the role 
of the school in transmitting those traditions to the next generation. 
Indeed, given the educational practices of his day, his first concern 
was to point out the fallacy of assuming that children would 
automatically share their parents and teachers' enthusiasm for, and 
grasp of, the formal products of culture. He noted many times that 
the more sophisticated and technological a culture becomes, the 
greater the distance there is between the immediately social interests 
of the young and the formal organization of the academic disciplines. 
His most often repeated educational prescription was accordingly that 
we must do what we can to bridge that gap, so as best to initiate 
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students into the conceptual and ethical norms of society but which 
they are unable to assimilate in adult form. 
It would, moreover, be a very great mistake to assume that 
Dewey broadly supported the radical practices advanced in his name. 
On the contrary, Dewey was, as I have tried to demonstrate here, one 
of the progressive education movement's harshest critics. The 
optimistic tones with which Dewey and his daughter, Evelyn, wrote of 
the experimental efforts of such progressive educators as the 
Rousseauan-influenced Marietta Johnson in Schools of To-Morrow 
reflected not so much his support of their specific practices as they 
did his approval of the general climate of educational experimentation 
of the 1910's. Indeed, as Cremin notes: 
[T]he reader ... derives the unmistakable sense that all 
the systems expounded are not of equal worth. Mrs. 
Johnson's Rousseauan pedagogy, which comes first in 
order, is not allowed to stand alone but is soon 
incorporated into a larger social reformism that bears the 
earmarks of Dewey's own philosophy. Moreover, while 
each of the individual schools is supposed to exemplify 
one or another of the central principles of progressivism, 
the further one reads in the volume, the more 
comprehensive the example. 
Patricia Graham adds to this explanation that "[t]he 
fundamental difficulty in assessing Dewey's own attitude toward 
progressivism results from his apparent unwillingness in his later years 
to criticize specifically those who called themselves his followers and 
who justified their work by his phrases."’®^ She later goes on to 
mention his seemingly limitless "patience with overzealous and 
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underbright' disciples."’®^ William Brickman completes the picture in 
his introduction to Schools of To-Mnrmww when he writes that 
Dewey might have dwelled to some extent on the 
shortcomings of the schools which were presumably 
putting his doctrines into practice. In 1938, he was to 
pin-point criticism of some tendencies in Progressive 
education. Had he done so in 1915, it might have been 
less necessary in the succeeding decades.^®® 
Finally, contrary to the popular misconception that Dewey's 
ideas underwent significant transformations as a result of failed 
progressive educational experiments, Dewey's later educational 
writings are almost entirely consistent with those from before his 
experience with the progressive schools. The changes in tone and 
emphasis are the result not of some transformation in his philosophy 
but instead of changed social and educational conditions brought 
about in large part by those "disciples" who distorted his early work, 
taking it to extremes unforseen by Dewey himself. For in their zeal to 
attend to students' "interests," progressive educators frequently 
eliminated the curriculum, instead of finding ways to match the two 
as Dewey had advocated. And, in their ardor to "democratize" the 
classroom, they often dispensed with the teacher's authority 
altogether, rather than using it, as Dewey had recommended, to guide 
students towards an active understanding of cultural traditions, 
especially as they relate to present social concerns. 
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Summary 
Transmitting the shared cultural information of a society is but 
a means to the end of preparing people for active participation in the 
affairs, decision-making processes, and characteristic way of life of 
that society. This principle is equally present in Hirsch and Dewey. 
Hirsch, however, does not fully come to terms with the question of 
how to transmit that knowledge in a way that promotes democratic 
habits of participation. The very evidence which he cites to support 
his claim that familiarity with the shared knowledge of a society is 
crucial to being able to participate in that society's affairs 
simultaneously demonstrates the need to learn that knowledge in the 
context of actively and socially constructing one's own knowledge 
and belief systems. Hirsch, however, disregards this need in the 
education of children on the dubious and self-contradictory claim that 
children do not, or do not need to, learn in the same way as adults. In 
contrast, Dewey's principles (1) that the content of education must 
interact with students' present experience, and (2) that the method of 
education must provide for the collateral learning of constructive 
attitudes and habits of continued learning, both show the need for an 
educational context that is not only active but social as well. For 
Dewey, teaching students to construct knowledge in the process of 
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negotiating and realizing shared purposes is the primary way to 
prepare people for the democratic way of life. 
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CRITICAL THINKING AS TRANSFER: THE 
RECONSTRUCTIVE INTEGRATION OF OTHERWISE 
DISCRETE INTERPRETATIONS OF EXPERIENCE 
One of the most debated issues in the current critical thinking 
literature is whether critical thinking should be taught as a single body 
of general, transferable skills, or as a body of diverse sets of skills, 
each peculiar to an academic subject area. In his landmark paper, "A 
Concept of Critical Thinking,"^ Robert H. Ennis, building on the work 
of John Dewey, Max Black, and B. Othanel Smith,^ identified twelve 
general "aspects" of critical thinking which he claimed were both 
teachable and transferable, and, in so doing, laid the groundwork for 
the present critical thinking movement. The list has since been revised 
and added to by many, including Ennis,^ and has acquired something 
of the status of a taxonomy, itself being further broken down into 
composite sets of "dispositions" and "abilities." The basic premise 
behind such inventories is that identifying the general components of 
critical thinking constitutes a major step towards teaching people to 
be critical thinkers. Proponents of this general skills approach hold 
that these aspects, once learned, can be transferred from one content 
area to another, given adequate knowledge of the subject area in 
question. Accordingly, they maintain that critical thinking can be 
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taught both in general skills courses and in courses that "infuse"^ 
general skills into the subject areas. 
In Critical Thinking and Education.^ John E. McPeck challenges 
the basic premise of the critical thinking movement by claiming that 
since all thinking is necessarily thinking about X, there can be no such 
thing as a set of general critical thinking skills, dispositions, or abilities 
that can be applied in all contexts, and that to teach critical thinking 
"in general" is therefore fruitless, perhaps even misguided. McPeck 
bases his argument on the notion that all thinking develops and occurs 
within the specific epistemological and logical frameworks of discrete 
subject areas, and cannot, therefore, be separated from the 
conceptual, evidential, semantic, and logical norms that comprise each 
of them. McPeck defines "critical thinking" as "the appropriate use of 
reflective skepticism"® to establish "good reasons for various 
beliefs,"^ and maintains that since what constitutes "good reasons" 
depends on the peculiar epistemological and logical norms of the 
subject area in question, critical thinking necessarily varies from one 
domain to the next. Rather than trying to teach critical thinking in 
general, McPeck believes we should concentrate instead on giving 
students a more thorough grounding in the epistemological 
underpinnings of the key subject areas. 
Although McPeck's critique has stirred a good deal of 
controversy, there is nevertheless widespread agreement that it has 
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revealed the need for a closer examination of the claim that critical 
thinking is transferable. Not surprisingly, this need is being met in 
large part through public, dialogic exchanges -- a mode of knowledge 
construction that, in the eyes of at least one prominent theorist,® 
captures the essence of what it means to think critically. Although 
these dialogic exchanges are being supplemented by empirical 
research In the cognitive sciences and education,® our main concern 
here will be with a conceptual analysis of the transferability question - 
- on the grounds that all empirical studies are unavoidably guided by 
theory (not overlooking the fact that they, in turn, inform it). In short, 
whenever we pursue or interpret "facts," we invariably impose certain 
theoretical perspectives, whether consciously or not. One purpose of 
the present analysis, then, is to make the theoretical underpinnings of 
the transfer question more explicit. 
Rather than giving separate summary analyses of the 
viewpoints in question,^® the present essay discusses them in 
something of a dialogic fashion intended to delineate and clarify some 
of the key interactions between the two main sides in the debate. 
Among the conclusions which emerge from this discussion are the 
following: (1) that although McPeck may be correct that mastery of 
subject-specific knowledge and skills is the major challenge in learning 
to think critically, general concepts and procedures of thinking 
nevertheless exist, are teachable, and are potentially useful 
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instruments of improved thinking and knowledge transfer, (2) that 
although McPeck's denial of the existence and teachability of general 
thinking skills is overstated, it should not obscure his otherwise 
legitimate point that thinking can neither occur nor be taught 
independently of the epistemological norms of some frame of 
reference or knowledge domain, and (3) that, although both general 
and subject-specific knowledge and skills are important conditions of 
critical thinking, the teaching of neither adequately addresses the 
fundamental problem of getting students to transfer their knowledge 
and skills to new areas. This is because critical thinking ability is not 
so much comprised of general and/or subject-specific knowledge and 
skills to be transferred {though it is that, too) as it is itself a habit of 
ongoing transfer, reconstruction, and integration of otherwise discrete 
interpretations of experience. 
The present essay concludes by reasserting, in a modified form, 
a thesis put forward most notably by Richard Paul -- that the foremost 
task in the teaching of critical thinking is less the transmission of any 
particular knowledge and/or skills than it is the fostering in students of 
those habits of reflective and reconstructive inquiry which ultimately 
lead to an ongoing disposition to seek intellectual, moral, and social 
integrity, or what is sometimes referred to as "the critical spirit. 
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The Argument for Subiect-Snecificity 
McPeck's claim that there are no such things as general, 
teachable skills of critical thinking begins with the following, much 
cited argument from the first chapter of his book: 
It is a matter of conceptual truth that thinking is 
always thinking about X, and that X can never be 
'everything in general' but must always be something in 
particular... 
Thinking, then, is logically connected to an X...and 
so critical thinking, too, must be directed toward 
something... 
In isolation from a particular subject, the phrase 
'critical thinking' neither refers to nor denotes any 
particular skill. It follows from this that it makes no sense 
to talk about critical thinking as a distinct subject and 
that it therefore cannot profitably be taught as such.” 
The argument basically consists of the following chain of inferences: 
(1) Thinking must be about X. 
(2) Hence there can be no thinking which is not about 
something. 
(3) Thus there can be no general thinking skills. 
(4) Therefore thinking cannot be taught as such. 
Clearly, there is no denying that the second premise follows from the 
first, just as the fourth follows from the third. The crux of the 
argument, then, lies in the notion that because we cannot think about 
everything in general, there are no such things as general thinking 
skills. 
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Counterargument: Topic-Specificitv Not Exclusive of General Skills 
As more than one of McPeck's critics has pointed out, 
however, the argument is invalid: because thinking must be about 
some topic, it does not follow that there are no general skills which 
apply to many topics. Drawing an analogy between bicycling and 
thinking, for example, Harvey Siegel holds that "the general activity of 
thinking is [no more] 'logically connected to an X,'... than the general 
activity of cycling is logically connected to any particular bicycle." 
Siegel continues: 
It is true that any given act of cycling must be done on 
some bicycle or other. But it surely does not follow that 
the general activity of cycling cannot be discussed 
independently of any particular bicycle. Indeed, we can 
state, and teach people, general skills of cycling {e.g., 
"lean to the left when making a left-hand turn," "slow 
down before cornering, not during cornering," etc.), even 
though instantiating these maneuvers and so exhibiting 
mastery of the general skills requires some particular 
bicycle. 
Similarly, Ennis holds that McPeck "has failed to prove his point about 
general thinking and logic," maintaining that common sense shows us 
many examples of general skills: 
With respect to general thinking, there are a number of 
concerns and problems that bridge fields, including: 
assumption identification, definition strategy, detecting 
and avoiding equivocation, being clear, inferring to an 
explanation, seeing possible alternative explanations, 
consistency, and judging credibility of putative 
authorities, to mention a few."’^ 
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Response: The Pomain-SDecificitv of Epistemological Norms 
In the first instance, however, McPeck responds that what is 
true of cycling does not necessarily hold true for thinking. The 
difference between them, according to him, is that: 
"cycling”... denote[s] a specific skill, whereas "thinking” 
does not... Cycling has a rather limited, if not unique set 
of standards and criteria which determine what counts as 
effective cycling. But there is no similar set of finite 
criteria which determine (or define) effective thinking... 
Different destinations and purposes do not change the 
specific nature of the skill of cycling. But different 
problems and purposes do change the inherent nature of 
the skills required in thinking. 
In the second instance, McPeck argues that although we can ascribe 
to any one of the "general thinking skills” the same label -- 
"identifying assumptions,” "recognizing fallacies,” etc. -- because of 
the specific semantic, conceptual, and evidential norms peculiar to 
separate knowledge domains, the skills themselves vary, sometimes 
dramatically, from one domain to the next: 
Take, for example, "the ability to recognize underlying 
assumptions.” That this is not a singular ability can be 
appreciated by considering the fact that to recognize an 
underlying assumption in mathematics requires a different 
set of skills and abilities from those required for 
recognizing them in a political dispute, which are 
different again from those required in a scientific dispute. 
Thus, the phrase "ability to recognize underlying 
assumptions” does not denote any singular ability, but 
rather a wide variety of them.^® 
It is important to note, however, that McPeck includes in these 
and similar rebuttals a premise not found in his initial argument, but to 
108 
which a major portion of his book is actually devoted. He began that 
argument, it will be recalled, from the premise that "thinking is always 
thinking about X [-- X being the particular topic at hand],'”® when 
what he really seems to be advancing is the notion that thinking is 
always thinking within X - X being the epistemological norms of a 
particular subject area. He does not undertake the necessary 
explanation, however, until chapter 2, though it is best summarized in 
the following passage from his concluding chapter: 
In chapter 2 it was argued that epistemology is, in effect, 
the analysis of good reasons for belief, including their 
specific character and foundation. Also, because 
collective human experience has discovered that different 
kinds of belief often have different kinds of good reason 
supporting them, it follows that there will be many 
different epistemologies corresponding to different fields 
of human endeavor. A corollary of this is that logic itself 
is parasitic upon epistemology, since logic is merely the 
formalization of good reasons once they have been 
discovered. Thus epistemology, and to some extent logic, 
have intra-field validity but not necessarily inter-field 
validity (see chapter 2).’^ 
Because McPeck does not reveal this claim to the epistemological 
subject-specificity of thinking in his initial argument, however, it is not 
as clear as it should be that it comprises his key premise. As such, it 
is helpful to put it in the context of some of his related assumptions. 
Borrowing from the philosophy of science, McPeck draws a 
distinction between two related contexts of thinking: the "context of 
discovery" - that side of thinking concerned with generating and 
formulating plausible hypotheses to solve problems and explain 
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relationships -- and the "context of justification" -- that side concerned 
with determining the adequacy of hypotheses once they have been 
formulated.’® According to McPeck, deductive, formal logic (for 
him, the one aspect of thinking that can be at all divorced from 
subject-specific content) is restricted to the context of justification, 
and affects the context of discovery only insofar as it eliminates 
certain possibilities as logically invalid. But, he maintains, formal logic 
cannot generate possible solutions itself, as these are necessarily 
contextual; i.e., they depend on knowledge of and familiarity with the 
epistemological - semantic, conceptual, and evidential’® - norms of 
the relevant problem-areals). Moreover, even though the context of 
discovery is, for McPeck, restricted to content-bound or inductive 
modes of thinking, it is evident that the context of justification admits 
of both inductive and deductive modes, as an hypothesis must be 
subjected to criteria of empirical truth as well as of logical validity to 
determine its adequacy. And, according to McPeck, these evidential 
criteria are again peculiar to specific subject areas. Thus, for McPeck, 
any complete act or description of thinking necessarily entails both the 
formulating and the testing of plausible hypotheses within the 
epistemological norms of the subject areals) in question, and therefore 
cannot be separated from them. 
In short, then, the essence of McPeck's critique of the general 
skills approach hinges, not on the premise that thinking must be about 
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some topic (a premise which, so far as I can tell, is superfluous to his 
argument), but rather on the premise that thinking must occur within 
the epistemological norms of some specific subject area.^° One of 
the apparent consequences of this postulation of the epistemological 
subject-specificity of thinking, for McPeck, is the subject-specificity of 
thinking skills. For him, "skills are born of knowledge of, and 
experience in, specific areas," and, hence, "are parasitic upon detailed 
knowledge of, and experience in, parent fields and problem areas. 
The key argument in his critique of the general skills approach, 
therefore, would be more accurately stated as follows: that because 
thinking must occur within the epistemological norms of some specific 
subject area, there can be no such things as general thinking skills. 
The Argument for General Skills 
For general skills proponents, however, the existence of 
subject-specific norms and skills no more precludes the existence of 
"general" skills than does the claim to the topic-specificity of thinking. 
(Thus, Siegel's assertion that "there are readily identifiable reasoning 
skills which do not refer to any specific subject matter"^^ could just 
as easily read that 'there are readily identifiable reasoning skills which 
do not refer to any specific subject area.') While not specifically 
denying that many, perhaps "most." reasoning skills are subject- 
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specific, general skills proponents believe that there are nevertheless 
certain "general" skills, or certain generalizable features of otherwise 
subject-specific skills, which enable us to refer to them with a general 
nomenclature.^^ Thus, the general skill of "assumption identification" 
would include knowing both what an assumption is and how generally 
to go about looking for one (in the most basic sense, by identifying 
the premise and conclusion of an argument, then formulating the 
missing premise). Moreover, practice in "assumption identification" 
would improve one's ability to identify assumptions generally. 
Counterargument: Facility with General Concents and Procedures Not 
the Same as Critical Thinking Ability 
This latter claim, however, is precisely the sort to which 
McPeck so adamantly objects, because for him there is no "general 
ability" to "identify assumptions." A moment ago I said that 
"assumption identification" as a "general skill" would include both a 
knowledge of what an assumption is and a knowledge of how to look 
for one generally. While McPeck has no particular objection to either 
of these claims as such, he does object to the implication that a 
knowledge of general concepts and procedures constitutes a general 
"skill" in thinking: 
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There is certainly something to be said for understanding 
what an assumption is, what a deductive inference is, 
etc. But I...object to such understanding being cashed- 
out as providing general "critical thinking skill. 
This is because, for McPeck, while it would be possible to know what 
an assumption is (the concept) and even how to go about looking for 
one generally (the procedure), the actual "skill" of "assumption 
identification" would be peculiar to the particular knowledge domain 
being thought about: "the so-called 'thinking skills' are an inherent 
part of the warp and woof of the various disciplines, and must, 
therefore, be taught as part of them."^® Moreover, according to 
McPeck, in any situation where the grounds for belief are uncertain - 
i.e., in any situation which calls for critical thinking -- it is not so much 
the general form or logical validity of the relevant claims that is hard 
to assess as it is the subject-specific content or truth of the premises: 
[l]n deciding upon real public questions it is usually not 
the logical validity of an argument that we find difficult 
but rather the task of determining whether certain 
premises are in fact true. And this latter difficulty 
invariably takes us into the unfamiliar ground of some 
technical subject area, where each question seems to 
generate several others and epistemological uncertainties 
abound.^® 
As far as McPeck is concerned, the general skills approach reverses 
this order by creating the misleading impression that learning to think 
critically is primarily a matter of mastering a given body of generai 
thinking concepts and procedures. 
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Thus, the problem with the general skills approach, for McPeck, 
seems not so much to be that certain general concepts and 
procedures of thinking do not exist as it is (1) that, even with the 
addition of subject-specific knowledge, an understanding of general 
thinking concepts and procedures does not automatically translate 
into critical thinking ability in that subject area, and (2) that, on the 
whole, an understanding of these general concepts and procedures is 
not really very important compared to field-specific knowledge and 
skills themselves in imparting critical thinking ability. To achieve that 
kind of ability, McPeck maintains, it would make much more sense to 
concentrate instead on "explaining and laying bare, as it were, the 
epistemic foundations and logical peculiarities of the various 
disciplines."^^ 
Response: General Skills as Supportive of Multi-Looical Thinking 
McPeck's point, however, has not been lost on general skills 
advocates, who readily concede that a thorough grounding in the 
peculiar norms of a subject area is necessary to thinking critically 
within that subject area. As Ennis states: "I do not know of anyone 
who thinks that having the relevant information and concepts in a 
discipline is not a necessary condition for understanding a good 
reason in [that] discipline.”'® Nevertheless, according to Ennis, while 
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a knowledge of subject-specific concepts and procedures is a 
necessary condition of critical thinking, it is not a sufficient one, as 
there are "many people who are educated conceptually and 
informationally in a field of study, but make a range of logical and 
critical thinking mistakes in [it].”^® Obviously, however, instruction in 
general skills is no guarantee of critical thinking ability, either. Indeed, 
as McPeck has pointed out, such instruction does not even appear to 
be a necessary condition, as "is evidenced by the fact that many 
people can and do display critical thinking who have never been 
directly taught, and perhaps never heard of, the specific skills 
supposedly required of critical thinkers."^® Of course, this does not 
prove that these people do not possess such skills; it only proves that 
they did not need to be taught them in a general skills course. Ennis, 
however, never claims otherwise. His main concern is only to argue 
that there are good reasons for believing that instruction in general 
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thinking skills can help people become more critical thinkers. 
One reason Ennis considers the general thinking skills helpful in 
learning to think critically is that they appear to play a particularly 
useful role in the transfer of thinking from one domain to another, 
especially in those situations where the topic being thought about is 
not confined to any single, established subject area. According to 
Ennis: 
[Mjany issues calling for good thinking are not 
within a single discipline, nor is it reasonable to expect 
115 
that most people exposed to them would have mastered 
all of the disciplines involved in the issue. Nor is it even 
clear in many issues what all the disciplines would be... 
So, even if McPeck were right about good thinking within 
a discipline being achieved by study of the discipline, 
there is a large set of significant situations that would 
not thus be provided with previous thinking instruction 
under his plan... 
Thus, though McPeck may have successfully 
argued that information and a grasp of field-specific 
concepts are necessary conditions for critical thinking in 
and out of a discipline, he has not shown that they are 
sufficient conditions for thinking within and outside of a 
discipline. He has not shown that logic and general 
critical thinking skills and instruction therein do not also 
help.^^ 
Ennis's point is that McPeck's subject-specific approach to teaching 
critical thinking does not adequately prepare a person to think about 
problems that fall into more than one subject area, or into subject 
areas other than those in which a person has background. General 
skills, on the other hand, seem to be useful in helping us learn to think 
both between discrete subject areas and within new ones, since they 
provide a general conceptual and procedural basis from which to 
launch even unfamiliar lines of inquiry. 
Richard Paul makes a similar point when he argues that: 
Even concepts and lines of reasoning clearly within one 
category are also simultaneousfly] within others. Most of 
what we say and think...is not only open but multi- 
textured as well. For example, in what logical domain 
does the (technical?) concept of alcoholism solely belong: 
disease, addiction, crime, moral failing, cultural pattern, 
lifestyle choice, defect of socialization, self-comforting 
behavior, psychological escape, personal weakness,....?^ 
How many points of view can be used to illuminate it? 
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Like Ennis, Paul is arguing that background in the epistemological 
norms of discrete subject areas does not prepare one to think about 
those topics which fall into more than a single subject area. The basic 
inference of both passages seems to be that because problems often 
fall into more than a single subject area, thinking itself is not 
constrained by subject-specific norms; hence critical thinking 
instruction should not be either. 
Counterargument: Cross-Disciolinarv Nature of Problems Not 
Sufficient Grounds for the Claim to Multi-Looical Thought 
While I agree with this conclusion, the inference is not a valid 
one, as is evident in McPeck's counterresponse: 
My answer to all these questions [raised by Paul] is that 
it depends on what, precisely, you want to know or say 
about alcoholism. If one is interested in how widespread 
it is, or in which age-group, then it is a sociological 
question. If one wants to know if it is right or wrong, 
then it is a moral question. If one wants to know why 
people become alcoholics, then it is a psychological 
question. If one wants to know whether it is sinful, then 1 
suppose this is a religious question. 
In other words, from the premises that topics do not always fall neatly 
into one subject area or another, and that they can, in fact, be 
approached from the perspectives of many different subject areas 
simultaneously, it does not necessarily follow that thinking itself must 
be cross-disciplinary or that it should be taught through a cross- 
disciplinary or general approach.- Rather, as the McPeck passage 
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makes evident, it is also plausible to infer that we simply apply to the 
same topics epistemological and logical norms from discrete subject 
areas or knowledge domains. Thus, for McPeck, the best way to learn 
to think critically about topics which fall into more than one subject 
area is to learn the epistemological norms of a wide range of them: 
One of the reasons I have been such a strong advocate 
of liberal education to develop critical thinking capacity is 
because I believe such an education helps to anticipate 
the multi-categorical nature of most problems. A person 
needs several different kinds of knowledge and 
understanding to appreciate the different dimensions of 
most real problems.^® 
Response: Intuitive "Wrongness” of Strict Epistemological Relativism 
There is in McPeck's counterresponse, however, a certain 
rigidity about the separateness of discrete knowledge domains that 
both Paul and Ennis find objectionable. As Paul states: 
From a logical atomist's point of view {everything to be 
carefully placed in an appropriate ^ generis logical 
category, there to be settled by appropriate specialists in 
that category), dialectical, multi-categorical questions are 
anomalous. When noticed the tendency is to try to 
fabricate specialized categories for them or to break them 
down into a summary complex of mono-categorical 
elements. Hence the problem of peace in relation to the 
military industrial complex would be broken down by 
atomists into discrete sets of economic, social, ethical, 
historical, and psychological problems, or what have you, 
each to be analyzed and settled discretely.®^ 
Drawing on their work in transfer research, David Perkins and Gavriel 
Salomon express much the same sentiment: 
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To be sure, general heuristics that fail to make contact 
with a rich domain-specific knowledge base are weak. 
But when a domain-specific knowledge base operates 
without general heuristics, it is brittle - it serves mostly 
in handling formulaic problems.^® 
And, indeed, the McPeck passages do leave him open to such 
criticisms. 
Critical Thinking as a Process of Reconstructive Transfer 
In truth, however, McPeck no more subscribes to the view that 
thinking is mono-categorical than Paul subscribes to the view that 
simply because problems fall into many domains, thinking itself must 
be inter-disciplinary. Rather, they both operate from a premise which 
not only makes the claim to multi-categorical thought a necessary 
conclusion, but which has significant implications for the entire 
transfer question as well. For, according to both, what we think In 
one context or domain usually, perhaps Inevitably, affects what we 
think in others -- indeed. It must do so if what we think is to be 
considered rational - with the obvious implication that thinking in one 
domain must, at times, transfer to others; 
Consider for example Copernicus' statements about the 
earth in relation to the sun. These are, you may be 
tempted to say, astronomical statements and nothing 
else. But if they become a part of concepts and lines of 
thought that have radically reoriented philosophical, 
social, religious, economic and personal thought, as 
indeed they have, are they merely in that one 
category?^® 
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McPeck agrees, but he is careful to distinguish between the 
notion that thinking is multi-categorical and the notion that it is a 
general skill: 
One kind of knowledge about things (like alcoholism) can 
often affect other beliefs one has about it as well. For 
example, if you believed alcoholism to be a disease, then 
you might not view it as a sin. But all of these cross¬ 
influences, and multi-texturedness, does not gainsay the 
existence of categories through which we perceive, talk 
and think about things. Indeed, rational belief and action 
is often predicated on seeing things from these different 
perspectives.'^® 
That thinking always occurs within a given frame of reference 
is, in fact, a point on which Paul agrees with McPeck: "The process of 
gaining knowledge is at its roots dialogical. Our minds are never 
empty of beliefs and never without a point of view. They cannot 
function framelessly."'^^ But whereas McPeck's concern is to warn 
against the dangers of conceiving of thinking in excessively formalistic 
terms -- that is, as something that can be reduced to a body of 
universal skills, principles, and procedures that transcend the various 
contexts and content areas in which thinking occurs -- Paul's concern 
is to warn against the dangers of conceiving of thinking in excessively 
relativistic terms - that is, as something that is so subject-specific 
that there remains no basis on which to consider the impact of 
discrete frames of reference on one another. In fact, however, where 
both McPeck and Paul come out is with a view of thinking as a 
process by which the perspectives of otherwise discrete frames of 
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reference enter into a reconstructive dialogue tending towards greater 
integrity. 
Indeed, as the remainder of this essay wiil argue, we might all 
be better served than we are with the present debate by a conception 
of thinking itself as transfer, or at least as the means by which 
transfer occurs. For what else can thinking be than the reconstruction 
and application of knowledge and skills gleaned in one context to 
meet the demands of new contexts? And if thinking is transfer, then 
criticai thinking is critical transfer, or the deliberate attempt to 
postulate, test, account for, use, and mutually reconstruct otherwise 
field-dependent semantic, conceptual, evidential, and logical norms in 
and in light of new situations for the purposes of solving problems, 
explaining relationships, and, above all, constructing increasingly 
powerful knowledge systems that integrate previousiy discrete frames 
of reference. Thus, while the general skills advocates are correct that 
knowledge and skills learned in one context can transfer to others, the 
means by which that transfer takes place is not so much through the 
use of "general thinking skills" as it is through "thinking itself, which 
is, as McPeck says, highly contextual. The chief limitation, then, of 
the general skills approach is that it fails to take adequate account of 
the fact that transfer is neither general nor automatic, but subject- 
specific and constructive in a way general taxonomies fail to capture. 
At the same time, however, in rejecting the notion of general skills in 
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favor of an apparently strict epistemological relativism, McPeck offers 
no clear explanation of how integrated knowledge systems can be 
constructed, a function which both he and Paul seem to regard as the 
pinnacle of critical thought. 
Thinking and the Construction of Integrated Knowledge Systems 
Richard Paul, of course, is already known for his advocation of 
a model of critical thinking as a dialogical process culminating in the 
construction of increasingly more integrated world views. But consider 
the following passage by McPeck: 
The process of justifying one's beliefs...has two 
distinguishable dimensions. One is to assess the veracity 
and internal validity of the evidence as presented, and 
the other is to judge whether the belief, together with its 
supporting evidence, is compatible with an existing belief 
system. If it is not compatible, then an adjustment 
somewhere In the system will be required: there is 
something amiss either with the new evidence or with 
the system of beliefs. The importance of this process of 
assessing, fitting and adjusting beliefs cannot be 
overemphasized because it is this process that makes the 
belief 'belong' to a person as distinct from being merely a 
proposition or belief that he knows about.'^^ 
Paul makes precisely the same point, when, utilizing Whitehead's 
notion of "Inert knowledge" as "knowledge that we in some sense 
have but do not use when logically relevant, knowledge that just sits 
there in our minds, as it were, without activating force," and his own 
notion of "activated ignorance" as those "beliefs that are firmly 
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entrenched in instinctual egocentric thinking [despite their 
inconsistency with knowledge gleaned through more rational 
means],he says the following: 
Students leave school not only with unreconstructed 
[i.e., unintegrated] mathematical and physical ideas but 
with unreconstructed personal, social, moral, historical, 
economic, and political views. Students leave school not 
knowing what they really, that is deeply, believe. 
Students leave school with a great deal of inert 
knowledge and even more activated ignorance. 
Therefore, students do not understand how to read, 
write, think, listen, or speak in such a way as to organize 
and express what they believe. 
What Paul and McPeck are both concerned with in these 
passages is that education should lead to the active reconstruction 
and integration of existing belief systems with and in light of new 
knowledge or evidence, a process which they both equate with the 
term "critical thinking." Such a conception, moreover, bears a striking 
resemblance to Piaget's conception of cognitive development as a 
process of ongoing "equilibration,"^® where every instance of 
thinking sees the assimilation of some new knowledge or belief into 
an existing belief system together with the simultaneous adjustment 
of the existing belief system to accommodate the new knowledge or 
belief. "Critical thinking," by this conception, would similarly entail the 
deliberate reconstruction, transfer, and integration of otherwise 
discrete interpretations of experience, as is evident in both the Paul 
and McPeck passages. 
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Reconciling the General and Domain-Specific Aspects of Thinking 
Despite this conceptual similarity, however, there are certain 
important differences in Paul's and McPeck's respective accounts of 
critical thinking and how It should be taught. Not surprisingly, high 
among these is the relative emphasis each places on the general 
versus the subject-specific features of thinking. According to Paul: 
The most important place that knowledge has in any lives 
is, on my view, that of shaping our concept of things 
uberhauDt. our system of values, meanings, and 
interpretive schemes.... Logical synthesis, cutting across 
categories, extracting metaphors from one domain and 
using them to organize others, arguing for or against the 
global metaphors of others, are intellectual acts that are 
grounded ultimately not in the criteria and skills of 
specialists, not in some science or other or any 
combination thereof, but in the art of rational-dialectical- 
critical thought. 
He goes on to say that "a global perspective....can be assessed only 
by appeal to general dialectical skills, not domain or subject-specific 
ones."^^ McPeck, on the other hand, argues that thinking is 
grounded ultimately not in some general art or skill of critical thinking 
but in the epistemological structures of the various knowledge 
domains which humanity has evolved over time: 
Paul states in several places that a person's "world 
view," or knowledge "uberhaupt," plays a crucial role in 
their critical thinking capacities. I could not agree more. 
However, if Paul would take the time to examine 
seriously the ingredients of a person's "world view," I 
think he would find it composed of certain kinds of 
beliefs and knowledge structures (i.e. cognitive 
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schemata) which is precisely what liberal education 
attempts to influence and enlighten/® 
From the perspective of a conception of critical thinking as 
culminating in the construction of integrated knowledge systems, 
however, this dichotomy over which is more important -- the general 
form or the domain-specific content of thought - is more apparent 
than real, as the McPeck quotation begins to suggest. Such a 
perspective is, curiously enough, even more evident in the following 
passage by Paul: 
The only way to test whole frames of reference without 
begging the question is by setting the frames of 
reference dialectically against each other so that the 
logical strength of one can be tested against the logical 
strength of the contending others by appealing to 
standards not peculiar to either.'^® 
What Paul is doing in this passage is describing the process which he 
alternatively refers to as "the art of rational-dialectical-critical thought" 
or as being composed of "general skills of critical-cross¬ 
examination"®® in such a way as to make apparent that the 
necessary referents upon which beliefs are justified, and integrated 
knowledge systems constructed, are not just the general principles of 
dialectical thought to which he refers but also the overlapping norms 
of the otherwise discrete knowledge domains about which one is 
thinking. In other words, the general, dialogical, and procedural form 
of critical thinking is no more the ultimate arbiter of knowledge 
construction than are subject-specific epistemological and logical 
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norms. In fact, the general and field-dependent norms of thinking 
necessarily work together in such a way that to conceive of them 
separately inevitably oversimplifies the actual dynamic process by 
which multi-categorical belief systems are constructed. 
A further clue as to how such knowledge construction works 
lies in the following response by Paul to what he sees as McPeck's 
excessively rigid conception of the domain-specificity of particular 
lines of thought; 
The category a thing is in is logically dependent upon 
what it is like, but all things (including conceptual 
schemes) are like any number of other things (other 
conceptual schemes for example) in any number of ways 
and so are in, dependent on our purposes, any number of 
logical domains.®’ 
Paul seems to be arguing that concepts and conceptual schemes have 
points of similarity that effectively put them in each others' domains, 
and, moreover, that these points of similarity vary according to the 
diverse contexts which call forth our deliberations about them. If this 
is his point, I would go one step further and argue, as Dewey does in 
How We Think, that "thinking" entails, in this regard, precisely the 
intentional grasping of these common elements: 
Similar qualities are always the bridge over which the 
mind passes in going from a former experience to a new 
one. Now thinking....is a process of grasping in a 
conscious way the common elements. It thus adds 
greatly to the availability of common elements for 
purposes of transfer. Unless these elements are seized 
and held by the mind....any transfer occurs only blindly, 
by sheer accident.®^ 
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In other words, knowledge and skills learned in a previous context 
(including a knowledge domain) apply in new contexts (new 
knowledge domains included) in the degree to which the new 
contexts share features with the old. And it is thinking which makes 
the grasping of such similarities possible. 
Thinking and the Construction of New Knowledge 
This conception of critical thinking as including the grasping of 
similarities between otherwise discrete contexts of reasoning also has 
important implications for what we consider a "subject area" or 
"knowledge domain." Whereas McPeck seems to adhere to the 
conventional taxonomy of subject areas that comprise a liberal 
education, Paul holds a more flexible notion: 
On my view the logics we use, and which we are daily 
constructing and reconstructing, are far more mutable, 
less discrete, more general, more open- and multi- 
textured, more social, more dialectical, and even more 
personal -- and hence far less susceptible to domain- 
specific skills and concepts -- than McPeck dares to 
imagine.®^ 
Although the present essay's account of the role of subject-specific 
norms in knowledge reconstruction challenges Paul's notion that our 
ways of reasoning are in any way exempt from domain-specific 
concepts and skills, it does suggest that our definition of a subject 
area should almost certainly be more flexible and progressive than the 
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traditional taxonomy of liberal education admits.®^ For although the 
conventional academic disciplines are the most reliable and powerful 
conceptual systems we have (their criteria and procedures having 
been constructed over time through ongoing and progressive dialogue 
regarding the recurring issues and concerns of the communities of 
people working within those frameworks), a conception of critical 
thinking as including the reconstruction and integration of otherwise 
domain-specific norms carries with it the implication that the 
conventional academic disciplines neither delineate nor circumscribe 
all the possible ways of thinking or knowing. Indeed, if thinking entails 
the reconstructive transfer of otherwise discrete concepts and norms, 
then it also entails the ongoing construction of new and potentially 
more integrated ways of understanding and explaining the world. 
Broadening the Scope of Our Conception 
This view of thinking as a process of ongoing construction, 
reconstruction, and integration of otherwise discrete knowledge 
systems brings to light the major shortcoming of both the general 
skills and subject-specific approaches. For although general and 
subject-specific knowledge and skills are perhaps both necessary 
conditions of the mutual reconstructive integration of otherwise 
discrete frames of reference, those models of critical thinking which 
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emphasize them do not capture the highly constructive nature of 
actual thinking, a process from which the natural human drive for 
connectedness and integrity®® simply cannot be separated. Such a 
conception suggests to me that the guiding criterion against which all 
thinking can or should be measured is as much moral as it is rational, 
the two terms being highly complementary. 
On this point I agree wholeheartedly with Richard Paul, who 
has so strongly advocated that our goal in teaching critical thinking 
should be the cultivation of critical thinking in the "strong sense" -- 
that is, of critical thinking as including an ongoing disposition of fair- 
mindedness and self-examination that makes intellectual, emotional, 
behavioral, and, indeed, social, integrity possible. Rationality and 
morality alike dictate that we think, feel, and act in a self-consistent 
manner. And while it is unclear which criterion -- rationality or morality 
— ultimately motivates us to broaden actively the range and depth of 
our understanding so as to include, even enlist, the viewpoints of 
others, the important point is that growth in understanding and 
appreciation is a universal criterion against which all rational acts can 
be measured. It is no accident, in this regard, that Paul and McPeck 
alike take for granted the value of having or constructing a world 
view," for the valuing of such an ideal is implicit in the very concept 
of rationality. 
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Teaching for Transfer: A Moral Task 
In "Questions and Answers about the Nature and Teaching of 
Thinking Skills, " Robert J. Sternberg asks what he considers to be 
"the fundamental question in the teaching of thinking skills": "What 
can we do to maximize transfer of training for thinking skills to 
students' everyday lives?"®® For McPeck, the answer seems to be 
that we should better acquaint students with the epistemological 
underpinnings and real-life applications of the subject areas -- on the 
grounds (1) that thinking cannot be separated from the subject- 
specific norms of discrete knowledge domains, and (2) that familiarity 
with a wide range of conceptual and procedural norms is the best 
preparation for dealing with complex, real-life problems. For general 
skills proponents, the answer seems to be that we should teach 
general concepts, procedures, and principles of thinking which are 
common to many subject areas -- on the grounds that such skills are 
applicable to a wide range of multi-dimensional, everyday problems for 
which no person could ever be adequately prepared using a strictly 
subject-specific approach. 
Not only do both approaches seem sound - McPeck's, because 
the power and range of applicability of the subject areas is formidable, 
and the general skills advocates', because general skills can provide 
students with familiar means of approaching unfamiliar topics - but 
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they seem complementary as well. Indeed, the trend in critical 
thinking research and instruction seems to be towards just such a 
conception, alternatively labelled the "mixed model" or "synthesis" 
approach, and according to which, as Ennis puts it, "there is a 
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separate thread or course aimed at teaching general principles of 
critical thinking, but [where] students are also involved in subject- 
specific critical thinking instruction."®^ Such an approach, write 
Perkins and Salomon, acknowledges that "there are general cognitive 
skills; but [that] they always function in contextualized ways."®® 
Nonetheless, while both approaches supply skills that are both useful 
and necessary in dealing with real-life problems, neither one {alone or 
even, necessarily, together) really answers the question of how to get 
students themselves transferring and applying -- actively, creatively, 
and autonomously — the particular skills it advocates. The irony of this 
situation is that such transfer is tantamount to thinking itself. That is, 
for students to transfer their thinking skills they would have to think 
about the relevance and applicability of those skills to new contexts. 
Sternberg, in answer to his own question of how to maximize 
transfer, begins by suggesting that we should be sure to teach those 
"executive” or "metacomponentiar' thinking skills that would help 
students plan, monitor, and evaluate their own thinking, thus helping 
them to become more aware of how to apply their thinking skills in 
new contexts.®’ Such "skills" as Ennis's "identifying or formulating 
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questions,” "identifying or formulating criteria for judging possible 
answers," and "keeping the situation in mind"®° would function, in 
other words, somewhat as skills of transfer. 
As Sternberg himself acknowledges, however, merely 
acquainting students with such skills still will not ensure that students 
will learn to transfer them. He thus goes on to emphasize not what 
thinking skills we should teach but how we should teach them. 
Towards this end, he recommends such strategies as presenting 
thinking skills across a range of disciplines, in concrete, abstract, 
academic, and practical situations, and using a variety of presentation 
techniques (video, audio etc.). And, indeed, showing students, by a 
variety of methods, how thinking strategies and skills function across 
a range of fields and exemplars is excellent pedagogical advice. But it 
still fails to address directly the question of how to get students 
initiating and extending such transfer themselves. 
Dispositions. Not skills, the Essence of Thinkinq 
The dilemma brings home the already obvious fact that 
"thinking skills” and "thinking" are not the same thing. As Sternberg 
writes: "Unless students can learn to think flexibly, look for 
opportunities to transfer their skills, and seek analogies between past 
and future situations, transfer is most unlikely to ensue."®’ What is 
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interesting about this passage (and many others like it, by many other 
writers) is that the verbs -- "learn," "think," "look," "transfer," and 
"seek" -- all refer not to "skills" but to "ongoing behaviors," or 
"dispositions." Indeed, critical thinking as a "disposition" is almost 
always invoked in the wake of the anticipated failure of skills 
instruction to impart autonomous critical thinking ability. And yet, the 
treatment of critical thinking as a disposition, with the notable 
exception of Richard Paul's work, usually amounts to little more than 
obligatory concluding statements to the effect that 'the teaching of 
thinking skills is all for naught unless we can develop in students a 
critical disposition.' 
In fact, as long as we emphasize the transmission of skills in 
the teaching of critical thinking, we will continue to formulate the 
problem of transfer as the problem of how to get students to transfer 
their thinking skills to new contexts. A concept of critical thinking as 
transfer, on the other hand, calls attention to the fact that teaching 
for transfer is less a matter of transmitting knowledge, skills, 
strategies, and principles of thinking (though it is that, too) than it Is 
of fostering in students from the start an inquiring disposition, by 
which I mean a "readiness"®^ to consider the bearing of apparently 
discrete frames of reference on one another and towards the 
construction of a more integrated world view. 
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Herein, then, lies the educational bearing which framing the 
concept of critical thinking in moral terms has on the question of how 
to teach for transfer. For if critical thinking entails the ongoing 
construction, reconstruction, and integration of a person's world view 
and ways of knowing, then the aim of "critical thinking instruction" 
(indeed, the aim of education) is not so much the transmission of 
time-tested knowledge and skills (though these are, of course, 
important!) as it is the fostering of those habits of rational inquiry that 
lead a person always to seek the expansion, deepening, and 
integration of her own belief structures. Familiarity with subject- 
specific and general conceptual and procedural norms may be a 
necessary condition of critical thought - it is certainly a primary aim 
of a liberal education - but more important is a disposition that 
consistently leads one to strive for intellectual, emotional, and 
behavioral integrity, or what is sometimes called "the critical 
spirit."®'^ And dispositions are not so much taught as nurtured, by 
creating the appropriate educational conditions. 
In fact, the only way to develop in students the disposition to 
pursue actively the integrity and expansion of their own belief 
systems is to lead them to conclude for themselves that such a 
pursuit is worthwhile, and this means creating educational conditions 
that simultaneously challenge and engage the interests of students as 
individuals.*' Difficult as this may be. it necessarily follows from a 
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conception of thinking as the constructing of integrated knowledge 
and belief systems. For, as I will discuss momentarily, it is only by 
engaging, then tactfully challenging, the habitual belief patterns to 
which students uncritically cling, that they will be motivated to 
examine critically and reconstruct their own otherwise unexamined 
assumptions. 
Some Educational Guidelines 
In this regard, educators concerned with the teaching of critical 
thinking have forwarded many ideas as to the necessary conditions 
for fostering a critical disposition. One such condition, on which at 
least three prominent theorists agree,®® is that teachers themselves 
should model critical thinking. In light of the view advanced in the 
present essay, such modeling would consist largely in public, 
interactive, dialogic exchanges with both class materials and students 
themselves, resulting in visible reconstructions of the teachers' 
knowledge and beliefs in light of class content and the students' 
input. Such modeling should not, of course, usurp the teacher's 
authority; it should rather demonstrate that even someone with more 
extensive knowledge and experience continues to grow intellectually 
by reconstructing and integrating new points of view with the old. 
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The whole purpose of modeling, of course, is to encourage 
students to follow the teacher's lead. And this means that the teacher 
must raise issues, or allow students to raise issues, that not only, as 
Richard Paul has suggested, engage students' egocentric or 
unexamined beliefs,®^ but which the teacher is confident she can 
challenge without intimidating or unduly discouraging students. 
Although one temptation here might be to get involved in students' 
immediate or personal concerns, such an approach tends only to 
reflect back to students their own egocentric beliefs, when what we 
really want to be doing is encouraging them to reexamine critically 
those beliefs in light of frames of reference with which they are as yet 
unfamiliar. My own strategy as a writing teacher has been to engage 
students' activated {and often uncritical) public beliefs on such issues 
as abortion, gay rights, public smoking, drug policies, SDI, etc., where 
I can help them locate and/or generate the alternative points of view 
that stimulate multi-logical reflection. Working with a range of issues 
such as these is relatively easy in a writing class, but teachers in the 
subject areas can similarly engage and challenge students' habitual 
thinking patterns: in the sciences, for example, by creating doubtful 
situations to which students themselves must seek answers, or, in the 
humanities, by having students generate and compare alternative 
interpretations of, and explanations and metaphors for works, 
theories, and points of view that intrigue them. 
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The key to making such issues into vehicles for learning to think 
critically, and a third condition for getting students to do so, is that 
students be required, much as Richard Paul has suggested,®® to 
formulate, articulate, and respond to alternative viewpoints from 
competing frames of reference, (in the sciences, for example, by 
generating, formulating, and testing competing hypotheses -- which is 
the way actual scientific inquiries typically operate). With highly 
opinionated students, teachers should generally concentrate on 
getting them to see and articulate the strengths of alternative 
arguments and theories, and the weaknesses of their own. Vacillating 
and indecisive students, on the other hand, should typically be asked 
to do the near opposite: to formulate and develop their own ideas in 
light of the many viewpoints between which they cannot decide. In 
both cases, the educational principle is the same: Put in students' way 
only such obstacles as are necessary to prevent them from being 
satisfied with habitual trains of thought but which do not discourage 
them from attempting to construct new ones. The artful teacher is the 
one who has taken the time to acquaint herself with the thinking 
habits of her individual students, so that she knows when and how to 
challenge, and when and how to offer support. 
A good deal more could be said about what educational 
conditions best foster a critical disposition, for example, concerning 
the appropriate social contexts of learning.®’ For now, though, I 
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conclude with a single, modest suggestion. As teachers concerned 
with the difficulty we see students having initiating and sustaining 
their own lines of inquiry, I believe we would all do well to study 
closely Dewey's classic work in this field. How We Think.^° For 
more than any other source I have seen, this book outlines the 
conditions which provoke "reflective thinking" (which Dewey basically 
defines as the search for reliable grounds for belief) and translates 
them into educational principles. The book is often misconstrued as an 
attempt to outline a five step model of inquiry, but only someone who 
skimmed the chapters dealing with that model could miss Dewey's 
repeated reminders that the "five steps" are neither linear, discrete, 
nor restricted to five in number. What the book really attempts is to 
describe in considerable detail the dynamic processes involved in 
"reflective thinking" and the educational conditions which elicit, 
regulate, and sustain those processes. In this author's opinion, it is 
the most significant work in the field of critical thinking instruction to 
date, and one which I hope, in future essays, to discuss in the light of 
recent developments in the critical thinking literature. 
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JUSTICE AND CARING AND 
THE PROBLEM OF MORAL RELATIVISM: 
REFRAMING THE GENDER QUESTION IN ETHICS 
Recent psychological research by Carol Gilligan and others 
suggests that men and women, as a result of certain general features 
of their respective gender experience, tend to develop morally 
somewhat differently, a fact which previous research into moral 
development overlooked. It appears that whereas men tend to 
construe moral problems in terms of the competing rights of separate 
individuals, women tend to do so in terms of the conflicting 
obligations they feel towards individuals with whom they feel 
connected.’ Gilligan has referred to the masculine moral experience 
as a "justice" or "fairness" orientation, and the feminine as a 
"responsibility" or "caring" orientation, and has argued that in each 
case these are the criteria by which men and women tend to make 
their moral decisions. 
Whether or not men and women do, in fact, develop along 
these two different lines,^ Gilligan's thesis has not only given rise to 
arguments concerning the scope of inquiry into moral development, 
but it has also refueled old debates concerning the nature of morality 
itself. Among the many philosophical questions which this 
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genderization of moral development has raised is that of which 
criterion, caring or justice, if either, defines a more mature form of 
moral reasoning, and, by implication, a more adequate morality. 
Most theoreticians of men's and/or women's moral 
development agree that the developmental crisis which marks the 
transition from conventional, adolescent morality to principled, mature 
moral reasoning is the confrontation with the problem of moral 
relativism -- the apparent contradiction between the philosophic 
assumption that morality is in some sense universal and the fact that 
people's moral beliefs differ. The hallmark of mature moral reasoning, 
for most theorists, is that it offers some way out of the problem 
without lapsing into dogmatism -- the arbitrary proclamation that one 
set of beliefs is right and all others wrong. 
Despite these similarities, however, developmental theorists 
disagree as to what constitutes a viable resolution of the problem. 
While none of them advocates unlimited moral relativism 
- the belief that there are no shared moral standards, i.e., that right 
and wrong are strictly matters of personal opinion -- conceptions of 
what constitutes mature moral reasoning range from Gilligan's notion 
of multiple moral contexts regulated by contextually relative criteria, 
which include caring and justice, to Kohiberg's notion of conflicting 
individual goods regulated by 3 single, universal justice criterion. 
Although Gilligan and Kohiberg alike maintain that justice and caring 
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are both proper moral concerns, and that a resolution is desirable, 
neither has articulated just how the two might work together to form 
a more comprehensive morality that transcends "gender" differences. 
Such a resolution could serve as a valuable guide for educators 
concerned with creating sufficiently integrated educational 
environments to foster moral autonomy in students. 
This paper examines the problem of moral relativism as it 
pertains to the gender question in moral development. It begins by 
reviewing the debate between Kohiberg and Gilligan as to whether 
mature moral reasoning uses formal or contextually relative criteria. 
The function of this review is to reveal and clarify the strengths and 
weaknesses of both positions for the purpose of setting the scene for 
a reframing of the problem of moral relativism. I argue that neither a 
justice nor a caring ethic by itself can solve the problem of moral 
relativism — which is ultimately a question of how to choose between 
alternative conceptions of the good -- since neither ethic addresses 
adequately the teleological question of what constitutes a quality life. 
Only by combining the justice and caring approaches can we 
sufficiently broaden the scope of morality to provide a principled 
referent for integrating the alternative moral constructions that give 
rise to the problem of moral relativism. I conclude by suggesting that 
John Dewey's postulation of growth as the ultimate moral standard 
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provides a principled, naturai criterion that integrates the formaiism of 
justice and the contextual relativism of caring. 
Hohlberg's Deontolooical Formali.«^m 
The problem of moral relativism amounts to this. If what is 
considered moral varies from person to person, or from culture to 
culture, then what guide do we have for choosing between alternative 
moral constructions when they conflict? Kohiberg's answer begins 
with the claim that while the specific content of our moral beliefs will 
inevitably differ, the forms of our moral reasoning are nevertheless 
universal. To cite a famous example, stage 2 boys in a Taiwanese 
village said a husband ought to steal food for his starving wife 
because a funeral would cost a lot of money if she died. Boys at the 
same stage in an Atayal village, in contrast, said he ought to steal the 
food because he needs his wife to cook for him. As Kohiberg points 
out, although the content of the two groups' judgments differs, the 
form of their reasoning is the same: the husband should do what is 
ultimately most convenient.^ There are similarly "universal" forms and 
criteria for all the stages. 
While the form/content distinction does not, in itself, offer a 
guide for choosing between conflicting moral constructions, it 
suggested to Kohiberg that it is within the forms and not the content 
149 
of moral judgments that a universal moral criterion might be found. In 
other words, he rejects locating his criterion of moral adequacy in the 
content of moral judgments on the grounds that the content is 
contextually relative and therefore incapable of yielding a universal 
moral criterion: 
The focus of Piaget and myself on morality as 
deontological justice springs, in part, from a concern with 
moral and ethical universality in moral judgment. The 
search for moral universality implies the search for some 
minimal value conception(s) on which all persons could 
agree, regardless of personal differences in detailed aims 
or goals.^ 
As the above quotation implies, Kohiberg includes individual 
aims and goals in his definition of "content." As such, he believes 
them to be subjectively relative. And although he does not explicitly 
state the connection, Kohiberg sees individual aims as being derived 
from subjectively relative conceptions of the good, a connection 
which is implicit in this citation of Dwight Boyd by Kohiberg, Levine, 
and Hewer: 
[F]or Rawls or Kohiberg..., pursuit of the good and 
human perfection is subordinated as a concern to 
adjudicating differences among individuals on how the 
good and human perfection are to be defined, furthered 
and distributed. One cannot understand this entry point 
unless one understands that they assume that individuals 
do and will differ in this fundamental way. This 
presumption of human conflict rests on a more 
fundamental belief that the good, even for one individual, 
is not one but pluralistic....® 
If people's conceptions of the good differ in general, it 
necessarily follows that individuals will have different conceptions of 
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what is good in specific situations. Thus, for Kohiberg, any 
consideration of the actual consequences of specific moral judgments 
is necessarily relative to the particular context of the judgement being 
made. In fact, it is not necessary to posit subjective "goods” (what I 
term subjective relativism") in order to hold that the good as it is 
manifested in particular situations is relative to its context (what I 
term "contextual relativism"). But it is worth mentioning Kohiberg's 
more extreme position to show that he is as sensitive as any 
contextual relativist to the difficulties inherent in determining the good 
in particular situations. (Indeed, as I will argue shortly, it is this very 
postulation of multiple subjective goods that makes Kohiberg's 
solution to the problem of moral relativism ultimately unworkable.) 
It is what Kohiberg does to circumvent the problem which the 
relativity of the good poses for a universal moral criterion that 
distinguishes him from contextual relativists like Gilligan. Since 
conceptions of the good are, for Kohiberg, contextually and 
subjectively relative, the search for a universal moral criterion, he 
reasons, must limit them from its purview: 
Morality as justice best renders our view of morality as 
universal. It restricts morality to a central minimal core, 
striving for universal agreement in the face of more 
relativist conceptions of the good.® 
Thus, justice is not a guide for choosing between alternative moral 
constructions or conceptions of the good (a central task of moral 
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theory for teleologists), a point which Kohiberg emphasizes 
repeatedly: 
I make no direct claims about the ultimate aims of 
people, about the good life, or about other problems that 
a teleological theory must handle. These are problems 
beyond the scope of the sphere of morality or moral 
principles, which I define as principles of choice for 
resolving conflicts of obligation.^ 
Rather, justice is a guide for regulating human interaction -- 
specifically, through the mandate that each person's claim to pursue 
his own individual good should be given equal and impartial 
consideration. 
The Primacy of Justice 
Part of what makes justice the best guide for adjudicating 
between conflicting claims, according to Kohiberg, is that it is that 
principle on which all rational persons can agree, regardless of their 
specific aims and corresponding conceptions of the good. Of all the 
moral principles which philosophers have ever put forth, Kohiberg 
maintains, justice best achieves this (theoretical) universality because 
it is the most reversible logically -- people can adhere to it regardless 
of their position in the moral equation, and regardless of their 
individual preferences for this or that moral outcome. What makes 
justice the most reversible of all moral principles, for Kohiberg, is that 
it is the most "differentiated" -- it best filters out all that is 
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contextually or individually relative, that is, "non-moral," from the 
moral domain. In other words, it "solves" the problem of moral 
relativism by reducing morality to the one principle people can agree 
on, given the shared assumption that they can't agree on what is 
good. 
Kohiberg's exegesis of why a formal stage 6 principle of 
deontological justice is more adequate morally than either a stage 5, 
act utilitarian principle of benevolence or a rule utilitarian conception 
of social contract® illustrates how this restriction of the definition of 
morality "solves" the problem of moral relativism. Unlike stage 4 
morality, which ignores the problem of moral relativism by construing 
all opinions that deviate from established custom as simply immoral 
and unlawful, stage 5 morality provides a rational criterion - the 
maximization of welfare, or benevolence - that acknowledges the 
right of individuals to pursue their own ends as long as those ends do 
not conflict with the greater good. This criterion, Kohiberg maintains, 
is manifest in both act utilitarianism - "consider the amount of good 
and harm produced" - and rule utilitarianism - "consider the results of 
everyone's acting on the rule."® 
Although he doesn't state it explicitly, it is fair to assume that 
the problem with benevolence, for Kohiberg, is that although it can be 
universalized in the sense that we should take into account the 
"good" of everyone, people's conceptions as to what is, in fact. 
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good differ. Thus, as Kohlberg sees it, the consequences or 
"results" which both forms of utilitarianism obligate us to consider are 
not something that can be agreed on. As a result, utilitarianism 
imposes a conception of the aggregate good at the expense of the 
good of the least advantaged. It must resort to this solution. 
according to Kohlberg, because it fails to differentiate adequately the 
consequences of moral judgement from the form: 
Although benevolence can be universalized (that is, 
everyone should care for the welfare of all other 
humans), it cannot resolve a conflict of welfares, except 
by quantitative maximization. The content of moral 
concerns and claims is always welfare, but maximization 
is no true moral principle....Concern for the welfare of 
other beings...is the precondition for experiencing a moral 
conflict rather than a mechanism for its resolution. The 
moral question is 'Whose role do I take?' or 'Whose claim 
do I favor?' The working core of the utilitarian principle is 
the maximization principle. As everyone knows, and our 
studies document, 'Consider everyone's happiness 
equally' is not a working principle of justice.’® 
Welfare, in other words, is both contextually and subjectively 
relative for Kohlberg, in that it means different things in different 
circumstances and for different people. As such, he eliminates it as a 
basis for agreement by differentiating it from the formal principles of 
equality and respect from which he claims it is derived. In the end, 
Kohlberg claims, we are left with a universal moral criterion that is not 
subject to changing conceptions of the good. 
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"The Dilemma of the Fant" 
Kohiberg's postulation of a formal justice principle as the most 
philosophically and psychologically adequate moral criterion has met 
with considerable criticism from his former student and colleague, 
Carol Gilligan. Aside from the more well-known charge of sex bias 
itself, Gilligan makes at least the following claims: (1) that the 
contextual and relativistic properties of mature moral thought are not 
adequately covered by a model of justice reasoning, (2) that moral 
reasoning based solely on formal justice structures cannot adequately 
solve the problem of moral relativism, and (3) that justice and caring 
define separate moral contexts which inevitably conflict, but which 
can be regulated by personal commitment within a moral universe 
understood to be contextually relative. 
According to Gilligan and her colleague John Murphy,” 
research shows that the problem of moral relativism often persists 
after people are scored at Stage 5, at which point the problem was 
supposed to have been solved, by Kohiberg's account. Even after the 
1978 revisions of the original Kohiberg scoring manual, which yielded 
relatively high rates of regression from stages 5 and 6 to either pre- 
principled stages or to the transitional 4/5 stage, Gilligan and Murphy 
found instances of regressive scores due to subjects framing the 
hypothetical dilemmas in more contextual terms than in their earlier 
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responses. Such contextual framing of moral dilemmas is the result, 
they claim, of adult encounters with real-life moral dilemmas in which 
people discover the existence of alternative value frames of reference 
for interpreting moral situations. They go on to say that mature moral 
reasoning actually witnesses the abandonment of a universal justice 
criterion in favor of a more contextual form of thinking which admits 
of different criteria — of which justice is but one -- appropriate to 
different moral contexts. 
To date, Gilligan has specified only one other possible "moral 
context than that of justice concerns, and that is the domain of 
special obligations defined by a criterion of caring (that domain more 
associated with women than with men), a context that she maintains 
inevitably conflicts with interpretations framed in terms of justice.’^ 
"The dilemma of the fact" offers an example of a real life 
situation in which Gilligan claims such a conflict occurs. Faced with 
the decision of whether to reveal to his lover's husband that he was 
having an affair with her, or to withhold that truth temporarily in order 
to protect his lover from undue emotional stress. Philosopher Two 
(previously scored at Stage 5) chose not to inform the husband, even 
though he believed it was the "fair" or "just" thing to do. Philosopher 
Two had this to say about his decision: 
The justice approach....really blinded me to a lot of 
realities of the problem....! think that the moral issue was 
simply the matter of honesty and truth in the relationship. 
But even if that had been fulfilled, we would have been 
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left with the interpersonal dilemma of life choices, of 
what kind of relationship you want in your life....And 
morality won't do you one bit of good in that 
decision.’^ 
(Although neither Philosopher Two nor Gilligan and Murphy specify 
what they mean, exactly, by "life choices," it is safe to assume they 
mean such options as 'to uphold truth at the expense of the well¬ 
being of loved ones,' 'to value the well-being of loved ones over 
honesty,' 'to remain in a relationship with someone who is married to 
someone else,' 'to refuse to be involved with someone who is married 
to someone else,' etc. A justice principle, they claim, does not 
adequately address such options. Thus, commitment to any one of 
them would constitute an example of what Gilligan means by 
"commitment in relativism.") 
Citing this example, Gilligan and Murphy maintain that a justice 
approach (equated with "morality" by Philosopher Two) does not 
provide an adequate guide for making the life choices that underlie the 
contextual decision making process inherent in any "moral" judgement 
(in the broad sense of the term): 
Equating morality with 'the justice approach'...The 
perceived disparity between the justice solution (telling 
the truth to honor respect) and the remaining problems of 
responsibility and consequence leads [Philosopher Two] 
to the further realization that while the problem was at 
once both moral and not moral, the 'moral' solution 
wouldn't solve the problem. Then the question becomes 
one of definition as to what is included in the moral 
domain, since the justice approach does not adequately 
address the responsibilities and obligations that ensue 
from 'life choices. 
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Redefining the Moral 
Kohiberg's response to these criticisms^® is mixed. He agrees 
that his model does not give an adequate description of the contextual 
aspects of moral reasoning, but he also explains that It was never 
supposed to do so. Justice, for Kohiberg, only insures that other 
people s claims to pursue their own life choices are honored. Life 
choices themselves, and the contextual judgments that follow from 
them, are, for Kohiberg, part of the content of moral judgments, not 
of their form, and as such are not covered by a formal justice 
principle. He reiterates that his decision to focus on justice concerns 
stemmed largely from his desire to locate a universal moral criterion 
on which people could agree regardless of differences due to 
contextual interpretations and varying conceptions of the good, and 
that such a principle must meet certain formal requirements, 
particularly reversibility, which is impossible with contextual principles 
like benevolence or caring. 
Kohiberg does concede, however, that his earlier restriction of 
the definition of morality to the domain of justice concerns was 
misleading; (what he was really doing was restricting the scope of his 
inquiry). Admitting that justice Is not an adequate moral principle by 
Itself, he accordingly broadened his definition of morality to include 
not merely contextual thinking^® -- considerations of the specific 
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welfare outcomes of moral judgments - but also the underlying ethical 
conceptions of human nature, society, the good, and reality itself” 
on which those more contextual judgments are based. And although 
he sees these contextual and ethical concerns as an integral part of 
mature moral thinking, he also argues that they must be the subjects 
of "soft stage," that is, non-formal, analyses. 
Nonetheless, this broadening of the scope of morality amounts 
to the admission that the problem of moral relativism is not 
adequately dealt with by a theory of justice reasoning per se. For 
although a formal justice criterion tells us to respect other people's 
right to pursue their own individual goods (It even provides us with a 
mutually acceptable method for doing so - Ideal Role Taking, or Moral 
Musical Chairs), when it comes to actually deciding whose claim is 
reversible in a moral conflict, contextual and ethical judgments not 
covered by a formal justice criterion inevitably arise. 
In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what Philosopher Two 
wants to know Is whether he should tell the husband the truth or 
withhold it to protect his lover. Assuming (for now) that Kohiberg is 
correct that this dilemma does not constitute a conflict between 
justice and caring, but rather that Philosopher Two fell short of 
applying his justice principle in this particular context,^® even if 
Philosopher Two had completed the deliberative process of Moral 
Musical Chairs, he would still have been faced with the decision of 
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whose claim to honor: the husband's or the wife's. Kohiberg says this 
about the decision: 
assuming it is correct that disclosure of the truth would 
risk the wife's sanity, then if Philosopher 2 were to 
imaginatively continue the process and ask whether the 
husband's claim to truth would be valid if he placed 
himself in the wife's position, he would be likely to 
conclude that justice is better served by withholding the 
truth, because if the husband puts himself in the wife's 
position he sees her right to sanity. In other words, in 
this case Philosopher 2 realizes that choosing sanity over 
truth telling is a more reversible decision than the 
converse.^® 
There are two assumptions here, one factual, the other ethical, 
neither of which is supported by a formal justice principle. The factual 
assumption, as Kohiberg himself notes, is that one of the likely 
consequences of Philosopher Two's telling the truth would, in fact, be 
the loss of the wife's "sanity" {assuming, of course, that we can 
agree on its definition). A plethora of contextual judgments go into the 
making of such an inference: the nature of the wife's other problems, 
the relevance of her history in handling emotional stress, the extent of 
her feelings of guilt, the husband's likely response (will he fly into a 
rage? will he be understanding? will he seek a divorce?), the pattern 
of the husband and wife's relationship, etc. Such contextual 
judgments are."factual" because they attempt to answer the question: 
what would the likely outcome be? And as Kohiberg himself points 
out, "...the most problematic, changing, historically relative aspect of 
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moral choice is attending to the factual aspects of a moral 
dilemma."^® 
Of course there will never be a principled moral criterion that 
can answer such questions, so we can hardly fault justice for not 
doing so.^’ But implicit in Kohiberg's conclusion that Philosopher 
Two would have chosen the wife's right to sanity as the more 
reversible claim -- i.e., as the more "just" solution - is the ethical 
assumption that sanity is more intrinsically valuable than either 
honesty or the right to truth. Such a conclusion is hardly a given (the 
husband might or might not choose the wife's right to sanity as the 
more reversible claim in this dilemma), and necessarily implies 
epistemological and ethical assumptions not covered by a justice 
principle -- for example, that one person's "well-being" justifies lying 
to another, and that a person can be considered "well" or "sane" 
though living in deceit. My purpose is not to pass judgement on these 
assumptions; avoiding a nervous breakdown may justify deceit in 
some situations. Rather, the point is that a formal justice criterion fails 
to provide an adequate guide for making or evaluating these sorts of 
contextual life choices, or for choosing which underlying conception 
of the good to embrace in general. 
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Justice and Caring 
Nevertheless, while Kohiberg admits that justice by itself is not 
a sufficient moral principle — precisely because it does not provide an 
adequate guide for making life choices -- he still maintains that it is a 
necessary one, and, as such, does not conflict with decisions framed 
in terms of caring. In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what 
Gilligan construes as a conflict between justice and caring, Kohiberg 
sees as uncertainty about how to apply justice in a specific context: 
In our interpretation. Philosopher 2 is struggling to 
formulate a principle of justice which would resolve the 
situation of conflict between the husband's right to the 
truth and the wife's right to sanity. 
Viewed in this light, it is hard to see how Gilligan infers that justice 
conflicts with caring, unless one confuses "justice" with a narrow 
adherence to "honesty and truth" (as Philosopher Two does), or as 
"telling the truth to honor respect" (as Gilligan and Murphy seem to 
do).^^ But, as Kohiberg points out, even Philosopher Two frames the 
dilemma in justice terms when he asks, "was [the wife's] right to 
sanity, which I think was being jeopardized, less important than [the 
husband's] right to know?"^'^ The point is that a formal justice 
principle does not, and is not supposed to, prescribe contextual 
judgments such as "tell the truth" or "protect loved ones," which are 
part of the content, not the form, of morality; its whole purpose. 
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rather, is to leave room for such decisions to be made contextually 
(which is, of course, both its strength and its limitation). 
There is, however, another sense in which justice and caring 
could be said to conflict, and that is not as moral principles but as 
two human capacities that are sometimes difficult to integrate. As 
Philosopher Two puts it: 
the dilemma I have is in the fact that....the Veil of 
Ignorance is not down. It is very difficult for me to 
completely withdraw from the situation and say if I was 
K. or if I were T., I would certainly want to know the 
truth. 
But, if anything, this difficulty only points to the need for a principle 
of justice, so that the husband's claim be given equal and impartial 
consideration when compared with the wife's. Besides, Philosopher 
Two's inability to employ the Veil of Ignorance (i.e., to be impartial) 
violates not only his own sense of justice but of caring, or "principled 
non-violence," as well, since it prevents him from fully considering the 
welfare consequences which withholding the truth might have for the 
husband. Thus, rather than demonstrating that justice and caring 
comprise two contradictory ways of framing moral dilemmas, the 
dilemma of the fact illustrates the "fact" that human beings are not 
(generally) capable of universal or impartial love. 
To construe this difficulty as a conflict between justice and 
caring is to frame the dilemma in conventional, "genderized" terms, 
for it is when principles are interpreted as rules that they inevitably 
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conflict. Such conflicts are unavoidably the case with all conventional 
moralities, which are, by definition, contextually determined. And the 
postulation of different moral contexts defined by gender is no 
different than that of different moral contexts defined by culture. The 
combined facts (1) that women have tended to function in different 
social contexts than men, and (2) that the role expectations which 
society imposes on them at the conventional level differ, are enough 
to explain why men and women might (and I believe they do) tend to 
follow different developmental paths, a point which Gilligan makes 
poignantly in In a Different Voice.^^ But to infer from these facts that 
moral principles necessarily conflict is to commit a form of the 
naturalistic fallacy: specifically, to confuse the conventional, social 
"is" with the principled, moral "ought." 
Rather than mature moral reasoning being characterized by the 
criteria which distinguish conventional, "genderized" moral thought, 
moral reasoning at the post-conventional level should transcend such 
dichotomization, leading to neither "justice" nor "caring," but to some 
sort of reconciliation. Gilligan is actually an advocate of such a 
resolution, but her postulation of multiple moral contexts, each with 
its own guiding criterion to be chosen on the basis of personal 
commitment, does not provide one, for it fails to articulate the basis 
on which such personal commitments are to be made -- a basis, 
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moreover, which would define a more encompassing value context 
that contradicts the postulation of multiple moral contexts. 
Murphy and Gilligan assert that there are: 
two essentially different kinds of moral relativism which 
stand in different relation to postconventional or 
principled moral judgement. In making this distinction, we 
rely on the contrast described by Perry ... between 
relativistic multiplicity (position 4 in Perry's scheme), the 
postulation that there are many right answers to moral 
problems and no way of choosing among them, and 
contextual relativism (position 5), the position that while 
no answer may be objectively right in the sense of being 
context-free, some answers and some ways of thinking 
are better than others.^® 
By this account, the transition from "multiplicity" to "contextual 
relativism" marks the key transition from immature to mature moral 
reasoning, where the individual postulates that although there are no 
absolute, universal, or objective moral referents ("multiplicity"), 
relative judgments are nevertheless possible ("contextual relativism"). 
There are, however, two related problems with this distinction. The 
obvious one is that neither Murphy and Gilligan (nor Perry) articulate 
any criteria by which "some answers and some ways of thinking" can 
be determined as "better." Nor does Perry's model of the higher 
stages of commitment^® provide an answer. It merely asserts that 
we commit ourselves to our evolving conceptions of the good, 
without indicating the direction which that evolution should take, or 
helping us decide which conception is better or how to reconcile them 
when they conflict. In this sense, the "contextual relativism" which 
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Gilligan posits as the hallmark of mature moral reasoning is little 
different than the stage of "multiplicity” which precedes it, except 
that it replaces uncertainty" with "commitment" about which good 
to pursue. Thus, although this transition seems to mark an important 
psychological step in the related processes of intellectual development 
and identity formation, it is dubious that the two stages differ morally 
in any significant sense. 
More importantly, however, this failure to articulate a criterion 
on which to base personal commitment reveals the fundamental 
difficulty with Gilligan and Murphy's conception of "contextual 
relativism" as a solution to the problem of moral relativism, and that is 
that it begs the question: commitment to what, on the basis of what? 
The postulation that "some answers and some ways of thinking are 
better than others" implies the existence of some broader, more 
encompassing value criterion (whether formal or contextual), since 
different value contexts cannot be regulated by "personal 
commitment" alone. That commitment must be to something if the 
question of which moral construction to embrace is to be answered. 
And that "something" implies a larger, more encompassing value 
context that contradicts the postulation of discrete multiple moral 
contexts as defining the moral domain. Moreover, because the 
principle referent by which Gilligan and Murphy (and Perry, except 
that his is a psychological and not an ethical theory) would have us 
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regulate what are otherwise relative moral values is the self, or 
personal commitment," their position would, in fact, be better termed 
"subjective relativism" than "contextual relativism." 
Gilligan and Murphy have attempted to show, it could be 
argued, that mature moral reasoners "commit" themselves to the 
actual welfare consequences of their moral judgments. But although 
this positing of responsibility for consequences gives necessary 
substance to Kohiberg's conception of the formal properties of mature 
moral reasoning, it still fails to answer the question: which welfare 
consequences are desirable? And, as I have tried to argue, such 
judgments, though "contextually relative" (in the sense that they, of 
necessity, vary with the contextual realities of particular moral 
situations), ultimately depend on one's ethical conception of the good. 
In the dilemma of the fact, for example, what Philosopher Two 
needs is some guide for choosing, not just between the wife's "right" 
to sanity and the husband's "right" to the truth, but between the two 
sets of likely "welfare consequences" that accompany the two 
avenues his decision might take. What will happen to the wife if he 
talks to the husband? What will happen to the husband if he remains 
silent? Who will be more hurt? Phrased in this way, the dilemma of 
the fact is both a "caring" and a "justice" dilemma.^® But the 
decision itself, if taken to the level of reflectivity, ultimately rests on 
Philosopher Two's conception of what constitutes "hurt," which is 
167 
nothing more than the opposite of "welfare." And it is "welfare" that 
ultimately needs defining in this situation, if Philosopher Two's 
judgement is to be morally adequate. 
Reframinq the Problem 
Kohiberg s criticism of utilitarianism, it will be recalled, is that it 
ultimately solves moral conflicts by prescribing those judgments which 
deliver the greatest good to the greatest number, and that this 
principle of maximization is a less than satisfying solution morally 
because it does not adequately represent the claims of the least 
advantaged.^’ But it will also be recalled that this criticism rests on 
the premise that "the good" is subjectively relative -- i.e., that, 
ultimately, people cannot agree on it or its content. Given this 
assumption, Kohiberg restricts any concern with defining "the good" 
from his formal model of the ontogenesis of "universal" justice 
reasoning, (though he does flirt with it in his postulation of a seventh 
stage of ethical reflectivity), and in so doing bypasses the teleological 
question in the problem of moral relativism. 
Gilligan's critique, on the other hand, despite its failure to show 
that justice and caring define separate moral contexts at the principled 
level, makes it apparent that when people are faced with choices 
between two or more alternative courses of action that each lead to 
168 
discrete welfare outcomes, they must ultimately choose between 
alternative conceptions of the good. But this necessary foray into 
teleology does not commit us, as she would have it, to subjective 
commitments within an otherwise contextually relative moral universe. 
Such a solution to the problem of moral relativism is really a non- 
solution, since it denies the very question it begs: to which "moral 
context" should I commit myself? 
In fact, Kohiberg's and Gilligan's underlying assumption of 
irreconcilable subjectively relative goods is the same, but the scope of 
the problem of moral relativism goes beyond what either of them 
considers. What Kohiberg appears to have overlooked is the possibility 
that it is not the quantity of welfare but its quality which lies at the 
heart of all moral conflicts.And although Gilligan does not reduce 
the concern with welfare to a question of quantity, her postulation of 
multiple moral contexts regulated by personal commitment never 
really comes to terms with the question of quality, either. In actuality, 
any genuine moral conflict, when taken to the level of reflectivity, 
leads to a reappraisal of either one's conception of the good or of how 
it manifests itself in a particular context -- a reappraisal not adequately 
dealt with by either "personal commitment" or "justice." 
In Carina: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education.Nel Noddings offers "caring" as a principled, natural 
moral criterion, accessible to and ultimately desired by all persons. 
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This postulation of caring as an ultimate good is premised on the 
assumption that the meeting between subjective human 
consciousnesses evokes an affective response of "joy” that is a 
natural good for human beings, whether they are conscious of it or 
not. For Noddings, moral judgement relies, finally, not on principles, 
which she argues are ultimately ambiguous, but rather on the "ethical 
ideal we each construct of ourselves as "ones-caring" in our effort to 
consciously reproduce those feelings of connectedness that we 
remember from previous experiences of "natural caring." As pursuers 
of the ethical ideal we see ourselves as people who seek not only to 
appreciate the needs and goals of others but to nurture that 
receptivity in others as well. In such an ethic (to paraphrase 
Noddings somewhat loosely), "welfare" -- as an outcome desired by 
subjective "individuals" -- is subordinated to "welfare" - as the 
enhancement of caring relations between "persons," who are in any 
case connected by virtue of living in society together. The caring 
relationship, in turn, it could be argued, leads to a shared vision of 
desirable outcomes, of which caring itself is the most important. 
Thus, in a conflict of welfares the caring ethic that Noddings puts 
forth prescribes the following imperative: "Do that which best fosters 
future caring," which, for her, means to do that which best nurtures 
the ethical ideal in oneself and in others. In other words, rather than 
avoiding or begging the question of which good to pursue, a caring 
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ethic posits enhanced relations through conscious, reciprocal 
"motivational displacement" as an end in itself. 
Probably the most serious criticism leveled against Noddings' 
"feminine" ethic is that it requires face-to-face contact to produce the 
necessary motivational displacement for a full appreciation of others. 
Betty Sichel writes: 
Caring and response focus morality on a very limited 
population, which may be directly affected by our moral 
voice, which may hear our response, feel and be affected 
by our care. Should moral agents only be concerned with 
this narrowed moral universe and ignore all of the world's 
millions of unfortunates?...Can the feminine approach to 
ethics include these unfortunates? If not, are we left with 
a theory which concentrates on limited, concentric circles 
and thus, focusses on the traditional categories of 
women's private lives?^'^ 
As Sichel points out, although Noddings advocates the application of 
a "feminine" ethic to the public domain, it is not clear how such an 
ethic can be applied, given the limited "moral context" it assumes — 
that of intimate circles and chains of caring. Rather than accepting 
Gilligan's and (to a lesser extent)^® Noddings' premise that men's 
and women's moralities comprise two different approaches in need of 
reconciliation, Sichel suggests instead that we concentrate on 
constructing a more comprehensive ethic and model of moral 
development which transcends the limitations of "genderized ethics" 
from the start (without ignoring that which both conceptions have to 
offer).^® 
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Towards that end we can see that implicit in Noddings' 
feminine ethic lies an intrinsic valuing of ongoing dialogue and 
enhanced relations as moral aims. If we combine her notion of caring, 
as an ethical ideal which motivates us to maintain and extend our 
special relations, with a criterion of justice, which mandates that we 
universalize our ideal through practiced impartiality, we arrive at a 
more extensive, public moral criterion which not only promotes those 
conditions that foster "caring" but which also promotes a more 
comprehensive ethical ideal of world unity. 
John Dewey's moral and educational writings^^ do precisely 
this by positing "growth" itself as the ultimate moral criterion, in 
which the moral aim is to cultivate a social disposition that seeks 
always to broaden and deepen our shared experience. Such an ethic 
offers a solution to the problem of moral relativism that neither 
suspends from the moral domain subjectively relative conceptions of 
the good, nor begs the question "which conception do I adopt?" It 
suggests, rather, that the problem of moral relativism is not so much a 
question of choosing between conflicting moral conceptions as of 
continually reconstructing a more encompassing one, (always with the 
understanding that the increase and enhancement of shared meaning 
is an end which needs no justification). 
The details of such a resolution are the subject of another 
essay, but a few general features are worth noting here. Growth 
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defines a broader moral context than genderized moralities - a context 
within which both justice reasoning and a caring disposition could 
conceivably be seen to develop. For Dewey.^« how we reason, feel, 
and behave are all the result of pre-established active tendencies, or 
habits, which in turn stem from the interaction of personal 
dispositions with given social conditions. Thus, our primary moral 
concern should be with establishing those habits of reasoning, feeling 
and acting most conducive to growth 
” the expanding and deepening of shared meanings.^® 
An ethic defined by growth offers the sort of principled 
resolution to subjective and contextual moral differences that Gilligan 
seeks, without denying the validity of the multiple moral contexts idea 
as descriptive of relative moralities prior to dialogue. Like Gilligan's 
ethic, Dewey's prescribes dialogue, but his offers the possibility for a 
reflective transformation of relative moralities that is more workable 
than Gilligan's notion of irreconcilable contexts. It does this by 
positing a dynamic, principled criterion that both prescribes the 
direction of change and maximizes the role of reflective intelligence. 
With the exception of her postulation of the irreconcilability of 
separate moral contexts, the rest of Gilligan's model makes a great 
deal of sense within Dewey's framework, particularly her description 
of the role self-concept plays in the ontogenesis of principled moral 
reasoning. 
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Dewey s ethic of growth, like Noddings' of caring, posits the 
ethical ideal -- the intervening means between a natural good and a 
consciously desired one -- as the primary faculty of moral judgement 
and the primary moral concern. But it also generalizes this ideal from 
the individual to the societal level. Like Noddings, Dewey believes that 
what matters most morally is the effect of moral judgments on 
people s characters', both those of the people affected by our 
judgments, and that of the moral agent herself. Consistent with 
Noddings,^® but more reminiscent of Kohiberg, however, Dewey 
sees a habit of reasoning in accordance with principles of impartiality 
and justice as a strong component of a moral character.'^’ And, like 
Kohiberg, he believes democracy (as a mode of associated living 
rather than as a form of government per se) to be a necessary social 
condition of growth.''^ 
Growth combines the rational criterion of justice with the 
intrinsic valuing of social connections of caring, and, in so doing, 
solves the problem of moral relativism by providing a principled, 
natural criterion which simultaneously stands up to formal 
requirements of inclusiveness, prescriptivity, and universality, while 
also explaining the role of deliberation and character in handling 
contextual variations. Above all, life choices, personal commitments, 
and conceptions of the good are not subjectively relative within a 
moral perspective guided by a criterion of growth, which defines a 
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sufficiently expanded conception of morality to provide a referent for 
making moral judgments on the basis of their impact on the quality of 
communal life. For all these reasons, growth, as an educational 
principle, mandates that autonomous rationality and a sense of 
community be complementary aims of a complete moral education. 
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Notes 
1. Carol Gilligan, Ln a Different Voice: Psvcholoainal Theory and 
Women^S Development (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1982), p. 19. 
2. For some convincing evidence to the contrary, see Lawrence J. 
Walker, Sex Differences in the Development of Morality and 
Reasoning," Child Develonmpnt 55 (1984): 677-691. Despite this 
evidence, however, Gilligan's conclusion nevertheless remains 
plausible. According to Gilligan, who cites the research of Nancy 
Chodorow, whereas male development is largely defined by the 
process of increasing autonomy, leading to a justice orientation, 
female development is defined largely by the strengthening of 
empathic and affectional ties, resulting in the caring orientation 
attributed to women. Gilligan's own research, moreover, seems to 
indicate that these gender differences get reinforced throughout the 
lifespan of most adults by virtue of the social roles men and women 
generally play. See Gilligan, In a Different Voice, ch. 1; cf., Nancy 
Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1978). 
3. Lawrence Kohiberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral 
Development" (1971), in Lawrence Kohiberg, The Philosophy of Moral 
Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 115-116. 
4. Lawrence Kohiberg, Charles Levine, and Alexandra Hewer, "The 
Current Formulation of the Theory" (1983), in Lawrence Kohiberg, 
The Psychology of Moral Development (New York: Harper & Row, 
1984), p. 248. 
5. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," p. 306; 
cf., Dwight Boyd, "The Rawls Connection," in Brenda Munsey, ed.. 
Moral Development. Moral Education, and Kohiberg (Birmingham, 
Alabama: Religious Education Press, 1980), pp. 185-213. 
6. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," p. 306. 
7. Kohiberg, "Is to Ought," p. 169, my emphasis. He does, of 
course, broaden this definition in "The Current Formulation of the 
Theory," as I will discuss shortly. 
8. Kohiberg, "Is to Ought," pp. 152-168. 
176 
9. Kohiberg, "Is to Ought," p. 164, emphasis added. 
10. Kohiberg, Is to Ought," p. 175, my emphases. 
11. Carol Gilligan and John Michael Murphy, "Development from 
Adolescence to Adulthood: The Philosopher and the Dilemma of the 
Fact, In D. Kuhn, ed., Iniellectual Development Bevond Childhood 
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1979), pp. 85-99; John Michael Murphy 
and Carol Gilligan, "Moral Development in Late Adolescence and 
Adulthood: a Critique and Reconstruction of Kohiberg's Theory," 
Human Development. 23 (1980): 77-104. 
12. Gilligan's reason for defining a separate moral context defined 
by caring stemmed, largely, (ironically enough) from the "unfairness" 
of the Kohiberg model in representing the moral thinking of women, 
whose responses to hypothetical justice dilemmas were frequently 
framed in more narrative and contextual terms than men's. 
13. Gilligan and Murphy, "Dilemma of the Fact," p. 96. 
14. Gilligan and Murphy, "Dilemma of the Fact," p. 97. 
15. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," pp. 
224-236; Lawrence Kohiberg, Charles Levine, and Alexandra IHewer, 
"Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics" (1983) in Lawrence 
Kohiberg, The Psychology of Moral Development (New York: Harper & 
Row, 1984), pp. 361-370. 
16. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," p. 227. 
17. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," pp. 
237-238, 249-250. 
18. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "Synopses," pp. 367-368. 
19. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "Synopses," p. 367, emphases 
added. 
20. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current Formulation," p. 300. 
21. Nonetheless, a more comprehensive model of mature moral 
reasoning would include a description of how mature moral reasoners 
deliberate about such questions of fact. 
22. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "Synopses," p. 367. 
177 
23. What both Philosopher Two and Gilligan and Murphy seem to 
have done is to confuse the principle of justice -- "consider the claims 
of everyone equally and impartially" - with a rule that might be 
justified by that principle -- "tell the truth because everyone has an 
equal right to it." This apparent regression on the part of Philosopher 
Two to rule-oriented moral reasoning constitutes an example of what 
Kohiberg calls the "second-order" nature of Stage 5 moral principles, 
one of the many factors which led him to hypothesize a sixth stage 
where formal justice becomes a principle of the "first order." See 
Lawrence Kohiberg, "Justice as Reversibility: The Claim to Adequacy 
of a Highest Moral Stage" (1978), in Kohiberg, The Philosophy of 
Moral Development (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 190-226. 
See especially pp. 220-221 ff. 
24. Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "Synopses," p. 367; cf., Gilligan 
and Murphy, "Dilemma of the Fact," p. 95. 
25. Gilligan and Murphy, "Dilemma of the Fact," p. 95. 
26. Kohiberg himself makes this point in "Justice as Reversibility," 
pp. 218-219, and Kohiberg, Levine, and Hewer, "The Current 
Formulation," p. 307, as do Murphy and Gilligan in "Moral 
Development," p. 98. 
27. Particularly striking is her account of the contradiction between 
conventional conceptions of "adulthood" and "femininity," a chief 
factor in explaining women's moral development as focusing on 
resolving the conflict between "self-preservation" and "self-sacrifice." 
See Gilligan, In a Different Voice, pp. 64-107, especially pp. 70-71. 
28. Murphy and Gilligan, "Moral Development," pp. 82-83; cf., 
William G. Perry, Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the 
Colleoe Years. 2nd Edition. (New York; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 
1970). 
29. Perry summarizes these higher positions as follows: 
Position 6: The student apprehends the necessity of orienting 
himself in a relativistic world through some from of personal 
Commitment (as distinct from unquestioned or unconsidered 
commitment to simple belief in certainty). 
Position 7: The student makes an initial Commitment in some area. 
Position 8: The student experiences the implications of 
Commitment, and explores the subjective and stylistic issues of 
responsibility. 
Position 9: The student experiences the affirmation of identity 
among multiple responsibilities and realizes Commitment as an 
ongoing, unfolding activity through which he expresses his life style. 
178 
more detailed description can be found See Perry, Forms, p. 10. A 
on pp. 134-176. 
nrtt J shortly, justice and caring as moral principles are 
ot at odds, but work together. Caring helps us consider in all their 
con extua etail the claims of everyone involved in a moral situation. 
And justice insures that we are not unduly swayed by our 
attachments to certain people and outcomes. Together they imply the 
va uing of the expansion and deepening of a shared conception of the 
good which John Dewey termed "growth." 
31. In the dilemma of the fact, for example. Philosopher Two could 
have simply chosen that solution which did the least "harm" to the 
majority, in this case, himself and the wife - clearly an unjust 
resolution (given the assumption that people's definitions of "harm" 
conflict). 
32. Jhis same point forms the basis of Mill's critique of Bentham's 
hedonistic utilitarianism, and is elaborated on by Dewey. It is what 
Mill means when he says that it is "better to be Socrates dissatisfied 
than a fool satisfied." See John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism 
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1861/1957); John Dewey, Human Nature 
and Conduct (New York: Modern Library, 1922/1930). 
33. Nel Noddings, Carina: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984). 
34. Betty Sichel, "Beyond Genderized Ethics," Paper presented at 
Philosophy of Education Society Forty-Third Annual Meeting: April 
1987. 
35. Noddings' ethics, she says, is peculiarly feminine, which is not 
to say it is only for women, but rather that it has its root in the 
"receptive" side of the human psyche usually associated with, and, 
for the most part, more developed in women. See Noddings, Carina, 
pp. 2, 130. 
36. Betty Sichel, "Women's Moral Development in Search of 
Philosophical Assumptions," The Journal of Moral Education. 14 
(1985): pp. 149-161. 
37. John Dewey, Democracy and Education (New York: Free Press, 
1916/1966); Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1920/1948); Human Nature and Conduct (New York; Modern Library, 
1922/1930; John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (New York: 
Holt, 1910/1932). 
179 
38. Dewey. Human Nature and rnnfiiir;| 
39. Dewey. Democracy and Education: Reconstruction. 
40. Noddings. Caring, pp. 25-26. 35-37. 
41. Dewey. Human Nature and Conduct: Dewey and Tufts, Ethics. 
42. Dewey, Democracy and Education: Reconstruction. 
180 
References 
Boyd, Dwight. "The Rawls Connection." Moral Develonment Moral 
kggcgtiQn, gnci Kghlt^erg. Ed. B. Munsey. Birmingham, AL: 
Religious Education Press, 1980. 185-213. 
Chodorow, Nancy. The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis 
and the Spciplogy of Gender. Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1978. 
Dewey, John. DgmQqrgcy and Education. 1916/1944. New York: Free 
Press, 1966 
Dewey, John. Reconstruction in Philosnnhy. 1920/1948. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1957. 
Dewey, John. Human Nature and Conduct. 1922. New York: Modern 
Library, 1930. 
Dewey, John, and Tufts, James H. Ethics. New York: Holt, 1932. 
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and 
Women's Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1982. 
Gilligan, Carol, and Murphy, John Michael. "Development from 
Adolescence to Adulthood: The Philosopher and the Dilemma of 
the Fact.” Intellectual Development Bevond Childhood. New 
Directions for Child Development 5. Ed. D. Kuhn. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1979. 85-99. 
Kohiberg, Lawrence. "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with It in the Study of Moral 
Development.” 1971. The Philosophy of Moral Development. L. 
Kohiberg. New York: Harper & Row, 1981. 101-189. 
Kohiberg, Lawrence. "Justice as Reversibility: The Claim to 
Adequacy of a Highest Moral Stage.” 1978. The Philosophy of 
Moral Development. L. Kohiberg. New York: Harper & Row, 
1981. 190-226. 
181 
Kohlberg, Lawrence, Levine. Charles, and Hewer, Alexandra. "The 
Current Formulation of the Theory." 1983. The Psychology nf 
^rgl Development. L. Kohlberg. New York: Harper & Row. 
1984. 212-319. 
Kohlberg, Lawrence, Levine, Charles, and Hewer, Alexandra. 
"Synopses and Detailed Replies to Critics." 1983. The 
Psychology of Moral Development. L. Kohlberg. New York: 
Harper & Row. 1984. 320-386. 
Mill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. 1861. Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill, 1957 
Murphy, John Michael, and Gilligan, Carol. "Moral Development in 
Late Adolescence and Adulthood: A Critique and Reconstruction 
of Kohiberg's Theory." Human Development 23 (1980): 77- 
104. 
Noddings, Nel. Carina: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral 
Education. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984. 
Perry, William G. Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in 
the College Years. 2nd ed. New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1970. 
Sichel, Betty. "Women's Moral Development in Search of 
Philosophical Assumptions." Journal of Moral Education 14 
(1985): 149-161. 
Sichel, Betty. "Beyond Genderized Ethics." Paper presented at 
Philosophy of Education Society 43rd Annual Meeting. 1987. 
Walker, Lawrence J. "Sex Differences in the Development of Moral 
Reasoning: A Critical Review of the Literature." Child 
Development 55 (1984): 677-691. 
182 
CHAPTER 5 
THE INDETERMINACY OF KNOWLEDGE 
AND DISCOURSE COMMUNITIES: HOW 
COGNITION AND CONTEXT INTERACT 
IN REFLECTIVE THINKING AND WRITING 
One of the more fruitful debates in composition studies of late 
has been over the relative importance of individual cognition and 
social context in the writing process. On one side of the fence sit 
cognitive theorists (Flower/ Kroll,^ Larson,^ Perl/ Sommers/ and 
so on), who emphasize the thinking and composing strategies by 
which successful writers make and communicate meaning. On the 
other side sit social constructionists (Bartholomae,® Berlin,^ 
Berthoff,® Bizzell,® Bruffee,’° et cetera), who concern themselves 
chiefly with the social contexts in which thinking and writing take 
place. 
Although proponents of the two schools frame what is being 
debated somewhat differently, the following formulation more or less 
captures the gist of that debate. Social constructionists basically 
accuse cognitive theorists of holding a conception of language as 
nothing more than a medium of communication which people use to 
achieve purposes formed independently of their sociolinguistic 
contexts, contexts which social constructionists believe are actually 
the major determinants of how we think and act in the world. 
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Cognitive theorists, in their turn, charge social constructionists with a 
determinism that undervalues the role of the self-conscious individual 
in negotiating among and between socially constrained options, 
options which cognitive theorists admit may indeed shape a great deal 
of our thinking but which do not override the capacity of individuals to 
construct their own meanings and achieve their own purposes. 
Part of what has made the debate a fruitful one is that it has 
compelled both camps to refine and broaden their respective 
conceptions in response to the shortcomings raised by the opposition. 
Even more promising have been the overtures made on both sides 
towards a model of writing in which cognition and context are 
conceived as interacting components in a single, dynamic process. 
Thus, cognitive process theorist Linda Flower advocates 
a grounded vision that can place cognition in its context, 
while celebrating the power of cognition to change that 
context, in a theory so richly specified that it can 
describe how individual writers develop those powers for 
themselves.’^ 
And social constructionist James Berlin advances a "notion of rhetoric 
as a political act involving a dialectical interaction engaging the 
material, the social, and the individual writer, with language as the 
agency of mediation."’^ 
Such overtures are encouraging. Yet, as the above quotations 
suggest, both parties still tend to focus on their own particular 
agendas, saying little that is specific (or constructive) about the 
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complementary" perspective. This phenomenon is largely the result 
of the need to clarify misunderstandings which have arisen between 
the two camps. Linda Flower, for example, devotes virtually the entire 
second half of her most accommodating essay to date’^ essentially 
to countering the charge that she construes her observation-based 
theory as anything other than one possible rhetorical mode (albeit a 
very fruitful one) among many. Although no comparably conciliatory 
response has (as yet) come from the social constructionist camp, 
proponents of that perspective^^ have made respectable efforts to 
show that their socially-driven model, despite its relative determinism, 
not only leaves room for but advocates individual choice. Although the 
defensiveness of such responses may seem an obstacle to the 
construction of a more interactive conception, it is in fact a positive 
and necessary step, and signifies the desire on both sides to 
communicate their perspectives in terms the other can understand. 
The present essay supports such efforts and seeks to take them 
one step further. Its primary aim is to suggest an interactive 
conception of the writing process that cognitive theorists and social 
constructionists alike might find plausible. The key to such a 
conception, I believe, lies in the often-heard but rarely explored notion 
that cognition and context, thought and language, operate in a 
"dialectical" relationship with each other. While many composition 
theorists share this hypothesis, it nevertheless needs considerable 
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development, both conceptually and empirically. In particular, we need 
to consider much more carefully than we have what we mean by it, 
how it might manifest in the writing process, and what its implications 
for writing instruction might be. 
The present essay attempts to advance our conceptual 
understanding of this dialectic in some small measure. It begins with 
an analysis of the social constructionist critique that cognitive process 
models underestimate the role context plays in forming ideas and 
purposes. It next considers the cognitive theorists' charge that social 
constructionist models do not adequately explain the role cognition 
plays in navigating among and between alternative social and 
linguistic contexts. In both cases, rejoinders are considered and 
conclusions drawn about the validity and implications of the various 
arguments. 
The third part of the essay attempts to reconcile the dichotomy 
by advancing the idea that cognition and context only make sense in 
terms of one another, and that we thus diminish our conception of 
both to the extent that we devalue either one. Cognition, I argue, can 
no more be disembedded from context than context can be 
understood as determining cognition. There are two reasons for this. 
First, while the cognitive theorists' claim that the individual agent 
constructs and communicates her own unique representations of 
reality is true, formal and structural models of thinking and writing can 
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never adequately represent the contextual nature of these processes 
in practice. Second, while it is thus also true that all thinking and 
writing are necessarily contextually situated, there is no such thing as 
a definitive context. All contexts, including the knowledge and 
discourse communities" into which we seek to "initiate" students, 
are themselves indeterminate. Reflective inquiry and discourse are 
precisely the attempt to make sense of this indeterminacy. 
As the means by which we negotiate among indeterminate 
contexts of experience, reflective inquiry and discourse are not so 
rriuch general cognitive or contextually determined functions as they 
are intercontextual ones. As such, they are constantly in the process 
of inventing, reconstructing, and integrating themselves, and can only 
be understood as entailing the interaction of cognition and context. 
What such a conception means for writing instruction is 
essentially this: that the key to teaching students to write 
meaningfully is neither to provide them with formal problem-solving 
strategies and heuristics nor to explain to them the discourse 
conventions and concerns of a variety of knowledge communities 
(though these are both important objectives); it is rather to provide 
students with situations which they experience as both indeterminate 
and socially compelling, thus motivating them to construct and 
negotiate their own ways of knowing and communicating in order to 
achieve psychologically and socially satisfying resolutions. Creating 
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such conditions is primarily a matter of juxtaposing competing or 
alternative interpretive frameworks that challenge students' habitual 
ways of thinking and conversing. Such a pedagogy requires teachers 
who are sensitive to both individual cognition and the multitude of 
interpretive frameworks which characterize all human inquiry. 
Limitations of Cognitive Formalism 
A significant portion of the cognition/context debate has 
revolved around Linda Flower and John Hayes's "cognitive process" 
model of writing,^® widely regarded as the most comprehensive of 
its kind.’® Based on the thinking-aloud protocols of writers engaged 
in writing, the Flower-Hayes model seeks to describe the basic 
cognitive processes which underlie all successful composing. The 
model itself consists of three main divisions: the "task environment" 
(or writing context), the "writer's long-term memory" (a sort of data 
storage component), and the actual "writing processes" which guide 
composing. 
It is the "writing processes" which constitute the main subject 
of Flower and Hayes's research, and Flower and Hayes divide these 
processes into four main groups. "Planning" refers to the ways in 
which writers formulate ideas and purposes, and is sub-divided into 
"generating," "organizing," and "goal-setting." "Translating" denotes 
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the putting of thoughts into language. "Reviewing" includes the 
"evaluating" and "revising" of writing once it has been recorded. And 
the monitor is that part of the writer's mind which governs the 
whole process, deciding which sub-processes to employ and when. 
The Flower-Hayes model has been hailed generally for its 
characterization of the writing process as a complex phenomenon 
involving the "recursive" networking of distinctive but interrelated 
sub-processes. What is controversial about the model is primarily the 
way it disembeds cognitive processes from the sociolinguistic 
contexts in which they necessarily operate. In describing the writing 
process in terms of underlying cognitive processes, Flower and Hayes 
assume that cognition can be usefully described in general terms, 
outside the constraints of particular linguistic and social contexts. 
In a process model, the major units of analysis are 
elementary mental processes, such as the process of 
generating ideas... One major advantage of identifying 
these basic cognitive processes or thinking skills writers 
use is that we can then compare the composing 
strategies of good and poor writers. And we can look at 
writing in a much more detailed way.’^ 
Pedagogically, Flower and Hayes's aim is to articulate a set of 
basic cognitive processing tools which writers can use to generate, 
communicate, and revise their own interpretations of experience. 
By placing emphasis on the inventive power of the writer, 
who is able to explore ideas, to develop, act on, test, and 
regenerate his or her own goals, we are putting an 
important part of creativity where it belongs -- in the 
hands of the working, thinking writer.^® 
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This disembedding of cognitive skills from their sociolinguistic 
contexts has been the source of much controversy. Criticism has been 
along several lines, with critics leveling charges of positivism, political 
obfuscation, and educational insensitivity, to name a few. While these 
charges are sometimes based on debatable interpretations of the 
methods and motives of cognitive research, they all entail the 
legitimate questioning of the formalist assumptions on which cognitive 
theory is based. I will begin with the charge of positivism, as it is the 
most misplaced. 
Echoing Ann Berthoff's 1971 critique^® of Janice Lauer's 
1970 essay, "Heuristics and Composition,”^® Patricia Bizzell takes 
Flower and Hayes to task for pursuing the kind of positivistic certainty 
that "is supposed to end all debate" on the grounds that they base 
their model on "the supposedly unimpeachable evidence" of empirical 
research.^’ Berthoff, too, in a 1984 essayrenews her earlier line 
of attack when she argues. 
Empiricists do not generally recognize that all method, 
including scientific method, entails interpretation; they do 
not generally recognize that there are no raw data; there 
are no self-sufficient facts; there is no context-free 
evaluation. Their method is not to recognize the fact that 
all knowledge is mediated and that facts must be 
formulated, but to proceed as if interpretation were 
supererogatory.^® 
Flower's response to such charges^'^ provides a most helpful 
overview of what is in fact her non-positivistic approach to scientific 
inquiry, and is required reading for anyone unfamiliar with the 
190 
discourse conventions and knowledge-making procedures of empirical 
research in the area of composition studies. Besides refuting the 
charge of positivism, her exegesis illustrates that Flower views the 
empirical approach to composition studies as only one possible mode 
of inquiry and discourse - one that attempts to guard against its own 
limitations by relying on communally-established procedures and 
standards. As Flower puts it, 
Terms such as "evidence," "results," and validity" are 
loaded concepts to a reader entering the discourse. They 
contribute to misunderstandings in part because their 
meaning must be grasped in the context of specific 
research methods. Seen in situ, they do not refer to 
ultimates or absolutes, but to tools that help build more 
persuasive arguments.^® 
Flower goes on to explain how tests of "reliability" and "fit" are not 
efforts at certainty but are rather methods for guarding against the 
preconceived theoretical biases which researchers "inevitably, 
constantly, and energetically impose ... on the data of experience."^® 
"The point of all this," writes Flower, "is not to prove a claim but to 
understand more about the strength and predictive power of the 
patterns we have created. 
In fact, the charge that cognitive researchers are on a 
positivistic quest for empirical certainty is a red herring. All theory is 
based on empirical evidence, and all theorists must assume a tentative 
isomorphism between their models and objective reality; without this 
assumption all inquiry would halt, just as it would if absolute certainty 
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were ever claimed. Empirical research is simply one way of 
proceeding, just as Frank D'Angelo's phenomenological approach^® 
and James Berlin's historicist approach are others. "lAjrguments 
based on the permanent rational structures of the universe ... should 
not be accepted without question," writes Berlin.^® But Flower never 
claims otherwise. 
What is problematic about cognitive research is not its alleged 
positivism, or even its supposed claim to a superior methodology. 
(The tone of Flower's rationales, after all, has always been more 
justificatory and defensive than incontestable or irrefutable. And one 
can hardly fault her for the unwarranted faith which many people put 
in "science" narrowly conceived, any more than one can fault social 
constructionists for the unthinking relativism of college freshpersons 
who hold "that every belief ... is as good as every other."®®) 
What is really at issue here is the fruitfulness of a model which 
postulates universal cognitive processes as providing the underlying 
structure of all acts of composing. Flower believes that such a model 
is useful because it offers a concrete means for empowering novice 
writers regardless of the varied contexts in which specific acts of 
writing take place. Social constructionists question the fruitfulness of 
such an approach on the grounds that cognition cannot be separated 
from the plurality of contexts which give it meaning and determine its 
contents and functioning. 
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In this regard, the major criticisms which social constructionists 
have launched against the Flower-Hayes model are 
(1) that it ignores the generative force of language in 
(2) 
cognition, 
that it does not account for the influence of the rhetorical 
situation in invention, organization, and goal-setting. 
(3) that it neglects the interpretive, and hence generative, 
function of discourse communities and their attendant 
conventions. 
(4) that it overlooks the ways in which historically and 
culturally embedded assumptions shape thinking. 
(5) that its alleged value-neutrality begs the ideological 
question of which social and political arrangements it 
supports. 
(6) that it is insensitive to the need - of poor writers in 
particular - to learn discourse conventions and not to 
"advance" cognitively. 
and (7) that its pedagogy tends to put form before function. 
In the years since Flower and Hayes first introduced their 
cognitive procoss theory, Flower has responded to most of these 
criticisms without substantially altering the original model. Most 
notably, in "Cognition, Context, and Theory Building," she takes to 
task her own early work with Hayes for failing "to account for how 
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the situation in which the writer operates might shape composing."^’ 
Declaring "context cues cognition" as one of three major principles of 
a more interactive conception, she outlines the many ways in which it 
does so: from the unconscious cultural and linguistically embedded 
assumptions people hold, to the specific goals, criteria, and strategies 
which the rhetorical situation imposes on the individual writer.She 
nevertheless defends her formal approach on the grounds that general 
cognitive processes provide a powerful means for negotiating among 
the constraints imposed by these contextual factors. 
I want a framework that acknowledges the pressure and 
the potential the social context can provide, at the same 
time it explains how writers negotiate that context, 
create their own goals, and develop a sense of 
themselves as problem-solvers, speakers, or subjects 
who create meaning and affect other people through their 
writing. 
As to why such an approach focuses on general problem 
solving strategies as opposed to how people manipulate the 
contextual elements of the rhetorical situation. Flower intimates that 
observation-based theory can't really say anything useful about the 
latter. 
Cognitive action is often initiated in response to a cue 
from the environment -- in response to an "ill-defined 
problem" that the "solver" may have to define from 
limited and ambiguous cues in the world around. 
Research in cognition tends to concentrate on the 
response of the individual rather than on the situational 
cues, for obvious reasons: one can observe a writer's 
actions with some clarity; however, the cues which 
stimulated a given action often need to be inferred or 
34 
may even remain a mystery. 
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Here lies the real limitation of Flower's approach, not in its 
alleged attempt at certainty. In essence, she leaves the learning and 
implementation of the contextual elements of the rhetorical situation 
out of account. She does so apparently because she thinks useful 
empirical generalizations about such processes cannot be made. While 
It should be said in Flower's defense that she has come to recognize 
this limitation, one wonders why it should be any more difficult to 
make inferences about how people manipulate the contextual 
elements in a rhetorical situation than the cognitive ones (assuming 
the two can even be separated). And even if it is more difficult, does 
that mean we shouldn't try? Isn't this, after all, something like what 
social constructionists do, for example, when they analyze discourse 
conventions? 
When social constructionists take this line of argument, they 
are on solid ground. Bizzell states the point and it implications most 
succinctly: 
The Flower-Hayes model of writing ... cannot alone give 
us a complete picture of the process. We might say that 
if this model describes the form of the composing 
process, the process cannot go on without the content 
which is knowledge of the conventions of discourse 
communities. In practice, however, form and content 
cannot be separated in this way, since discourse 
conventions shape the goals that drive the writing 
process. To let the model stand alone as an account of 
composing is to mask the necessity for the socially 
situated knowledge without which no writing project gets 
under way. The problems of letting this model stand 
alone can be seen in the pedagogy emerging from Flower 
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and Hayes's work. They are inclined to treat the model 
itself as an heuristic...^® 
Writing about heuristic-based models in general, John Gage 
develops this last point: 
In writing, the sort of competence we desire is not the 
mere ability to exercise paradigmatic patterns, but the 
ability to adjust and fine tune those means to fit 
particular situations... The problem for teachers is not, 
however, to factor the rules for making this adjustment 
out of the composing process so that they can be taught 
prescriptively, even though such factoring seems to be 
the goal of much current research into the composing 
process... We mislead our students and ourselves when 
by our methods we imply that the difference between 
knowing how to write and not knowing how to write is a 
matter of being in possession of some secret 
formula...^® 
I resist absolute categorization, but such methods as 
teach what I have called empty forms ... seem to 
promulgate just such a faith in a priori, mechanistic 
means of solving problems of knowledge and persuasion. 
I disagree that, by idealizing the form, we can discover 
the formula in which thought is presumed to be at its 
objective best.®^ 
Flower's response to such criticisms, as already mentioned, has 
been to acknowledge the role of context in idea and purpose 
formation. However, as part of her effort to suggest how her model 
can function within a more comprehensive framework made up of 
many alternative approaches, she still chooses to put faith in the 
notion of universal structures of the mind, as processes over which 
students can exercise some conscious control. The corollary to 
"context cues cognition" thus becomes "cognition mediates context," 
with the idea that it does so, at least in part, through the use of 
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formal processes of problem solving and invention. The problem with 
this solution is that it doesn't say enough about how cognition does 
that. In other words, how does cognition apply these various 
strategies in specific rhetorical situations? In essence, the formalism 
of the model bypasses what is probably the most important function 
of cognition as mediation: the way it negotiates the contextual factors 
-- the needs of the relevant knowledge communities, the various 
discourse conventions, the culturally embedded assumptions, etcetera 
-- of the rhetorical situation. 
Ambiguities of Sociolinauistic Determinism 
As far as social constructionists are concerned, the 
shortcomings of the cognitive process approach reside in cognitivists' 
failure to grasp fully the ways in which sociolinguistic context 
conditions thinking. Such conditioning, they maintain, occurs at 
several levels, beginning with the generative force of language in 
thought itself. According to social constructionists, language and 
thought are linked in a way that cognitive process models disregard. 
Language, they maintain, doesn't simply express our thoughts; it 
profoundly affects what we think. Bizzell, for example, objects to the 
separation of planning and translating in the Flower-Hayes model. 
During planning, the writer generates and organizes ideas 
before struggling to put them into words. Language itself 
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is not seen as having a generative force in the planning 
process, except insofar as it stands as a record of the 
current progress of the writer's thinking in "text 
produced so far." Planning processes, therefore, have to 
be elaborated because they are all the writer has to guide 
her toward a solution to the particular writing problem. 
What's missing here is the connection to social context 
afforded by recognition of the dialectical relationship 
between thought and language.^® 
Bizzell cites Lev Vygotsky's conception of this dialectic: 
At first, language use and thinking develop separately in 
the child. But eventually the child comes to understand 
that language not only names ideas but develops and 
evaluates them... The child's linguistic and cognitive 
development culminates in "verbal thought," which "is 
not a natural, innate form of behavior but is determined 
by a historical-cultural process..." To illustrate the mature 
relationship between thought and language, Vygotsky 
uses situations that are strongly context-bound, such as 
conversations between lovers or among actors In a 
play.®® 
Bizzell goes on to argue that Vygotsky's analysis advises against 
separating planning and translating in "describing adult language-using 
because these activities are never separate in adult language¬ 
using. •I 40 
In fact, however, Vygotsky's position is extremely complex and 
open to other interpretations. For Vygotsky, the convergence of 
thought and language is indeed a culminating step in the child s 
linguistic and cognitive development, an achievement which Vygotsky 
remarks upon as the feature which most distinguishes humans from 
other mammals.But it is hardly the culminating step in the adult s 
linguistic and cognitive development, which, according to him, is in 
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fact marked by the increasing differentiation of two forms of verbal 
thought: inner speech and social speech (both oral and written). 
What Vygotsky^^ is illustrating in the context-bound examples 
to which Bizzell refers is in fact the separate structure and function of 
these two forms of verbal thought. True, inner speech remains a form 
of verbal thought, and Vygotsky even holds that one of its semantic 
peculiarities is the preponderance of the contextual sense of words 
over their dictionary meanings.'^^ But he nevertheless regards inner 
speech as an autonomous speech function, one which is in turn 
supported by a more inward plane of verbal thought still: thought 
itself. "The flow of thought," he writes, "is not accompanied by a 
simultaneous unfolding of speech. The two processes are not 
identical, and there is no rigid correspondence between the units of 
thought and speech. 
Vygotsky's research on transfer, moreover, coupled with his 
criticisms of Thorndike in this regard,'*® led him to postulate that 
awareness, abstraction, and control are general and transferable 
characteristics of all the higher cognitive functions. All these passages 
suggest that it may in fact be fruitful to separate planning and 
translating in describing the way people write, though the full 
implications of Vygotsky's analysis remain unclear. 
At the very least, Vygotsky's research does suggest that any 
attempt to circumvent context in describing the writing process wiil 
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lead to an incomplete description. But Flower already acknowledges 
this fact. Social constructionists, however, are prone to overstate the 
case by denying the usefulness of postulating formal structures of 
reasoning altogether. "[Oluter-directed theorists," writes Bizzell, 
believe that universal, fundamental structures can't be taught; 
thinking and language use can never occur free of a social context 
that conditions them."'^® 
In fact, this argument is a non sequitur; the undeniable 
contextuality of thought and language does not preclude the existence 
of universal structures of reasoning any more than the specific skills 
involved in hitting a tennis ball preclude the existence of the general 
skill of "keeping one's eye on the ball." While the specific 
manifestations of this general skill necessarily vary from sport to sport 
(e.g., from tennis to baseball to golf -- to all of which this skill is 
crucial), the skill remains a transferable one, given that the individual 
can make the connection. A minimum condition for making the 
connection is, of course, that one learn the peculiarities of the 
relevant sport, just as one needs to learn the discourse conventions of 
the relevant knowledge community in order to think and write within 
its interpretive framework. But the fact that the skill has peculiar 
manifestations does not contravene its existence. By the same token, 
the fact that all thinking is contextual does not rule out the existence 
of general thinking processes, though it does raise the question of 
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how far a formal model can take us. In postulating such structures, 
however. Flower is really only suggesting that a knowledge of general 
cognitive processes can increase a writers's awareness and control of 
what he's about (her tendency to rely on them too heavily 
notwithstanding). 
In defending her approach against the charge that the 
postulation of universal structures is fruitless. Flower maintains that 
social constructionists have yet to specify a constructive alternative 
which can explain the power of the individual to make choices within 
the constraints imposed by context. 
If we would understand how cognition and context 
interact, we cannot remain satisfied with speculative 
theories based only on abstract social or political 
imperatives... Nor can we rely on contributions that offer 
us only a deconstruction or critique without offering in 
turn a substantive -- and in some way substantiated — 
alternative. 
More precisely. Flower maintains that social constructionists 
have yet to "face the troubled issue of intentionality[:] Are writers 
'determined' by their situation, or do they 'control' the meanings they 
make...?"'*® 
Social theorists who attack the illusion of control, who 
would locate purpose in the unconscious and dismiss the 
ephemera of cognition, have a special agenda -- to 
understand why context and culture controls us as much 
as it does. Writing researchers and educators may be 
quite happy to acknowledge such forces, but their 
agenda is not to explicate or reify them. Rather it is to 
ask where, within this looming landscape of internalized 
forces we do not control, does human agency and 
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insert itself? And when it does, how does it do 
so?^® 
The fact is, social constructionist approaches in general remain 
extremely vague about the role of individual cognition in overcoming 
the constraints of social and linguistic determinism. Flower cites peer 
response as a case in point. 
Peer response places writing in a teacher-designed 
community of response. If we see writing as a social, 
context-driven event, this instructional move makes 
sense because it seems to enact our image of writing as 
a social, cultural process, happening within a classroom 
community. But what is happening to the cognition of 
individual students in this instructional context?... It 
seems naive to assume that the cognitive processes we 
desire will naturally follow from the social situations we 
engineer.®® 
The excessive claims of peer response advocates (of which I 
nonetheless consider myself one) is a subject in itself (and one which I 
take up in the next chapter). So it is enough for now to note the 
accuracy of Flower's critique. In "Collaborative Learning and the 
'Conversation of Mankind'," Kenneth Bruffee advances what is to 
date the most ambitious attempt at a theoretical rationale for the 
alleged "necessity" of peer collaboration. Yet, although he refers 
repeatedly to knowledge-making as a process of "socially justifying 
belief" within a "community of knowledgeable peers," he really says 
very little about what that process entails, either in the minds of 
individuals or, for that matter, communally (though the little he does 
say®^ helps). Moreover, his rationale for why peer collaboration will 
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stimulate students to "sociallv justify belief is based on the highly 
dubious Claim that reflective thought is not only the product of social 
conversation but is functionally the same. In support of this claim, 
Bruffee, like Bizzell, alludes to Vygotsky's conception of the 
relationship of thought and language, somehow missing the fact that 
for Vygotsky not only is the "dialectic" of thought and language a 
two-way street (neither being the product of the other) but "(ilnner 
speech is not the interior aspect of external speech - it is a function 
in Itself."” Here we see another example of the tendency of social 
constructionists to emphasize sociolinguistic context at the expense 
of an account of individual cognition. 
One of the strongest theoretical statements to come from the 
social constructionist camp of the relationship between sociolinguistic 
context and individual cognition comes from Berlin.In order to 
grasp his model it is helpful to visualize it schematically. (What 
follows is my own representation; I do not guarantee its 
correspondence to Berlin's conception.) Picture three equally 
interlocking circles (the Ballantine beer logo) surrounded by two 
concentric circles. The interlocking circles represent the individual self, 
the material conditions of reality, and the social group or discourse 
community in which the individual is functioning. The curved triangle 
where the circles intersect represents knowledge. The smaller of the 
two concentric circles represents language -- the medium through 
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which the three interacting elements and their interactions, including 
knowledge, are understood and constructed. And the larger circle 
represents the social-historical moment in which all the other 
components are situated. 
Berlin describes his conception as follows (I quote him at length 
so that readers may judge for themselves the accuracy of my 
representation): 
[T]he real is located in a relationship that involves the 
dialectical interaction of the observer, the discourse 
community (social group) in which the observer is 
functioning, and the material conditions of existence. 
Knowledge is never found in any one of these but can 
only be posited as a product of the dialectic in which all 
three come together... Most important, this dialectic is 
grounded in language: the observer, the discourse 
community, and the material conditions of existence are 
all verbal constructs. This does not mean that the three 
do not exist apart from language: they do. This does 
mean that we cannot talk and write about them - 
indeed, we cannot know them - apart from language. 
Furthermore, since language is a social phenomenon that 
is a product of a particular historical moment, our notions 
of the observing self, the communities in which the self 
functions, and the very structures of the material world 
are social constructions -- all specific to a particular time 
and culture. These social constructions are thus inscribed 
in the very language we are given to inhabit in 
responding to our experience. 
In elaborating on this initial description, Berlin anticipates the 
objection that the model leaves little room for individual agency. 
The self is always a creation of a particular historical and 
cultural moment. This is not to say that individuals do 
not ever act as individuals. It is to assert, however, that 
they never act with complete freedom. As Marx 
indicated, we make our own histories, but we do not 
make them just as we wish.®® 
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He goes on to explain that while consciousness is constrained by the 
material conditions of reality, it can also affect that reality, but that it 
always does so through the interpretive framework of one or another 
discourse community. At the same time, however, according to Berlin, 
communities themselves can be affected not only by the constraints 
imposed on them by material reality but by individuals as well: "The 
community in turn is influenced by the subject and the material 
conditions of the moment."^® 
The passage thus suggests a conception of self, material 
reality, and discourse community as more or less equivalent forces in 
a single dynamic interaction. It thus comes as some surprise (though 
not really, given his initial description -- the one I have tried to 
represent pictorially) that his next step is to situate this entire 
interaction within the constraints imposed by socially-determined 
language-using practices. 
Thus, the perceiving subject, the discourse communities 
of which the subject is a part, and the material world 
itself are all the constructions of an historical discourse, 
of the ideological formulations inscribed in the language- 
mediated practical activity of a particular time and 
place. 
Exactly what Berlin intends here is a bit confusing. On the one 
hand he ascribes to individuals the ability to affect the discourse 
communities to which they belong. On the other he declares that 
process itself to be constrained by socially-determined language-using 
practices, as if to imply that some larger sociolinguistic force 
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supervenes not only over the individual and her interactions with 
material reality but over the individual's interactions with 
sociolinguistic context as well. 
Knowledge, after all, is an historically bound social 
fabrication rather than an eternal and invariable 
phenomenon located in some uncomplicated repository -- 
in the material object or in the subject or in the social 
realm.®® 
One is led to wonder not only how knowledge can be a social 
fabrication without residing in the social realm but just what the 
producer of knowledge is in this scheme. Is knowledge a product of 
the interaction of individual consciousnesses, the knowledge 
communities to which individuals belong, and the material conditions 
of reality? Or is it the product of socially-determined language using 
practices? Or is it the result of some larger, historically-bound 
sociolinguistic force? And if there is such a force, of what is it 
comprised if not of the interaction of individuals, the multitude of 
knowledge communities to which individuals belong, and the material 
conditions of reality (of which, it should be pointed out, people, social 
groups, and written marks and spoken sounds are all a part)? And, 
concerning the issue at hand, what exactly is the role of individual 
cognition in this scheme? Berlin should be given his due for 
articulating a model which raises such difficult and thought-provoking 
questions; unlike many Marxian influenced accounts, his is no simple 
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diatribe against the inequities and lack of political sophistication of 
conventional approaches. But the above questions still remain. 
As part of his effort to offer a constructive alternative to 
cognitive-based models, Berlin cites the critical learning approach of 
Ira Shor®® as the pedagogical manifestation of his social-epistemic 
rhetoric. In so doing, he again attempts to come to terms with what 
Flower refers to as "the troubled issue of intentionality[:] Are writers 
determined' by their situation, or do they 'control' the meanings they 
make...?" Berlin writes: 
Shor ... situates the individual within social processes, 
examining in detail the interferences to critical thought 
that would enable "students to be their own agents for 
social change, their own creators of democratic 
culture"...®® 
The self ... is regarded as the product of a dialectical 
relationship between the individual and the social, each 
given significance by the other. Self-autonomy and self- 
fulfillment are thus possible not through becoming 
detached from the social, but through resisting those 
social influences that alienate and disempower, doing so, 
moreover, in and through social activity.®^ 
While I appreciate this stressing of the need to develop 
consciousness through social activity, what puzzles me about this 
scheme is the ambiguous account of individual agency it advances. 
Who or what is resisting these interferences to critical thought? What 
is it that these negative social influences are alienating from what? In 
overcoming these influences what agency is at work? What is the 
difference between detachment and resistance? How do we know the 
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difference between "false consciousness” and "liberated" 
consciousness -- i.e., how do we know we are resisting — if not 
through some form of detachment? Throughout this exegesis Berlin 
seems to affirm the capacities of individuals to achieve self- 
consciousness and to act autonomously at the same time that he 
denies them. 
Like so much Marxist-based theory, what this entire account 
seems to demonstrate is the inherent contradiction of its own 
determinism: 
(1) Social arrangements determine ideology. 
(2) Only a change in ideology can alter social 
arrangements. 
(3) Therefore, while change through human agency 
should be impossible, it is possible. 
It would seem that in declaring the ability of individuals to resist the 
influence of social and linguistic context, Berlin essentially replaces 
the premise that cognition is conditioned by context with the premise 
that it is only conditioned by context to some extent. If such is the 
case, what remains unclear is the basis on which individual agency 
rests -- one of the very things Flower attempts to explain with her 
postulation of universal structures of reasoning. 
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The Indeterminacy of Context’ 
The Intercontextualitv of Connitinn 
Whatever Berlin's actual intent, one thing remains evident: 
social constructionists reject the idea of universal cognitive structures 
which can be formulated and taught outside particular sociolinguistic 
contexts. It is just as evident, however, that they do want to 
acknowledge the role of individual cognition in mediating context, just 
as Flower wants to acknowledge the role of social context in 
generating and organizing ideas and forming purposes. The problem is 
that neither has given an account of how cognition and context 
interact that satisfies the other. 
There is, however, a way of looking at the interplay of 
cognition and context which unites in a single interactive theory the 
full range of ways in which context cues cognition as well as the role 
of cognition in mediating context. It begins from the premise, common 
to both cognitive process and social constructionist frameworks, that 
all encounters between cognition and context are mediated (to 
whatever extent) by community-generated, language-based 
interpretive frameworks. What neither social constructionists nor 
cognitive theorists seem to have fully considered - though they both 
touch on it at times - is that these interpretive frameworks are 
themselves indeterminate, as are the knowledge and discourse 
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communities to which they are connected. It is within the context of 
this indeterminacy that cognition takes on its mediating function -- not 
as a formal problem solving agent, but as an agent of the 
reconstructive integration of otherwise discrete and indeterminate 
ways of interpreting experience. 
As social constructionists frequently point out, some 
community-generated interpretive framework always stands between 
the individual and experience. "'[R]eality,'" writes Bizzell, "only makes 
sense when organized by the interpretive conventions of a discourse 
community."®^ But the fact is, there is no such thing as a definitive 
interpretive framework which can cope with all the permutations of 
experience. Anomalies are always present; what makes sense in one 
context falls short in another. As a result, no individual subscribes to 
only one Interpretive framework but has present within her interpretive 
repertoire a multitude of frameworks. Inevitably, what are otherwise 
discrete frameworks for interpreting experience come into conflict, 
and the individual must negotiate some sort of resolution, either by 
adopting one or the other of these frameworks, or by constructing a 
more encompassing framework which integrates the elements of the 
previous ones. 
Something like this same process goes on at the social level. 
Each person's experience is necessarily unique, and no two individuals 
construe their experience in exactly the same way. Although the ways 
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in which people interpret experience are learned -- not only from other 
people but from the dominant culture — there is no single framework 
which can successfully explain all aspects of experience, just as there 
is no person who is subject to the influence of only one framework. 
The dominant ideology of a society is a powerful force, but even 
sociolinguistic determinists acknowledge that resistance is possible. 
To get at the source of that resistance, however, it is not necessary 
to postulate some innate capacity for self-consciousness which 
transcends cultural and historical conditioning (though in the last 
analysis I personally don't see how we could resist that conditioning 
otherwise). All that's needed is the recognition that no interpretive 
framework is omnipotent or omnipresent. Ideological conditioning in 
some degree is a fact of life, one which we must constantly resist. 
Fortunately, the possibility that any single ideological framework could 
be everywhere at once or seem to provide all the answers is unlikely 
(as long as we don't assume that it's too unlikely). In short, 
indeterminacy is a pervasive characteristic of experience - one, 
moreover, that we should embrace. 
In an effort to make sense of this indeterminacy and to control 
the flow of experience, individuals come together and seek to 
construct ways of talking that they can agree on. But these attempts 
also fall short, with the result that no discourse community is 
monolithic; no two people within the same community subscribe to 
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exactly the same interpretive framework, nor do they as individuals 
subscribe to only one framework or belong to only that one 
community. In fact, not only is there no one-to-one correspondence 
between discourse communities and interpretive frameworks but 
neither are there any standard conditions for defining any discourse 
community as such. And any community that could establish such 
conditions would have ceased to be an instrument of human inquiry 
and growth. The term "discourse community" is in fact a 
convenience, a linguistic and interpretive construct. It refers to an 
approximate network of people who have agreed to use certain 
interpretive and language-using frameworks, even while recognizing 
that there can never be total agreement about those frameworks, and 
that their whole purpose in coming together is eventually to supplant 
those frameworks with more comprehensive ones. 
Human experience is thus saturated with indeterminacies which 
we negotiate by means of a multitude of interpretive frameworks 
which are themselves indeterminate. If we accept this premise (which 
I take to be the basis of John Dewey's pragmatic theory of inquiry,®^ 
as well as the foundation of Richard Rorty's "edifying" philosophy®'^), 
then the only possible role cognition can have as a producer of 
knowledge is that of constructing mediating connections between 
what are otherwise discrete interpretive frameworks (what Rorty calls 
"hermeneutics"®^). Reflective inquiry and discourse, according to this 
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scheme, are the deliberate attempt to construct just such integrating 
connections - the "ideal" aim being to construct a comprehensive 
picture of how this multitude of interpretive frameworks hangs 
together.®® Cognitivism and social constructionism thus become two 
different perspectives for viewing the same intercontextual process: 
the ongoing construction and reconstruction of ever more integrated 
knowledge systems. This process entails not so much the application 
of general cognitive strategies or the utilization of determinate (or 
normal ) discourse conventions as it does the intercontextual 
reconstruction and integration of otherwise discrete and indeterminate 
ways of interpreting experience, what is sometimes called "abnormal 
discourse." 
Educational Implications 
Flower and Bizzell both remark on institutional failures to 
provide the necessary conditions for students to respond appropriately 
to college writing assignments: 
Academics are, perhaps, too ready to assume that such 
operations as 'describe' or 'analyze' are self-evident, 
when in fact they have meanings specific to the 
academic discourse community and specific to disciplines 
within that community... To help poor writers, then, we 
need to explain that their writing takes place within a 
community, and to explain what the community's 
conventions are.®^ 
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Teachers ... hope the holy words of college assignments 
(e.g., 'analyze,' 'interpret') will cue the bundle of 
intellectual maneuvers every student should have learned. 
But 'transfer' is a perennial problem in education in part 
because the context of a new class may fail to cue a 
student to use strategies which are appropriate, but were 
learned elsewhere in a different context... [Clould meta¬ 
knowledge and awareness of one's own process play a 
role in expanding the cues students perceive and the 
options they entertain?®® 
In the passage above, Bizzell proposes to rectify the problems 
of poor and inexperienced writers by explaining to them the discourse 
conventions and concerns of the relevant knowledge communities. 
Flower's solution is to provide them with general problem solving 
strategies and inventional heuristics which would help students 
respond to situational cues. Bizzell seems to think that if students are 
first made familiar with the conventions and concerns of discourse 
communities, they will then know how to respond to the problems of 
those communities. Flower seems to think that if students are made 
aware of their own cognitive options, they will then know how to 
apply those options in specific situations. 
Both recommendations miss that the problem of inappropriate 
student responses lies not so much in students' lack of specific 
knowledge or general cognitive skills {although either lack can 
certainly be a sufficient cause for failure. II prefer to think of 
■•cognitive skills," incidentally, as "intellectual habits," as opposed to 
some kind of "developmental structures.")) Rather, "student" failure 
lies more in the fact that the assignments in such cases have no 
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particular meaning for students themselves. The task is prescribed by 
an outside agent, the teacher, who tries to provide students with the 
necessary background and tools to cope with it. Such assignments fail 
students because they do not elicit doubt about an indeterminacy 
which the students themselves perceive: they only produce doubt 
about how to attend to the task at hand. Discourse conventions and 
problem solving strategies thus become tools for completing tasks 
assigned by someone else, rather than means for making sense of the 
indeterminacies of students' own interpretations of experience. 
Meaningful writing doesn't come from discourse communities 
and their conventions. Nor does it come from problem solving 
strategies and heuristics. It comes from mind deliberately making 
sense of the indeterminacies of experience. To enjoin someone to 
"analyze," "discuss," or "interpret" some allegedly problematic 
situation about which she has not herself experienced a state of doubt 
is misguided. Neither making students aware that other people think 
something is problematic nor making them aware of their own options 
in solving such problems is going to make students adopt such 
problems as their own. The difficulties of poor writers aren't 
overcome by teaching these things. They are solved by designing 
assignments which induce in students themselves doubt about how to 
interpret experience, thus compelling students to construct their own 
solutions. Such a method requires that we focus our attention not on 
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individual cognition or sociolinguistic context but on the interaction of 
the two. In short, it means that we must attend to the ways in which 
the indeterminacies of academic discourse lead students to construct 
their own interpretive frameworks through the mutual reconstruction 
of their own active belief systems and the discourse conventions 
which they encounter. 
A key principle here thus becomes that all learning entails 
abnormal discourse, even the learning of normal discourse 
conventions, a point upon which Bruffee remarks in promoting his 
notion of collaborative learning: 
[Elntering an existing knowledge community involves a 
process of negotiation. Followed to its logical conclusion 
this principle implies that education is not a rite a 
passage in which students passively become initiated 
into an institution that is monolithic and unchanging. It 
implies that the means by which students learn to 
negotiate this entry ... models how knowledge is 
generated, how it changes and grows.®® 
"Abnormal discourse is therefore necessary to learning," Bruffee later 
goes on to say, although it cannot be taught directly. 
What we can teach are the tools of normal discourse... 
To leave openings for change, however, we must not 
teach these tools as universals. We must teach ... in 
such a way that, when necessary, students can turn to 
abnormal discourse in order to undermine their own and 
other people's reliance on ... normal discourse. We must 
teach the use of these tools in such a way that students 
can set them aside ... for the purpose of generating new 
knowledge, for the purpose, that is, of reconstituting 
knowledge communities in more satisfactory ways.^° 
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While I am in basic agreement with Bruffee on these points, 
there is a complication here which he doesn't seem to have fully 
considered. If students can only learn the conventions of normal 
discourse by means of abnormal discourse, then they cannot be 
expected to do so by means of normal discourse, although that is 
what Bruffee, like Bizzell, seems to be proposing. What distinguishes 
Bruffee s recommendations from Bizzell's, however, (though I'm quite 
sure she would agree with him on this point -- and rightly so) is his 
suggestion that normal discourse should be taught "in such a way" 
that it can become abnormal discourse. For Bruffee, that way is 
"collaborative learning." But collaborative learning, as he describes it, 
is an extremely vague notion ranging anywhere from students talking 
together about their writing to the very process of thought itself. 
Bruffee blurs the meaningful distinctions which could be drawn 
between these manifestations for the sake of advancing his dubious 
argument that students must work together in collaborative groups in 
order to embody the principle that knowledge-making is a social 
activity. Unfortunately, what gets shortchanged is an account of the 
role of cognition as the intercontextual mediator of otherwise discrete 
and indeterminate ways of interpreting experience, the sort of account 
which I have tried to give here. 
What an intercontextual account of cognition suggests is that 
the means to teaching normal discourse so that it can become 
217 
abnormal discourse is, in fact, abnormal discourse itself (of which peer 
collaboration is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition’’), the 
reason being that all discourse communities are themselves 
indeterminate. What makes them communities is that the people who 
write and speak within them are deliberately trying to negotiate an 
integrated picture of how their otherwise diverse and indeterminate 
ways of constructing experience hang together. That process may 
involve, among other things, direct challenges to another member's 
interpretations and choice of language, but it is still driven by a desire 
to communicate and negotiate an alternative vision. 
What such an account also suggests, then, is that more 
important than the particular conventions students learn and even the 
particular interpretations they construct are the active habits of 
reconstructive discourse and inquiry they acquire. In other words, 
more than introducing students to new discourse communities, we 
want to instill in them the desire and means to negotiate such 
connections themselves as an ongoing function in their lives. And we 
do this chiefly by demonstrating to students 
-- through challenges to their active, social belief structures -- the 
desirability of ongoing, reflective inquiry and discourse. 
The teacher's job is thus not so much that of providing problem 
solving strategies or explaining discourse conventions as it is of 
creating a learning environment that induces in students doubt about 
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what to believe or do. Since reflective thinking and discourse do not 
originate in social contexts or in individual cognition but in the 
interaction of the two, there are two conditions of such an 
environment. The first is that the indeterminacies with which teachers 
present students be indeterminacies which students themselves feel. 
Since no two people construct their experience in precisely the same 
way, this necessarily requires some flexibility on the teacher's part. 
Teachers must themselves be students of their students' cognitive 
processes -- of the ways in which students construct and reconstruct 
their own interpretive and language-using frameworks. Formal 
processing models can play an important role here, but they should 
not obscure the fact that it is the unique ways in which individuals 
manage the particular elements of specific rhetorical contexts and 
their own prior experience that is the greater concern. More important 
still are the intellectual and communicative habits which students 
acquire in the process of negotiating these constructions. 
Fortunately, although the ways in which individuals construct 
their experience are ultimately unique, general patterns do exist, and 
individuals can be roughly categorized according to learning style, 
interests, background, etc. I'm not proposing any absolute 
categorization. I'm merely pointing out that with teaching experience 
comes the recognition of similarities in the ways students learn, and in 
the ways we can facilitate that learning. For example, in challenging 
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students to negotiate their way between competing interpretive 
frameworks, we invariably see that some students form strong 
opinions without giving due consideration to alternative viewpoints, 
while others give proper consideration to alternatives but are unable or 
unwilling to formulate an interpretation of their own. Generally 
speaking, what we try to do is find ways to get the first type of 
student to see the shortcomings of their interpretations and the 
second type of student the strengths of theirs. Both strategies depend 
on maneuvering students into positions where they experience doubt 
about what to believe or do. 
This brings us to the second condition of a successful learning 
environment. In order that students might develop the ability to share 
their interpretations and purposes with others, it is not enough to 
present them with indeterminacies only they perceive. The context of 
learning must be social; it must involve the shared concerns and 
purposes of some community or communities. Peer collaboration in its 
many forms (peer response, coauthoring, workshopping, etcetera) can 
play an important role here. Its use, however, should not obscure the 
fact that it isn't the social arrangements per se which are thought 
provoking; it is the interaction of a structuring mind with a context 
which that mind perceives as indeterminate. Discourse necessarily 
involves the needs of some community, but that community need not 
be the other students in a class. Indeed (as I argue in the next 
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chapter), it is far more important that students be exposed to the 
concerns of discourse communities beyond the scope represented in 
the immediate needs and interests of their peers. It is important that 
they see the ways in which their own habits of thinking and language¬ 
using can be situated within those communities, and that they begin 
building their own unique interpretive frameworks through the mutual 
reconstruction of those larger communities' frameworks and their own 
active belief systems. 
The same holds true for the teaching of discourse conventions. 
Explaining the conventions of alternative discourse communities to 
students plays a role in their learning to negotiate their way within 
and between those communities. But it should not obscure the fact 
that students must ultimately negotiate the connections themselves. 
Students learn that writing takes place in communities by reading and 
writing within and for those communities, and they learn the 
conventions the same way. Although explaining comes into play, 
students learn conventions of writing and thinking chiefly by trying 
them out and revising them as necessary. That "necessity" arises 
from giving them assignments which require students to write within 
a social context that elicits doubt in students' own minds about what 
to believe or do. Again, the key principle here is that it is neither 
context nor cognition that elicits reflective activity but the interaction 
of the two. 
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As long as this principle is deliberately respected and 
systematically attended to, there is really no limit to the ways in 
which students can be taught to think and write. Some varied 
examples of instructional approaches which attempt, in my mind, to 
do so include Berthoff's use of assignments which force students to 
reevaluate their perceptions in the light of new contexts,^^ Gage's 
use of enthymeme as a tool for making sense of discrete viewpoints 
in a stasis, or indeterminate rhetorical situation,Annette 
Rottenberg s employment of the Toulmin model (which is essentially 
enthymemic) to specific social issues which students find 
compelling,James Reither and Douglas Vipond's nurturing of 
reflective inquiry and discourse within a scholarly field through 
collaborative projects,^® Kenneth Dowst's epistemic approach,^® 
Charles Kay Smith's rhetoric of reperception,and Marilyn Coopers' 
ecological approach.^® Indeed, most any approach that I have read 
about can work; what distinguishes the ones I have just mentioned, 
however, is that they all make, or speak of the need to make, specific 
provisions for an indeterminate rhetorical situation which fosters 
intercontextual thinking and writing, rather than leaving such a 
situation to chance. They all acknowledge, in short, that learning can 
only occur where there is the interaction of individual cognition and 
social context. 
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Near the beginning of this essay I wrote that cognition can no 
more be disembedded from context than context can be understood 
as determining cognition. The reason this is so is that cognition and 
context produce one another. Context cannot determine cognition 
because, as a human and social artifact, it is itself indeterminate; 
cognition cannot be disembedded from context because, as a product 
of social interaction, it is itself intercontextual. In a very real sense, 
cognition and context are the same thing; cognitivism and 
constructionism are but two ways of looking at the same interactive 
process -- a process about which a great deal more needs to be said. 
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CHAPTER 6 
PERSONAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL RESERVATIONS 
ABOUT COLLABORATIVE LEARNING 
University faculty from across the disciplines are increasingly 
turning to collaborative learning" as an alternative to more traditional 
modes of instruction. The term itself denotes a general pedagogical 
style which emphasizes cooperation -- either among students or 
between students and faculty — as the basic mode of learning.’ 
Founded on the premise that learning is fundamentally a social 
process, collaborative learning seeks to replicate that process in the 
classroom. In practice, it can take the form of small-group exercises, 
collaborative research projects, peer-review methods, cooperative 
course development, or reconfigured lecture formats - to name some 
of the more widely used techniques.^ 
I have no intention here of raising the usual doubts about 
collaborative learning - that it usurps the teacher's authority, that it 
sacrifices coverage of course content in favor of student involvement, 
that it asks of students more initiative and commitment than they can 
give, that I've tried it and it hasn't worked. During the two years that 
I worked as an instructional consultant advising university faculty and 
teaching assistants from a range of disciplines, I heard these and 
similar objections many times. Yet I probably recommended that 
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teachers try making their classes more collaborative as often as any 
other piece of advice. I personally developed confidence in the 
effectiveness of collaborative techniques during a six year stint 
teaching freshman composition in a university writing program noted 
for its advocacy of peer group methods. So when I raise my doubts 
about collaborative learning, I do so as a proponent of its techniques 
but as someone who is nevertheless reluctant to jump on the 
collaborative bandwagon. 
My reservations about collaborative learning stem primarily from 
too many of its proponents ascribing to it educative powers it doesn't 
necessarily possess. In saying this I do not mean to deny those 
powers which it does possess but merely to suggest that we have not 
yet made an adequate effort to ask what those powers might in fact 
be. Far too often the objections which I listed at the outset of this 
essay are presented as the only possible ones, as if the only real 
grounds for questioning collaboration as a mode of learning are that 
one isn't comfortable with it or that one doesn't get it. Such an 
assumption leads to treating all objections as something to be refuted 
rather than as possible guides to further inquiry. 
Unsuccessful efforts to teach collaboratively, for instance, are 
often diagnosed as having neglected to provide adequate direction or 
structure. But it is peer collaboration and not the type of direction or 
structure employed to which good results, when they do occur, are 
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frequently attributed. In research circles this type of inductive mistake 
is known as the confounding of variables, though one needn't be an 
empiricist to see the error: unless one controls the variables (and in 
this case I'm not sure we can), there is no reliable way of inferring 
which results follow from which technique. 
The truth is I have a good deal of faith in teachers' ability to 
know if what they're doing is working or not. But when I hear 
colleagues persist in extolling the virtues of any particular technique 
over all others, then I begin to worry. I'm all for playing what Peter 
Elbow.calls the "believing game,"^ but to play it exclusively with 
one's own convictions is not what I think he had in mind. The virtue 
of suspending disbelief is that it leads to new ideas. But to increase 
the power of those ideas we need to play the doubting game -- to 
entertain objections, to explore limitations, to seek counterexamples, 
and so on. Indeed, doing so is necessary to the believing game itself, 
as new ideas do not arise in a vacuum but can only do so in the 
context of some doubt. 
By no means am I saying, then, that there's anything wrong 
with allowing, encouraging, and even requiring students to work in 
groups. On the contrary, I believe there are good pedagogical reasons 
for doing so. What I am saying is that I don't think we yet know what 
those reasons are as weil as we might think we do. Without a clear 
understanding of what collaborative learning does and, just as 
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importantly, does not do, we lack a coherent sense of which 
techniques to employ, at which points in the learning process, and 
with which students. Rather than being viewed as objections, then, 
my reservations should be taken as part of a more general effort to 
increase our understanding and control of collaborative pedagogy. 
Proponents of collaborative learning generally attribute to it 
three related learning outcomes; increased responsibility for learning, 
the understanding that knowledge is socially constructed, and the 
development of higher order reasoning skills (by which is meant 
primarily the ability to construct and negotiate alternative 
interpretations of experience both within and between established 
knowledge/discourse communities). My own experience and 
ruminations lead me to a more cautious position; while collaborative 
techniques are excellent motivators and promoters of intellectual 
tolerance, the development of higher order reasoning in socially 
significant contexts depends far more on the learning task and how it 
is structured than on face-to-face interactions with peers. Peer 
collaboration in its many forms is extremely useful in the teaching of 
reflective, dialogical thinking. But far more important is a learning 
environment which is structured so as to sustain and regulate the 
interplay of doubt and belief in students' reasoning. While 
collaborative techniques almost invariably enhance such an 
environment, there is nothing about them per se which provides one. 
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Neither do they offer the best kind of practice in constructing and 
negotiating alternative interpretations of experience, though they do 
provide a useful context in which students can experiment with 
unfamiliar interpretive and linguistic frameworks. 
Personal Reservations 
I arrived at these notions by two related paths. The first is my 
own experience as a student and teacher in various collaborative 
settings. The second is through my theoretical explorations of college 
teaching and learning in my home discipline of educational philosophy. 
Though the two accounts overlap, I'll begin with the first. 
Mv Experience as a Student 
My earliest recollection of collaborative learning is as a teenager 
in a progressive Long Island high school in the late 1960's. At the 
first meeting of our eighth grade science class, Mr. Marganoff 
announced that we would spend the next nine months working in 
groups: conducting experiments, formulating hypotheses, analyzing 
results, and coming to some sort of consensus about our conclusions. 
Our first task was to identify fifteen minerals on the basis of their 
various properties. Though there was only one "right answer, I don t 
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recall being graded on it. We didn't hand in any overly formal 
presentation, either. What I do remember is the spirit of cooperation 
and friendly competition that permeated the room like the late morning 
sun. When the Apollo mission landed on the moon a short time later, I 
don t think a single person from that class missed that this was a 
shared accomplishment, one made possible by a massive group effort, 
and one in which we felt we had almost played a part. 
Collaborative learning made its way into the English curriculum, 
too. I remember the year it happened: 1970. One semester Mr. Blake 
was lecturing to us about images of light and darkness in Hamlet: the 
next we were reading Jerry Farber's The Student as Niooer.'* forming 
collaborative groups from which to launch related inquiries of our own 
choosing, and convening as a class to "rap" about our ongoing 
explorations. This class was anything but the "authoritarian- 
individualist" experience described by Kenneth Bruffee in "The Way 
Out."® Indeed, to paraphrase something which John Dewey once 
overheard in a child-centered classroom in the 1920's, my attitude 
towards this class can be summed up by the following question which 
I once put to Mr. Blake: "Do we have to work in groups today?" 
(Dewey's tidbit is a good deal more quotable: "Do we have to do 
what we want today?") I didn't learn much in the way of content that 
year. And I didn't learn much about collaboration as a form of 
knowledge making, either. What 1 did get out of the class I got "on 
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my own, that is, without much input from my peers or teacher. In 
the vacuum left by a teacher who saw all external structure as a form 
of coercion, I spent my time exploring Eastern philosophy, an area for 
which I still hold much interest. 
I m led to wonder what the difference between these two 
experiences is. Perhaps it was the relative lack of structure or 
guidance provided by the English teacher. Or it could have been the 
absence of any specific task in his class. While I think these are both 
appropriate answers, I think the most distinguishing feature between 
the two classes was the deficiency in the English class — for me -- of 
any shared sense of purpose with the other people in the class. I can 
remember other class members enjoying and looking forward to their 
collaborations, both inside and outside of school. My collaborations, 
on the other hand, were with people removed from me in time and 
space. I wasn't able to converse with Alan Watts, Erich Fromm, or 
Herman Hesse about the differences between their interpretations of 
Eastern religious thought, but neither did I miss the point that their 
conjectures either involved or implied ongoing interactions with and 
interpretations of the works and lives of others: Confucius, Lao Tzu, 
Gautama Buddha, etc. I wonder, though, just to whom I owe this 
realization: Mr. Marganoff or Mr. Blake? 
In college I had a somewhat different experience, one which is 
again quite the opposite of the sort which Bruffee and Elbow write 
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about in their own lives. For them, the college classroom was usually 
a teacher-dominated arena, involving students as either passive 
recipients or intellectual adversaries competing for recognition. 
(Interestingly enough, and I'm quite serious on this point, the main 
places where I've had such experiences have been college English 
classes.) Collaborative learning, with its non-authoritarian philosophy 
and underlying spirit of cooperation, is a much needed remedy to the 
excesses of this top-down, competitive approach. As a student of 
philosophy and education, however, I took dozens of courses which 
employed collaborative techniques, primarily small groups in which we 
would interpret passages and books, respond to each others' writing, 
and negotiate group conclusions with the rest of the class. 
What's interesting about this experience is that while I much 
preferred the collaborative classes to the authoritarian-competitive 
ones (and I enjoyed the ones which encouraged non-competitive, 
independent work the most - more on that in a moment), I often 
found the collaborative classes extremely frustrating. What I enjoyed 
were the face-to-face interactions and the exposure to other people's 
ideas and experiences. What frustrated me was not the lack of closure 
one might expect but the premature closure which often resulted from 
the undiscriminating acceptance of "agreeable" ideas and the equally 
undiscriminating rejection of "disagreeable* ideas. 
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I couldn t count, for example, the number of times I listened to 
other students criticize B.F. Skinner without any serious consideration 
of the obvious merits of his model. And in reading and discussing 
John Dewey, the way people would select those passages which 
confirmed their own thinking at the expense of those which did not 
never ceased (and never ceases) to amaze me. (There is, for instance, 
a good deal of behaviorism in Dewey which many people overlook. 
Indeed, Dewey® is much closer to Skinner than he is, say, to Carl 
Rogers. ) Though mine was often the only dissenting voice, I 
generally expressed my reservations -- a quality which endeared me to 
many teachers though not generally to other students. But as my 
opinions were only half-formed and I was seldom very articulate, my 
contributions had little impact on the group. 
One might suggest that I could have used these experiences as 
opportunities better to formulate and articulate my ideas to the class. 
This is, after all, what we do as professionals in our fields, as well as 
members of the larger community of liberally educated persons 
generally. Although I often set out to do just that, what happened 
instead was that I found myself writing not to my peers in the class 
but to the community of people whose works we were reading. In 
other words, I found that my interest in articulating my views to my 
peers was for the most part supplanted by my desire to enter into the 
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written dialogue of the knowledge/discourse communities we were 
studying. 
Collaboration was occurring, of course, but a great deal of it 
was internal. Indeed, whether I had been collaborating with my fellow 
students or not, the more involved I became in the intricacies of the 
interpretive frameworks I was studying, the more I found I needed to 
work privately. The ideas were simply too challenging, and my 
interactions with them too complex, for spontaneous, in-class 
negotiations to take me as far as I wanted to go. I participated in 
class discussions, of course, and enjoyed both hearing other people 
talk about their ideas and sharing my own. But even here, the people 
with the most interesting ideas were the ones who had put in a great 
deal of "individual" effort. For them, as for me, collaborating directly 
with the other people in the class simply wasn't a priority. Like my 
experience in Mr. Blake's English class, our collaborations were chiefly 
with people and communities removed in space and time. And the 
evidence seemed to indicate that it was collaborations such as these 
which were the most fruitful and instructive. 
Some teachers did require group work, both in and out of class; 
joint written statements, oral reports, peer response on individual 
writing, and so on. While I went along with all this cheerfully enough, 
I never really got that enthused, and found that as time went on I 
increasingly did only what was required of me and no more. It was in 
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fact much easier to get enthused about what other people were doing 
when group work was not required. In such cases, collaboration 
evolved spontaneously, as a result of our individual involvement with 
and enthusiasm for the rhetorical situations in which we were 
engaged. In-class collective efforts may have been small -- 
recommending to someone an essay or book, giving somebody a 
photocopy of one of your own papers, suggesting that they go talk to 
a particular professor or fellow student, continuing class discussions 
in the hallway, cafeteria, dorm room, or parking lot — but they were 
genuine. Above all, such collaborations evolved out of our individual 
and shared involvement with academic discourse communities beyond 
the classroom. The classroom was its own community, of course, but 
not the most compelling one. Indeed, it clearly depended on the larger 
knowledge/discourse communities of the academy. 
Looking back over the whole of my undergraduate and graduate 
experience, I would say that the most important factors in my own 
learning were not the classroom interactions but rather my interest in 
the subject, the extent to which my instructors allowed me to pursue 
that interest, and the challenges to my own thinking and writing 
regarding that.subject with which they provided me. The most 
important results were that I learned actively to use written sources to 
challenge my own thinking and writing and to enter into 
reconstructive dialogue with the knowledge/discourse communities 
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that generated those sources. In my own educational experience, the 
role which face-to-face interactions with peers played in such learning 
was minimal. 
My Experience as a Teacher 
As I said near the beginning of this essay, peer response is a 
major component in the writing program where I learned to teach. In 
structuring peer response groups, one of the first things I learned is 
that, in the absence of teacher supervision, students need advanced 
preparation and clear guidelines - not simply to keep them on task but 
more importantly to help them know what sorts of things to look for 
and how to respond to them. By my second semester as a writing 
instructor, I had learned to frame questions on peer response sheets in 
ways that required substantive responses -- primarily by asking that 
responders make concrete citations and suggestions (e.g., "Cite at 
least one passage where the author could have used more detailed 
support." "Invent some hypothetical support of your own to illustrate 
what you mean"). 
Even more important than preparation and guidelines, however, 
were the assignments themselves. In my first semester teaching 
writing, I gave assignments which asked students to write about and 
generalize from personal experience. This "experiential approach"® 
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worked fine for the first essay; students could generally find 
something that both compelled themselves and evoked interest in 
others. But I was unhappy with the limited content and interaction 
with other viewpoints that such assignments elicited from students. 
What these assignments essentially did, I began to realize, was to 
send students in search of something to write about for the sake of 
meeting course requirements. So I started to develop assignments 
which from the start compelled students by challenging them to 
interact with alternative ways of seeing and talking about experience, 
especially the larger, more complex interpretive frameworks of 
academic knowledge/discourse communities. 
With these assignments, student motivation increased, as did 
the quality of student writing. Students were motivated by the 
challenge of negotiating among competing interpretive frameworks, as 
well as their own success in handling those challenges. The only 
problem was that the peer response groups seemed to be increasingly 
ineffective. The level of knowledge construction and discursive 
exchange at which students were now operating demanded responses 
and challenges which the students could not generally provide each 
another without assistance. They started to rely more and more 
heavily on my written comments because they didn't know how to 
offer substantive comments themselves. And we all knew this was 
happening. 
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A solution came from my observations of a senior colleague's 
course which employed teacher-facilitated peer groups. Instead of 
adding my written comments to the comments which student peers 
had written and discussed in class, I started facilitating, one at a time, 
small groups of four to six students in pre-arranged meetings. We 
substituted each of these meetings for two regular class meetings and 
my written comments. The trade-off was favorable on all counts. In 
the groups we covered five papers in seventy-five minutes (fifteen 
minutes per paper), and accomplished more than peer response and 
my written comments did put together. 
The key was that I offered as little as possible in the way of 
suggestions or direct comments myself. Instead I asked questions 
which allowed students to comment in constructive ways which they 
couldn't quite conceive on their own. What made these questions 
different than the ones on peer response sheets was that they were 
paper-specific - they dealt directly with the content and interpretive 
frameworks involved in the papers themselves. Thus, instead of 
responding to the questions "Where could the author better support 
her main argument?" or "Can you suggest an alternative interpretation 
she might have overlooked?" students could answer directly such 
questions as "What, according to Connie, is the connection between 
the fundamentalist stance on the issues of sex education and 
abortion?" "What do you think she is trying to say?" "Okay, but why 
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IS it unfair to deny the right to an abortion to someone whom you 
have also denied sex education?" and "What would a pro-life 
advocate say?" 
Another advantage I found to teacher-facilitated peer groups is 
that I could direct these response-eliciting questions to particular 
students on the basis of the kinds of contributions I knew they could 
make. Thus, a student with an opposing, or simply different, 
viewpoint could provide a challenge or explanation at a timely moment 
(in the above example, for instance, we could hear an actual pro-life 
stance). Or a more abstract thinker might be able to articulate where 
she saw a line of thought heading that the author might have missed. 
Or, conversely, I could ask a more concrete thinker if he understood a 
particular line of abstract thought, just where it might need clarifying, 
and what sorts of clarification he might suggest. And of course there 
was always the simple fact that I could, by these interventions, help 
outspoken students learn to listen, and quiet students to speak up, 
while still respecting their different learning styles. 
The actual outcome of these meetings was never planned, and 
students remained the primary makers and negotiators of knowledge. 
But through my eliciting and modeling of content- and context-specific 
questions, students were learning to make and negotiate knowledge 
at a level beyond their normal discourse. They were learning not only 
how to ask questions of others in face-to-face situations, but also 
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how to develop their own lines of questioning in their own 
academically-situated writing. And they were getting to see the same 
principles of argument, support, development, and so on, worked out 
in different rhetorical contexts. 
I continued to use non-facilitated groups in our regular class 
meetings. These were not, however, peer response groups but groups 
where 1 asked students to attend to such small tasks as generating 
supporting paragraphs for undeveloped ideas, summarizing in their 
own words the main point of a short piece of academic writing, or 
coming up with and generating support for objections to a 
controversial passage. A basic requirement, however, was always that 
students generate their own individual responses first. My reason for 
doing this was not only to make sure everybody participated and had 
something to contribute but also that they all took the time to reflect 
individually on the problem I had set. 
The key to such activities, however, lay not so much in the 
collaboration as in the task. It had to be something which challenged 
students to interact with and negotiate between alternative 
interpretive frameworks. The collaboration, it seemed to me, met most 
of the students' need for social interaction, and even provided a 
iimited kind of practice in negotiating alternative ways of seeing and 
talking. The main practice, however, went on internally and in writing. 
Students shared this writing, and the groups gave them more impetus 
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to write than merely writing for a teacher would have. But the key 
was that the assignments had to be good ones -- ones which 
challenged students to reconstruct their normal ways of thinking and 
writing. While the groups sometimes enhanced these challenges, by 
providing an array of interpretations, the challenges needed to come 
from the assignments themselves. 
Even with good assignments, I found that collaborative learning 
was not for everyone. Some students were simply too "independent," 
as opposed to those who were basically "collaborative." I use these 
terms, incidentally, in the narrow sense -- to refer to the amount of 
interpersonal interaction students sought in learning situations -- for 
there is no denying that we are all collaborative learners in the broad 
sense of social constructors of knowledge. The question is how much 
do the two senses have to do with one another? 
My experience as a teacher suggests one possible answer: It 
depends on students' individual learning preferences and their 
intellectual maturity. Let me make perfectly that I see these as quite 
distinct factors in student learning. Mature learners can be either 
independent or collaborative, just as immature learners can also be 
independent or collaborative. By "intellectual maturity, incidentally, I 
mean the quality of a person's intellectual and discourse habits, which 
are partly a function of biological development but are primarily a 
function of the quality of a person's total learning environment - both 
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formal and informal. The index of maturity, it seems to me, is the 
extent to which students can create and take advantage of their own 
learning opportunities, as opposed to having to depend on someone 
else to do these things for them. Collaborative groups are one kind of 
planned learning environment. 
I found that collaborative learning was, at times, inappropriate 
for all four types of students in this informal taxonomy, but 
particularly for immature collaborators and mature independents. 
Immature collaborators working together tended towards superficial 
agreement, and generally needed to practice complex negotiations 
with alternative viewpoints on their own. They were also in greater 
need of the more substantive challenges which a teacher versed in the 
concerns of the relevant knowledge/discourse communities could 
provide. Mature independents, on the other hand, like mature 
collaborators, already knew how to collaborate, but they did so 
internally. For whatever reasons, they tended to function better alone. 
The benefits of direct collaboration -- e.g., the diversity of viewpoints 
experienced, the immediate feedback provided, the feeling of 
commitment to the group, etcetera -- weren't as important for them, 
and could even be distracting. Such was my learning experience, and 1 
recognized and respected these feelings in many of my students. 
There were, on the other hand, those students who clearly 
benefitted from direct collaboration. Mature collaborators, for 
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instance, clearly found group work stimulating, though they didn't 
depend on it to the exclusion of careful independent thinking and 
writing. And immature independents clearly needed the exposure to 
alternative viewpoints, which face-to-face contact provided, to help 
them break out of their otherwise narrow intellectual and discursive 
tendencies. In both cases, however, the "need" for independent 
writing and thinking was always present, as was the "need" for a task 
or assignment which made connections between students' present 
tendencies and the knowledge/discourse communities of the 
academy. While collaborative group work usually helped to motivate 
students, increased their participation, and made the exposure to 
alternative viewpoints more direct, it was never, to my mind, 
"necessary" to college learning, though it was extremely helpful. 
Philosophical Reservations 
A close reading of the literature on collaborative learning reveals 
that what most distinguishes it from merely working in groups is that 
it entails the active negotiation of alternative ways of interpreting and 
talking about experience, precisely the characteristic which I have 
emphasized so far. What gives collaborative learning this distinction, 
its advocates stress, is its dependence on a task which demands that 
students arrive at some type of consensus, whether it be actual 
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agreement or an agreement to disagree. The task, in other words, 
must require students to negotiate among their own alternative ways 
of seeing and talking in an effort to construct this consensus.® 
Proponents of collaborative learning claim that in thus negotiating 
between alternative interpretive and linguistic frameworks, students 
not only learn that knowledge is socially constructed, but they also 
learn how socially to construct it, as well as to take more 
responsibility for doing so. These outcomes are achieved, ostensibly, 
through the combination of the collaborative group setting and a task 
requiring negotiation. 
While proponents of collaborative learning thus acknowledge 
that group work is not a sufficient condition of learning to engage in 
the social construction of knowledge, they often argue that it is a 
necessary condition. In "Collaborative Learning and the 'Conversation 
of Mankind',"’® Kenneth Bruffee, the main spokesperson for 
collaborative learning, offers a lengthy rationalization for this 
necessity. Bruffee draws heavily on the work of Thomas Kuhn and 
Richard Rorty, both outspoken advocates of the widely accepted 
notion that knowledge is a social artifact constructed through a 
process of socially justifying belief. But the social justification of belief 
obviously requires no such thing as people working in face-to-face 
collaborative groups, and there is nothing in either Kuhn or Rorty to 
suggest otherwise. A community of people with shared ways of 
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construing and talking about experience is obviously necessary, but 
the process rarely goes on in the form of person-to-person exchanges. 
Bruffee acknowledges this fact when he writes that "the 
particular thing I write every time" is not necessarily "something I 
have talked over with other people first, although 1 may well often do 
just that. ’’ Yet he goes on to argue that, as teachers, "our task 
must involve engaging students in conversation among themselves at 
as many points in both the writing and the reading process as 
possible."’^ He expresses much the same idea again in "Writing and 
Reading as Collaborative or Social Acts,"^^ when he insists that 
"collaborative learning, which is the institutionalized counterpart of 
the social or collaborative nature of knowledge and thought, is not 
merely a helpful pedagogical technique incidental to writing. It is 
essential to writing."^"* What leads Bruffee to make these remarkable 
and seemingly unwarranted claims? 
Much of the answer, unfortunately, lies in his equivocal use of 
the term "collaborative learning." On the one hand, he uses it to refer 
to the various pedagogical techniques normally associated with the 
term: peer editing, coauthoring, peer tutoring, etc. In this usage, 
"collaboration'.’ denotes face-to-face exchanges between people who 
elicit each others' direct input. In its other usage, "collaborative 
learning" is used to refer to the general philosophical principle that all 
knowledge is socially constructed. Here "collaboration denotes the 
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fact that knowledge is inescapably social in its functions and origins, 
as well as in the ways that we generate, test, and revise it. 
Drawing on the work of Lev Vygotsky,’® Bruffee essentially 
argues that the connection between the two usages resides in the 
fact that thought is internalized conversation. In other words, 
according to Bruffee, we learn to think -- that is, to carry on the 
internal dialogue known as thought -- by first learning to converse - 
that is, to elicit, receive, coordinate, accommodate, and respond to 
the diverse viewpoints of others. The implication, for Bruffee, is that, 
in order for college students to learn to think like, say, historians, they 
have to talk like them first. He assumes, in other words, that for 
college students to understand what it is to participate in a particular 
knowledge community, they must have face-to-face interactions with 
their peers within the context of that community's concerns. 
There are two problems with this assumption. The first is that 
the relationship between language and thought is hardly as linear as 
Bruffee assumes. To maintain, as Bruffee does, that we learn to think 
in ways we have learned to talk hardly states the case fairly. For it is 
just as true that we learn to talk in ways we have learned to think, as 
Vygotsky himself holds. Bruffee maintains that Vygotsky "has shown 
that reflective thought is public or social conversation internalized."" 
In fact, however, Vygotsky asserts that from the beginning language 
and thought stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. 
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A child's thought, precisely because it is born as a dim, 
amorphous whole, must find expression in a single word. 
As his thought becomes more differentiated, the child is 
less apt to express it in single words but constructs a 
composite whole. Conversely, progress in speech to the 
differentiated whole of a sentence helps the child's 
thoughts to progress from a homogeneous whole to well- 
defined parts. Thought and word are not cut from one 
pattern. In a sense, there are more differences than 
likenesses between them.^^ 
For Vygotsky, growth in thought clears a path by which language 
grows in complexity; at the same time, growth in language supplies 
structures by which thought becomes more conscious and deliberate. 
Furthermore, while Vygotsky does assert that the young child's 
intellectual development culminates in the convergence of thought 
and language in verbal thought’® - a process which depends upon 
children having linguistic interactions with others 
-- by far the larger portion of his work is devoted to explaining the 
ways in which inner speech then gradually distinguishes itself from 
conversation, through the natural experiment of egocentric speech. 
This emphasis in Vygotsky on the differentiation of speech for oneself 
and speech for others brings us to the second problem with Bruffee's 
assertion that peer collaboration is essential to college learning, and 
that is that he fails to specify the bearing which the need for 
conversation in children's intellectual development has on college 
learning. For all intents and purposes, when Bruffee claims that 
conversation between peers is a necessary part of the entry into 
academic discourse, he is assuming that the initial process by which 
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children learn to think linguistically and the process by which young 
adults enter an academic discourse community are structurally and 
functionally the same. 
Bruffee finds the connection in Vygotsky's notion of the "zone 
of proximal development": "the distance between the actual 
developmental level as determined by independent problem solving 
and the level of potential development as determined through problem 
solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable 
peers."’® For Vygotsky, the significance of the zone of proximal 
development is that since development always lags behind learning -- 
the latter providing the external structures by which the former can 
advance -- "the only 'good learning' is that which is in advance of 
dev lopment."^® Bruffee, on the other hand, construes the zone of 
proximal development as evidence that students need to work 
collaboratively amongst themselves as part of their induction into new 
knowledge communities. "We learn," writes Bruffee, "by reaching 
beyond what we can already do into a 'zone of proximal 
development.' Whatever the next thing we have to learn ... we learn it 
best in the society of, and with the help of, our peers. 
There are, again, several problems with such an inference. For 
one thing, the "collaboration" which Vygotsky cites as fostering 
development is that which occurs not so much between a chiid and 
her peers but between the chiid and an aduit or more capable peers. 
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The implication here would thus seem to be that children learn to 
think in ways they have learned to talk not so much with their peers 
as with people who are more knowledgeable. 
There are, however, two passages in which Vygotsky refers to 
children learning through peer collaboration specifically. In the first 
instance, he notes that, in certain experiments, what subjects "could 
do only under guidance, in collaboration, and in groups at the age of 
three-to-five years they could do independently when they reached 
the age of five-to-seven years.It is doubtful, however, if he 
meant to imply by this that peer collaboration is itself a means of 
formal learning, especially in light of his continued emphasis on 
"external knowledge" and "scientific concepts" as the instruments of 
development in learning. In the other instance, he comments that 
"learning awakens a variety of internal developmental processes that 
are able to operate only when the child is interacting with people in 
his environment and in cooperation with his peers.Here 
Vygotsky, like Piaget, clearly means that children develop cognitively 
through peer interaction. But the passage occurs in the context of his 
discussion of the ways in which children internalize social speech as 
an instrument of thought, not the ways they later differentiate inner 
speech from social speech through the experiment of egocentric 
speech, nor the way adults learn the discourse conventions of 
academic knowledge communities. 
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This latter point brings us to a second difficulty with Bruffee's 
inferences (1) that the ways children learn to think linguistically are 
the same as the ways college students learn academic discourse, and 
(2) that the zone of proximal development signifies the necessity of 
peer collaboration in college learning. Namely, there is a difference 
between how a child collaborates and how a young adult does. A very 
young child who has not yet learned to differentiate inner speech from 
social speech has only two avenues of recourse in solving difficult 
problems requiring verbal thought. One is to elicit overt help in the 
form of either physical or oral assistance. The other is to talk the 
problem through out loud using egocentric speech. The young adult, 
on the other hand, by virtue of having already internalized the ability 
to collaborate, does not need to do so overtly. "Once these 
[developmental] processes are internalized," writes Vygotsky, "they 
become part of the child's independent developmental 
achievement."^^ Moreover, in those cases when a college student or 
any adult does "think out loud," he is not employing undifferentiated 
egocentric speech but attempting to establish a text on which further 
thought can build. 
This brings us to the third problem with Bruffee's inference. 
The more difficult the situation which calls forth reflection, the more 
we resort not to social speech, as Bruffee seems to think, but to inner 
speech. Vygotsky cites the example of how a young girl, in figuring 
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out how to get at some candy on a high shelf, talks through her 
solution out loud.^® According to Bruffee, "What is evidently 
happening in this example is that the child is using social speech (as 
opposed to 'egocentric' speech) instrumentally to help get something 
done."^® But according to Vygotsky, it is precisely "egocentric 
speech" which the child uses in this situation. "Our experimental 
results indicate," writes Vygotsky, "that the function of egocentric 
speech is ... [that] it helps in overcoming difficulties; it is speech for 
oneself, intimately and usefully connected with the child's thinking... 
In the end, it becomes inner speech. 
Vygotsky's research into the structure and function of inner 
speech (which is invisible and impervious to empirical observation) is 
based entirely on the assumption that egocentric speech (which we 
can observe) is its precursor. Hence, even if Bruffee were correct that 
the ways in which children convert social speech into inner speech are 
functionally the same as the ways in which young adults learn the 
speech conventions of academic discourse communities, it would only 
go to show that college students negotiate difficult challenges not 
through conversation but through inner speech, or "internal 
collaboration." In other words, the more complex the subject matter, 
the more intricate its structures, and the more it intersects, 
converges, and diverges with other interpretive schemes, the more 
vital it becomes to work out those complexities in thought. If 
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anything, then, Vygotsky's analysis would seem to suggest that 
adults learn academic discourse primarily through inner speech and 
not social speech, simply because of the sheer complexity of the task 
of negotiating between one's own interpretive and linguistic 
frameworks and those of the academy. The more difficult the 
negotiation, the more imperative the need for Inner speech. 
Bruffee, however, seems to think collaborative group work can 
teach extremely complex processes of interpretive negotiation: 
We all see things differently. Group discussion helps each 
of us see In just what way our own views differ from 
others' and also perhaps why. Once we see these 
differences we can choose to change our views or try to 
convince others to change theirs. In the process, we 
negotiate toward a consensus of judgment which reflects 
a tempered, adequately Informed, well-thought out 
conception of the issue in question.^® 
Surely he overstates the role of collaborative groups In accomplishing 
these things. While face-to-face interactions certainly can help us see 
how and why our views differ from those of others, the more complex 
the differences, the greater is the need for inner speech, which is 
private and individual. Furthermore, the negotiation of "a tempered, 
adequately informed, well-thought out conception” is surely the 
product not of group discussion but of careful independent 
deliberation. Such deliberation is, of course, collaborative in the broad 
sense that it occurs and gets tested within the context of shared 
human concerns and ways of interpreting experience. But 
collaboration of this sort occurs primarily in reading and writing, not 
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group discussion. And students learn to collaborate in such a manner 
in precisely the same way, by reading, writing, and thinking about the 
shared concerns of larger communities outside the classroom. 
Oral speech about shared problems does have certain 
advantages. It is faster, more efficient, more spontaneous, and 
requires less explicit contextualizing; it is good for generating ideas, 
eliciting and judging gut reactions, and considering possibilities. Its 
disadvantages are the same ones that lead to the beginnings of inner 
speech in egocentric speech in the first place. It is superficial, 
Impermanent, and unable to handle much complexity; it is bad for 
developing, weighing, and testing ideas, considering implications, and 
negotiating satisfactory and more stable reconstructions. 
What concerns me about Bruffee's enthusiastic appraisal of 
collaborative learning is not that peer collaboration can't help students 
learn academic discourse (by providing them with a context in which 
they can receive concrete and immediate, if limited, feedback on the 
social implications of their thinking and writing). What bothers me is 
the disproportionate amount of attention he gives to extoiiing the 
principie that knowledge is something people construct socially at the 
expense of specifying how and why they do it. Although he cautions 
many times that merely putting students together in groups does not 
constitute a learning environment, he nevertheless puts an 
unwarranted amount of faith in the power of groups to create |ust 
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such an environment. At least two things get shortchanged in the 
process. One is an account of the ways in which people actually learn 
to justify belief socially. The other is an account of why they do so. 
I'll begin with the second. 
According to Bruffee, collaborative learning is supported 
theoretically by social constructionism. In fact, however, where social 
constructionists stress the importance of sociolinguistic context in 
defining the rhetorical situation and providing the stimulus to write, 
Bruffee tends to focus more narrowly on the peer group and the 
individual as the sources of invention. 
[Cjollaborative learning can help with "invention." In the 
process of "working up" a topic for an essay, students 
should learn how to use each other effectively as * 
sounding boards for ideas, as resources for information, 
and as prods to further elaboration and explanation.^® 
It's not that students shouldn't do these things; they should. But 
Bruffee makes it sound as though it is the peer group which motivates 
and guides the writing process, and not the shared concerns and 
norms of the larger discourse communities of the academy. 
At other times he indicates that invention is a process of 
students generating "ideas out of personal experience, perceiving 
issues implicit in those experiences, and generalizing on those 
issues. 
[Elssays are normally written from the inside out. Writers 
begin by thinking about what they want to say and how 
to defend or explain their views. Only then do they 
consider how to introduce their views to a reader and 
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how to draw what they have to said to a satisfactory 
close. 
In this scheme, the influence of the larger academic community only 
comes In at the end of the process, when "teachers evaluate 
[students'] work ..., comparing it with professional standards and the 
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work other students have done, both currently and In the past. 
Little account Is given of the ways in which sociolinguistic context not 
only motivates composing but provides it norms, procedures, and 
content from the first. Bruffee says little more on this subject than 
that the task with which the teacher provides students should allow 
for more than one answer and require students to come to some kind 
of consensus. 
As a result, how students learn to deliberate and converse 
about the shared concerns of academic communities also gets 
shortchanged. Bruffee makes it sound as though students conversing 
in autonomous groups about academic concerns will thereby learn 
academic discourse, ostensibly by modeling the process of sociaily 
justifying beiief with each other. In fact, however, collaborative 
learning models the social construction of knowledge on a very 
concrete level. The ways in which knowledge is actually socially 
constructed go much deeper. And the only way for students to learn 
those processes is not through unfacilitated peer group discussions, 
but through reading, writing, and thinking about the concerns of those 
communities. Where the emphasis on peer collaboration falls most 
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short, then, is that it makes no particular provision for the need of 
students as individuals to negotiate their own complex entries into 
unfamiliar discourse communities for themselves. Bruffee claims that 
peer collaboration gives students practice in negotiating alternative 
interpretive frameworks, but the real practice is that which goes on 
between student and discourse community, in the form of critical 
reading, thinking, and writing. 
What would teachers need to do to promote such reflective 
activity that structuring peer groups to negotiate solutions to assigned 
tasks does not do? The answer is that they would provide more 
deliberate control of the interplay of doubt and belief in students' 
reading, writing, thinking, and conversing. They would do this not by 
simply engineering situations where student peers are likely to 
negotiate among themselves, then leaving that process to follow its 
own course. They would do it rather by attending to the specific, 
personal interactions which individual students have with both their 
peers and the knowledge/discourse communities of the academy. 
To expect that collaborative groups, no matter how carefully 
prepared and structured, will generate the kind of reflective thinking 
and discourse.we want students to learn is to ignore the only genuine 
authority we as teachers have. That authority comes not from our 
possession of knowledge conceived as a non-negotiable commodity 
which we transmit to students. Rather it comes, just as Bruffee says. 
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from our being representatives of the knowledge/discourse 
communities which students aspire to join. But our authority also 
comes from another source: our knowledge of the processes by which 
students -- working together and alone -- negotiate their way into 
those communities. 
What teachers can do that students themselves can't is 
recognize points in the process that call for specific interventions. 
Such interventions do not strip students of responsibility for their own 
learning, as Bruffee seems to think they inevitably must (except, 
ironically, when it comes time to evaluate students' work). Rather, 
they help make students more responsible than they would be if left 
strictly to their own devices. Teachers, by virtue of their experience 
with and study of the learning processes of students, particularly in 
their own areas of expertise, are in a much better position than are 
students themselves to recognize when students should be allowed to 
continue along a particular course unhindered, when they need to be 
encouraged, when they should be presented with challenges, and, 
especially, which challenges to present. 
The danger is always present that teachers will try to prevent 
students from making "mistakes," which in the long run teaches 
students to rely too heavily on authority, discouraging the very habits 
of rational inquiry and discourse we are striving to foster. But the 
danger of miseducative experiences is even more present in 
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unfacilitated collaborative groups, where students influence each 
other with far less knowledge of the bearing their interactions have on 
the intellectual and discursive habits we seek to foster in the long run. 
Teaching, as Bruffee says, is not the simple transmitting of 
subject matter. But the negative consequences that accrue from 
teachers approaching their work as if it were should not lead us to 
dispense too much with the guidance teachers can provide. Such is 
the theme of what is one of John Dewey's most concise educational 
statements. Experience and Education.^'* which he wrote in 1938, 
following his experience with the excessively student-centered 
schools of the 1920's. Dewey takes so-called "progressive" education 
to task for defining itself on the basis of its criticisms of traditional 
schooling rather than in terms of its own constructive theory of how 
personal experience interacts with subject matter to produce learning. 
Especially pertinent to this discussion are Dewey's repeated 
reminders that educational freedom should not be equated with a 
lessening of teacher control; 
Because the older education imposed the knowledge, 
methods, and the rules of conduct of the mature person 
upon the young, it does not follow, except upon the 
basis of the extreme Either-Or philosophy, that the 
knowledge and skill of the mature person has no directive 
value for the experience of the immature. On the 
contrary, basing education upon personal experience may 
mean more multiplied and more intimate contacts 
between the mature and the immature than ever existed 
in the traditional schooi, and consequently more, rather 
than less, guidance by others. 
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Bruffee and other advocates of collaborative learning^® argue 
the need for teacher guidance in the structuring of groups and 
activities, but they generally rule out the teacher's role as a facilitator 
of group interactions, insisting that "collaboration advances best when 
groups are pretty much left to the students themselves.Where 
the teacher does offer guidance, they say, is as a "synthesizer," 
"referee,"^® or "arbiter of last resort" at the end of the group 
process.®® They tend to downplay this function, however, offering 
no specific guidelines as to how the teacher should fulfill it. 
Most troublesome, however, is that they say virtually nothing at 
all about the teacher's interactions with individual students or the 
students' interactions with the academic discourse communities in 
which their learning is situated. That learning will occur as a result of 
group Interactions is simply taken for granted. In the process, how 
and why students are motivated to negotiate their way into unfamiliar 
knowledge/discourse communities gets left out of account, as does 
the teacher's role in facilitating that process. The danger is all too 
great that teachers, overconfident about the intrinsic educative power 
of collaborative peer groups, will, quite simpiv, stop teaching, leaving 




1. The Collaborative Learning Action Community of the American 
Association of Higher Education defines collaborative learning as 
follows: 
Collaborative education is a pedagogical style which 
emphasizes cooperative efforts among students, faculty, 
and administrators. Rooted in the belief that knowledge is 
inherently social in nature, it stresses common inquiry as 
the basic learning process. 
See Jean Sheridan, Ann C. Byrne, and Kathryn Quina, "Collaborative 
Learning: Notes From the Field," College Teaching. 37 (1989): 49-53. 
2. For a concise description of some or the major techniques, see 
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York: Modern Library, 1930, which is in many respects a behavioristic 
account of the development of morality and reflective thinking. 
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CHAPTER 7 
COMMON THEMES AND KEY PRINCIPLES 
OF AN INTERACTIVE EDUCATIONAL CONCEPTION 
In reviewing the six previous chapters, no simple pattern 
emerges, no unambiguous representation which holds true for all the 
topics discussed. What does emerge is a story of apparent oppositions 
tending towards resolution in an interactive conception that is itself 
surprisingly consistent. Before outlining the broad features of that 
conception, it is worth noting some of the shared patterns by which 
that conception emerges. 
Common Themes 
All the chapters deal with issues that either explicitly or 
implicitly involve dichotomous educational conceptions. While the 
dichotomies themselves vary, they all seem to stem from an initial 
demarcation of otherwise interacting components, followed by various 
attempts to bring the severed components back together. Clearly, 
chapters three, four, and five -- those on critical thinking, genderized 
ethics, and college writing - all address specific oppositions directly. 
By contrast, the first, second, and sixth chapters -- the ones on 
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student involvement in learning, national cultural literacy, and 
collaborative learning - involve implicit dichotomies. 
In chapter one, for example, the NIE Study Group starts from 
the premise that students' interests and subject matter are intrinsically 
opposed. Their suggestion that external standards be used to secure 
student involvement is an attempt to bring these two allegedly 
opposing forces together — by supplanting one with the other. 
Similarly, in chapter two, although he insists that there is no 
necessary opposition between an extensive curriculum of shared 
cultural knowledge and an intensive curriculum adapted to student 
interests, Hirsch ultimately puts his faith in the transmission of a 
prearranged extensive curriculum. In chapter six, proponents of 
collaborative learning assume essentially the same opposition. But in 
advocating that students be allowed to negotiate their own knowledge 
and standards without the constraints imposed by a teacher in 
authority, they go in the other direction from Hirsch and the Study 
Group. 
Taken as a whole, the dichotomies themselves seem to fall 
along two axes. One axis is the apparent dichotomy between the form 
of learning and the contexts in which it occurs. The other axis is the 
apparent dichotomy between student development and the 
transmission of subject matter. The two axes are not the same. The 
general skills approach to critical thinking, the justice approach to 
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moral education, the cognitive process approach to college writing, 
and the content-neutral curriculum criticized by Hirsch all emphasize 
student learning over subject matter. But instead of emphasizing the 
interests and backgrounds of individual students, as romantics tend to 
do, the above conceptions are formal and general. Conversely, the 
subject-specific approach to critical thinking and the social 
constructionist approach to college writing both emphasize teaching 
subject matter within specific learning contexts. On the other hand, 
collaborative learning and the caring approach to moral education both 
combine a romantic, subjectivist conception of spontaneous student 
development with a contextual model of learning. While Hirsch and 
the Study Group take a traditional cultural transmission approach that 
utilizes formal presentation and the imposition of external standards. 
In short, the preceding chapters suggest something like a four- 
quadrant framework for categorizing educational approaches. 
Formalists sometimes direct their attention to subject matter and 
sometimes to student cognition. Similarly, contextualists sometimes 
concentrate on the conditions which promote student development 
and sometimes on those which sensitize students to existing 
knowledge and discourse communities. The four quadrants are thus 
roughly essentialism, cognitivism, romanticism, and reconstructionism 
(I list them in the order of their approximate political affiliation - from 
right to left - though of course there are anomalies: Kohlberg, for 
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example, is clearly of the moderate left, while McPeck is of the 
moderate right). My intention here is not to draw any hard and fast 
categories, but simply to frame a possible way of sorting out 
educational dichotomies, and to note that it is sometimes unclear who 
is objecting to what or what alternative conception they are 
advancing. Hirsch is a prime example, for in criticizing one type of 
formalism he only endorses another. Bruffee offers a different 
example, for although he claims to ascribe to social constructionism 
he is clearly more romantic. 
In any case, certain themes are common to some issues, and 
others to others. The tension between attending to securing student 
involvement and transmitting subject matter is most evident in the 
first, second, and sixth chapters, as discussed earlier. The tension 
between formalism and contextualism, on the other hand, is most 
evident in the critical thinking, moral education, and college writing 
literatures, and goes something like this. 
Kohiberg, Flower, and the advocates of general thinking skills 
all believe in the fruitfulness of trying to discern those mental 
processes which transcend context. Gilligan, Bizzell and Berlin, and 
McPeck, on the other hand, all attack such formalism on the grounds 
that form and context cannot be thus dissociated. But in so doing, 
they all advance a contextual relativism which leaves unexplained how 
people are able to negotiate their way between otherwise discrete 
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contexts. For Gilligan, this manifests as the irreconcilability of justice 
and caring. For Bizzell and Berlin, as a sociolinguistic determinism 
which leaves no room for original thought. And for McPeck, as a 
logical atomism that leaves no room for multi-logical thinking. 
Formalists fare little better, however, since models that divorce 
reasoning from context fail to capture the undeniable context- 
specificity of thought; for all their complexity, the models of Kohiberg, 
Flower, and general skills advocates alike are descriptively somewhat 
sterile and prescriptively weak. 
In all three literatures, theorists from both camps have called for 
a reconciliation of formalism and contextualism, although they have 
each tended to remain somewhat entrenched in their respective 
positions. The way out which I have argued here lies in the notion 
that thinking, moral reasoning, and writing are neither general nor 
context-specific processes but intercontextual ones which entail the 
reconstructive transfer, transformation, and integration of what would 
otherwise remain discrete interpretations of experience. This means 
that critical thinking is not something we either transfer or do only in 
specific contexts; it is itself transfer - the constructing of more 
integrated and comprehensive knowledge systems. Similarly, moral 
reasoning isn't something that either follows a universal form or is 
constrained by specific contexts; it is a reconstructive dialogue that 
makes connections between previously separate value systems. 
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creating a more shared understanding. Again, writing is not the 
application of general cognitive processes or the following of 
predetermined lines of thought and discourse; it is an intercontextual 
dialogue that tends towards the same comprehensiveness mentioned 
in the previous two examples. 
In all three cases, then, it is not so much form or context which 
is the educational concern as it is the habits of thinking, valuing, and 
conversing that students develop. Such habits are fostered not by 
attending to cognitive form or social context alone, but by creating 
indeterminate and socially compelling situations which elicit students' 
uncertainty about what to believe or do — the interaction of cognition 
and context. 
In the hypothesis of this dissertation, I postulated three 
conditions of an educative situation. These conditions were doubt, 
dialogue, and commitment. Looking back over the previous chapters, 
it seems that cognitive formalists tend to concentrate on the condition 
of doubt, and contextualists on the condition of dialogue. But neither 
doubt nor dialogue guarantees that students will be engaged. 
Engagement requires commitment, and that would seem to occur only 
where students experience an uncertainty that matters. It is not 
enough, in other words, that they be merely uncertain. Nor is enough 
that the uncertainty matters to someone else. It must matter to 
students themselves. But commitment does not stand alone either, as 
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commitment without doubt leads to neither reflection nor dialogue, 
but to prejudice and dogmatism. Again, my intention here is not to 
advance this framework as complete or exclusive. It is simply to 
suggest a set of criteria that educators might find helpful, and that 
might help us understand under what conditions learning occurs and 
what to do when it doesn't. 
Key Principles 
The following ten principles strike me as characteristic of the 
interactive conception of higher learning which has emerged in these 
pages. They also serve to provide an overview of higher learning as I 
am led to conceive it at the present time. 
(1) Learning is best understood as neither an absorbing from 
without nor an unfolding from within but as the interaction of people's 
structuring tendencies with the people and things around them. It is a 
constructive process, in which people make sense of their experience 
through the mutual accommodation of prior interpretive frameworks 
and the data of present experience. 
(2) We grow intellectually and socially through a process of 
ongoing revision of our knowledge and beliefs, primarily by 
constructing integrating connections between otherwise discrete 
interpretations of experience, including the experience of others. 
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(3) Teaching, then, is not so much a matter of transmitting 
subject matter or developing skills as it is of creating conditions which 
compel students to seek integrating connections. 
(4) The primary condition for eliciting this search is to provide 
such challenges to students' habitual ways of thinking as will compel 
them to construct a superior and common understanding, 
(5) In order that students might develop the ability to share 
their understanding and purposes with others, the context of learning 
must be social; it must involve the shared concerns and purposes of 
some community. 
(6) The paramount, though not the only, aim of education is to 
instill in students the active disposition to reconstruct and integrate 
their understanding of experience, including the experience of others. 
This is the educational aim to which acquired skills and knowledge are 
means. 
(7) As the best means humanity has developed for making 
sense of and controlling experience, the subject areas indicate the 
direction of growth as well as its means. 
(8) But to grasp the subject areas as means, students need to 
learn them in the context of solving difficulties which they perceive -- 
that is, in the process of reconstructing and integrating their own and 
other people's understanding of experience -- and not as products to 
be recited on demand. 
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(9) Genuine learning of this sort necessarily entails a mutual 
accommodation of subject matter and student cognition; in other 
words, both students and subject matter are transformed in the 
process. Students take genuine ownership of subject matter only 
when they are led somehow to construct it for themselves as part of 
their own active knowledge and belief systems. 
(10) Demonstrations of such integrating transformations 
towards the resolution of some social concern are the best evidence 
of learning at the college level. For example, colleges could require as 
a condition of graduation that all students complete a thesis or project 
which integrates knowledge and procedures from more than one 
discipline towards the solution of a viable social concern. A 
precondition for students' being able to undertake such projects would 
be that they first take more responsibility for constructing their own, 
faculty-approved courses of study. 
Closing Thoughts 
At the present time, I know of only a handful of colleges whose 
programs seem consistent with these principles. They are Antioch 
University in Ohio; Hampshire College in Massachusetts; Marlboro 
College in Vermont; and Reed College in Oregon; though I'm sure 
there are many others with which I'm unfamiliar. Many colleges and 
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universities also offer independent, interdisciplinary majors which are 
along much the same lines, such as our own Bachelor's Degree with 
Individual Concentration (BDIC) here at the University of 
Massachusetts at Amherst. 
The objection naturally arises that the reason there are only a 
handful of such programs is that there are only a handful of students 
who have the personal initiative to undertake such self-directed study. 
In this era of public cries for excellence and higher expectations, I am 
surprised that few commentators on the educational scene advance 
the expectation that students should take more responsibility in 
directing their own learning. {Ernest Boyer is one of the exceptions.) 
Part of the problem would seem to be that students have sometimes 
been given freedom without responsibility, and have predictably 
faltered. But such would seem to be a case of low expectations rather 
than high. 
On the other hand, most high school graduates probably aren't 
ready for the sort of program I'm recommending. What this suggests 
to me is not some intrinsic inability to think for themselves or to 
negotiate knowledge and purposes with others, but rather that they 
have not had an education which fosters independence of thought and 
democratic habits of participation. Perhaps if more colleges set such 
expectations, more high schools (and more elementary schools) would 
do what they could to prepare students to meet them. But such a 
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transformation would require at the very least the dissemination of an 
interactive conception of learning that is far more articulate and 
accessible than that presented here. In the meantime I, for one, watch 
with great interest the continuing experiments of those colleges, 
universities, independent majors, and courses that seek to realize the 
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